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Spanning thirteen years of British employee relations, and using three datasets 
with a total of over 80,000 observations, this thesis comprises three empirical studies 
of workplace practices. It focuses on the impact of Human Resource Management 
(HRM) practices on employee job satisfaction and on work effort, as well as 
analysing the relationship between training and promotion. Subjective constructs are 
deployed, positioning this research at the forefront of modem Labour Economics, 
while also attempting to bridge the HRM and Labour Economics literature. Original 
results include: the discovery of a consistently high and positive impact of employer- 
encouraged training and learning on job satisfaction and employee effort; the study of 
effort intensity; a contribution towards the setting of a research framework on effort; 
the use of a matched employee-employer data to analyse workplace employment 
relations; an inter-temporal analysis of training and promotion; the finding that returns 
to training in the extant literature are biased upward; and the finding that training and 
promotion with the same employer are positively associated. Several human resource 
management practices - in particular job autonomy, employee involvement and pay 
negotiation - and perceptions of pay inequality have highly significant effects on job 
satisfaction. Additionally, the thesis determines sets of practices that could lead to 
higher employee and workplace effort. The research agenda supported by this thesis 
can contribute to a more satisfactory and performance-enhancing workplace 





1.1. Thesis sources of originality and main contributions
This thesis aims to increase the current understanding of the relationship 
between workplace practices, company performance and employee behaviour, which is 
a hitherto under-researched area. It investigates what practices work from the 
perspective of the manager, of employees, and of both, in order to increase job 
satisfaction, employee and workplace effort, and the likelihood of being trained and 
promoted. The thesis offers benefits to practitioners who can then attempt to motivate 
employees better and increase employee and company / workplace productivity.
The thesis attempts to open novel interdisciplinary paths of research by 
aiming to bridge the HRM and Labour Economics fields. This is done via positioning 
the three empirical studies on the border of HRM and Labour Economics, for instance 
with regard to the selection and classification of HRM practices, or with regard to the 
study of intensive effort. Moreover, the use of subjective measures adds to a 
developing area in Labour Economics, placing this thesis at the forefront of modem 
Labour Economics.
Original and noteworthy results show that several human resource 
management practices, in particular training, employee involvement, job autonomy and 
pay negotiation, have highly significant positive effects on job satisfaction. An original 
find is the discovery of a strong positive impact on job satisfaction obtained if
1
employers encourage training and learning. This contributes to a previously under­
research area in the literature, concerning the impact of training on job satisfaction.
In the second empirical chapter, sets of practices that could lead to higher 
work effort are determined. They include a complementary set of four practices which 
comprises training, consultation, performance-related pay and job autonomy. This 
chapter contributes to the study of effort by sourcing and presenting the main 
theoretical and empirical developments that can generate a framework of research; this 
input is much needed to research on effort which is a complex and unclear area. The 
single largest impact on workplace effort comes from workplaces having pay equality, 
setting competency standards and using customer surveys. Supervision practices also 
have a positive impact on effort, but, in isolation, they can only have a limited 
influence on employee and workplace effort.
Finally, the third empirical chapter finds support for the hypothesis that 
British employers ‘cherry pick’ their promotion candidates by offering training to those 
whom they intend to promote. An original finding is that returns to training in the 
extant literature are biased upwards due to other studies conflating training with 
promotion. Furthermore, this finding is obtained as a direct result of conducting an 
original analysis of the time dimensionality for training and effort. This looks at when 
training and promotion occur, and the way they precede or succeed each other within 
the employment relationship with the same or the previous employer.
The thesis highlights not only sources of success but also potential pitfalls. 
Amongst the latter, an original insight is that a continuity of progress in HRM
2
practices, whereby more modem / advanced HRM practices would have a higher 
impact on organisational outcomes, cannot be assumed. Moreover, a perception of pay 
inequality as being too high or a perception of relative income as being too low have 
highly significant negative effects on job satisfaction. With regard to effort, not 
implementing learning or training in the workplace can decrease the likelihood of 
employees working hard.
The value added by this research in Labour Economics is high through the 
fact that it constitutes an empirical study in Labour Economics. According to Lazear 
(1998), Labour Economics has only relatively recently benefited from firm-level data, 
which means that empirical studies are very welcome.
Additionally, this thesis looks at employee data, which is matched with 
employer data when possible, thus allowing the employees' perspective to be seen. For 
instance, an original approach is based on combining the employees and management's 
views on effort to generate a composite measure of effort. Then it analyses the impact 
of HRM practices on the combined and separate views of the employee and 
managerial-reported work effort
The data used comes from three nationally representative studies, spanning 
a period of more than a decade in the history of employee relations in Britain (1993 -  
2001) with a total of over 80,000 observations: the Workplace Employment Relations 
Survey 1998 with around 20,000 employee-employer matched observations; Changing 
Employment Relationships, Employment Contracts and the Future o f Work 2000 with
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over 2,000 employee observations; and the British Household Panel Survey, waves 
1991-2003, with 60,000 multi-spell observations collected from 11,000 employees.
1.2. The study of HRM practices and research conducted in this thesis
Sharply rising competition in world and domestic markets during the past 
two decades has put increasing pressure on British firms to increase employee and 
company performance. In response to the interest in the importance of Human 
Resource Management (HRM) practices as tools to increase productivity, there has 
been an expansion in HRM and labour economics research focused on understanding 
the role of HRM practices in the workplace. Due to the accelerating rate of change in 
the workplace, existing studies constantly need to be updated with new research. More 
profoundly, there is a need for research that delves deeper into the role and scope of 
HRM practices in influencing workplace attitudinal variables such as job satisfaction 
with pay or with job autonomy, or employee effort.
In the past two decades it has been argued that changes observed in 
organisations are part of a transfer from the previous Personnel Management (PM) to a 
new management system labelled Human Resource Management (HRM) (Guest 
1987). Attention has gradually turned more towards welcoming changes on a scale that 
makes contemporary authors write about a ‘new agenda’ of HRM (Sparrow and 
Marchington 1998). On a continual basis, in both practice and managerial literature of 
the latter part of the twentieth century, a better understanding and utilisation of human 
resources is considered crucial for reaching key business objectives, such as achieving
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excellence (Peters and Waterman 1982) or creating a competitive advantage, known 
also as ‘competitive edge’ (Guest 1987, Legge 1995).
The field of workplace practices and the extent and spread of change 
remain one of the most controversial issues in organisational analysis and labour 
economics (Appelbaum and Batt 1994, Ichniowski et al 1996, Cully et al 1998, Bacon 
and Storey 2000, Millward 2000). On the one hand, when comparing HRM to PM, 
both labour economics and organizational behaviour research conclude that there are 
distinguishable features, particular to HRM. For instance, HRM is found to aim more 
at the individual than the collective. It employs workplace practices, such as methods 
of direct communication, employee involvement, appraisal systems and performance- 
related pay (Cully et al 1999, or Bacon and Storey 2000). On the other hand, neither 
labour economics nor behaviour in organisation studies on HRM manage to converge 
to a theory or definition of HRM practices.
This theoretical uncertainty fuels the debate around the metamorphosis of 
workplace practices from the ‘industrial relations’ to the ‘employee relations’ stage. 
Moreover, it makes it difficult, if not impossible, to compare research on HRM 
practices, because of the lack of a unified set of measures and definitions.
Instead, it is easier to identify a number of alternative workplace practices, 
analysed in ‘consistent wholes’ by Kling (1995), in ‘bundles’ by Black and Lynch 
(2001) , as ‘clusters’ by Ichniowski et al (1997) or tested as ‘bundling hypothesis’ in 
Leigh and Gill (1999) -  which are adopted in different sectors of the British economy. 
Furthermore, the 1998 Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS 98) reports
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on the changes that have taken place in British workplace practices, mentioning the 
need for more research ‘that might help to shed light on the profusion of these practices 
across British workplaces’ (WERS 98 online, User Guide, Vol. 2 : 4).
This thesis starts with a review of the HRM practices from both a labour 
economics and a human resource perspective, presented in Chapter II. This critical and 
comprehensive review sets up the scene for the empirical analysis performed, and 
highlights the need for further research. It is observed that managers and employees 
frequently combine workplace practices drawn from very different work systems to 
create a new model they hope will lead to improved efficiency or quality. Several 
recent approaches to organising and managing work have been used with apparent 
success inside national economies, generating worldwide managerial attempts to 
import and adopt them (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). For example, Japanese-originating 
quality circles, teamwork and continuous improvement have generated in America one 
of the most highly-publicised transformations in workplace practices and performance 
in the 1980s: the New United Motors Manufacturing Industries (NUMMI) under the 
paradigm of ‘management-by-stress’ (Parker and Slaughter 1988, Ichniowski et al 
1996).
More specifically, there is an entrenched trend in the labour economics 
literature, both theoretical and empirical, but mainly empirical and with a noticeable 
presence of American based research, emphasising the multifaceted influence of 'new' 
(‘innovative’, high-performance’) workplace practices on either employee or employer 
/ company performance (Parker and Slaughter 1988, Osterman 1994a, Appelbaum and
6
Batt 1994, Kling 1995, Parks 1995, Ichniowski et al 1996 and 1997, Black and Lynch 
1998 and 2004, Leigh and Gill 1999, Askenazy 2001, Delaney and Godart 2001).
In parallel, British research in the field of employee relations and (high- 
performance) workplace practices is well-established through studies such as Heywood 
et al 1997, Poole and Jenkins 1998, Whitfield 2000, Addison et al 2000 and 2001, 
Delbridge and Whitfield 2001. British research is joined, substantiated and fuelled by 
the government funded Workplace Industrial Relations Survey (WIRS) series in 1980, 
1984, 1990, with a change of name to Workplace Employment Relations Survey 
(WERS) in 1998 and 2004. The series, but in particular WERS 98, is the subject of 
extended analysis in studies such as Cully et al 1998, Marginson and Wood 2000, 
Millward et al 2000 or Millward 2001.
There is also a notable tendency towards studying the impact of new 
workplace practices on company performance, as opposed to employee performance. 
At first glance, this is evidenced by relatively fewer studies which focus on workplace 
practices’ impact on the employees’ side and individual performance. Examples are 
Rigano and Edwards 1998, Leigh and Gill 1999, Adkins and Lury 1999, Galang 1999 
or Ramsey et al 2000. This may be due to the relatively easier access to, transparency 
and objectivity of, data on companies, as opposed to the inherent subjectivity of data 
on employees. Thus, it is to be remarked that for the first time in the WIRS series, 
WERS 98 has included data on employees, and the survey’s title was changed from 
Industrial Relations (IR) to Employment Relations (ER).
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At the same time, the ways in which workplace practices contribute to 
performance have remained the subject of debate among academics, practitioners and 
policy makers. For instance, while Appelbaum and Batt 1994 report that ‘innovations 
still affect a minority of employees’ (1994:10), Osterman (1994a) finds results 
suggesting that between 20 and 25 percent of workers are affected by these changes. 
This is a much higher proportion than previously thought. Other examples of 
controversies in the field relate to the efficiency of using innovative workplace 
practices towards improving workplace health and safety (Askenazy 2001) or choosing 
and using indicators of performance measurement (Appelbaum and Bat 1994, Cully et 
al 1999).
Therefore, Chapters III -  V form the foundation of the thesis and study the 
impact of workplace practices on both company and employee performance in Britain. 
The analysis is based on an interdisciplinary theoretical underpinning which attempts 
to synthesise the theoretical approaches in Economics, Industrial Relations and 
Behaviour in Organisations.
One of the main claims to original research stems from bringing to the fore 
the employee’s side of the story, to a greater extent than in the prevalent extant 
research framework. The theoretical underpinnings for each study, along with the 
specific methodology for the econometric models built in the thesis are presented 
within each chapter. The main assumption is that the presence of a set, or of an 
individual, HRM practice within an organisation can be ascertained from the 
questionnaires distributed in organisations.
In order to determine the impact of workplace practices on job satisfaction 
and work effort, as well as the link between training and promotion, three datasets are 
analysed: (a) Workplace Employment Relations Survey, 1998; (b) Changing 
Employment Relationships, Employment Contracts and the Future of Work, 2000; and 
(c) British Household Panel Survey, 1991-2003. The data used in this thesis has been 
obtained from the Data Archive University of Essex and has been made available for 
the purpose of this particular research.
Chapter III investigates the relationship between HRM practices, and 
workers’ overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay. Two British datasets 
are used here: the ‘Changing Employment Relationships, Employment Contracts and 
the Future of Work Survey’ and the ‘Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998’. 
After controlling for personal, job and firm characteristics, it is shown that several 
HRM practices raise workers overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay, 
but these effects are only significant for non-union members. Satisfaction with pay is 
higher where performance-related pay and seniority-based reward systems are in place. 
A pay structure that is perceived to be unequal is associated with a substantial 
reduction in the union interaction differential for overall job satisfaction and their 
satisfaction with pay. Although HRM practices can raise worker job satisfaction, if 
workplace pay inequality widens as a consequence, then some non-union members 
may experience reduced job satisfaction.
Chapter IV aims to determine sets of practices that could lead to higher 
individual employee effort and managerial perception of workplace effort (the latter is 
shortly referred to hereafter as workplace effort), as well as looking at the impact of
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these practices on supervision and quality monitoring. The cross-section British 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998 has been chosen for this study as it has 
the advantage that responses are obtained from both employees and their managers. 
This advantage is used to assess which practices impact on employee or on workplace 
effort.
The conclusions drawn from Chapter IV suggest the HRM practices with a 
consistent positive impact on supervision and ways of monitoring work quality are: 
using competency standards and customer surveys. The main implications for 
practitioners, as well as for the research framework that future studies into the impact 
of supervision on effort could use, are as follows: (1) too much monitoring can be 
detrimental to effort; (2) some monitoring practices do not have a significant impact on 
employee and workplace effort; (3) there is considerable variation between practices 
that have an impact on individual effort and those that have an impact on the 
workplace effort; (4) there is considerable variation in impact of supervision HRM 
practices across sub-samples when data is split by sector and occupation; and, finally, 
(5) monitoring and supervision practices on their own may not be enough to ensure 
high levels of employee effort or positive changes in workplace effort (since 
coefficient sizes reported in this study are overall not very large).
Not enough support is found to suggest that more advanced practices have 
a higher impact on effort. This constitutes a warning for HRM practitioners and HRM 
researchers that HRM progress cannot be taken for granted i.e. those practices heralded 
to be the “most modern” or “the newest” are not necessarily having (the highest) 
impact on employee and workplace effort.
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The HRM practices most likely to have an impact on individual effort 
comprise allowing for employee job control, consultation, performance related pay and 
employee-paid training. In fact, training and communication and consultation appear to 
have a strong and consistent impact on individual effort as well as workplace effort, 
while benchmarking and strategic planning play a major role in increasing workplace 
effort. Some practices which decrease the amount of supervised control, such as job 
autonomy, lead to decreases in individual effort, but working from home is associated 
with higher individual effort.
Chapter V focuses on two workplace practices, training and promotion. It 
uses a panel of individuals from the 13 waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2003). Splitting the data by gender, sector and occupation, estimates for probit, 
bivariate probit and fixed effects models are obtained in order to analyse the 
determinants, interrelationships, and real wage impact of recent training and 
promotion.
The main finding is that training and promotion with the same employer 
are positively associated. Training also generates further training, especially if previous 
training was with the current employer. A noteworthy result, distinct from previous 
research, is that the gender discrimination with regard to training access is not 
observed in the panel based on BHPS data.
With regard to the determinants of current promotion, it is estimated that 
for both men and women training is significantly associated with the likelihood of 
promotion and that previous training, one to three years ago, is rather irrelevant for
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recent promotion. Also, previous promotions (but mostly promotions with the current 
employer for males) generate further promotions. This chapter finds little evidence in 
support of the expectation that women are discriminated against with regard to 
promotion prospects with their current employer. The difference between the genders 
is modest. Results from a bivariate model that allows for endogeneity of training and 
promotion reinforce the findings from two independent probit models. The originality 
of this research lies in implementing a bivariate probit model, where the inter­
dependence between training and promotion can be observed to point out higher 
impacts than univariate probit models.
An estimation of real wages as they change over time shows that recent 
training does not translate into important wage increases in the same period of time. 
Finally, with regard to returns to recent promotion, wage growth for promoted women 
is shown to only be lower than for promoted men in the case of women in professional 
occupations. Whereas both men and women enjoy positive returns to previous 
promotions awarded by the current employer, neither continue to experience a post­
promotion wage effect contemporaneously if promoted with a previous employer one 
to two years ago.
Each of the Chapters II to V ends with a summary of the main points, 
following their respective conclusions section, which highlights the main findings. 
Chapter VI summarises the main conclusions of the thesis, discussing its limitations, 
the implications for practitioners and identifying issues for future research.
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CHAPTER II
WORKPLACE MANAGEMENT PRACTICES: ECONOMICS AND HUMAN 
RESOURCE MANAGEMENT LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1. Introduction
Rising competition in world and domestic markets during the past two 
decades has put increasing pressure on British firms to adopt innovations in their work 
systems, in a similar way in which American firms had to respond to Japanese 
competitors.1 Irrespective of whether performance per se is quoted, concern with 
performance is the cohesive feature of both a large array of organisational activities 
aimed at creating competitive advantage, and of academic research. In their continual 
search for progress and competitiveness, companies have to find alternative or 
innovative solutions to improve their businesses, for instance by increasing 
productivity or the quality of goods and services. Indeed, company managers around 
the world are preoccupied with performance issues and with an efficient way of 
employing human resource management (HRM) practices to achieve these goals. For 
instance, Baron and Kreps (1999) consider that:
‘...the main challenges that organisations are facing in pursuing total quality nowadays 
[...] concern the human resources’ (Baron and Kreps 1999 : 10).
1 In the past decade, Asian markets are becoming increasingly com petitive with skilled workforces and 
low wage econom ies.
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In relation to the workforce, a conceptual objective of HRM (whether 
based on altruism or not) has habitually been framed as employees who are satisfied, 
productive, knowledgeable and committed to make use of their abilities and knowledge 
in the organisational benefit. In parallel to practitioner pursuits, a survey of the 
economic and HRM literature proves that, from an early stage in its development, 
research on company and employee performance has stressed the critical role of human 
resources (Arthur 1994; Huselid 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997). 
Moreover, it may be that pressure for new HRM practices is greater when market 
competition is more intense.
Expectations placed on HRM peak when human resources are portrayed as 
the major key to organisational success or failure: ‘success with poor HR policies is 
probably impossible, and the effects of improved HR polices on organizational success 
are potentially enormous’ (Baron and Kreps 1999 : 4). Similarly, Pfeffer (1998) 
suggestively entitles his book on organisational success The Human Equation, 
implying in this sense that HRM helps organisations to adapt to increasing market 
demands by fine tuning their company practices with regard to a multitude of aspects 
such as skills, enhancing cooperation and teamwork, and productivity.
There is an expanding and highly analytical literature built on the 
hypothesis that HRM practices have an impact on organisational performance. Interest 
in studying performance has been especially growing in the 1990s (Cully et al 1999, 
Boselie et al 2001). A growing percentage of journal space is concerned with this 
topic. For instance two well-known journals, Industrial Relations 35(3) and the 
Academy o f Management Journal 39 (4) have dedicated special issues to this topic in
14
1996. More recently, Brian Becker and Mark Huselid have edited a special issue of the 
Human Resource Management Volume 38(4) in 1999, presenting five case studies 
which explore strategic HRM and performance.
However, despite the extensive and interdisciplinary interest that the HRM- 
performance link has stirred, uncovering its more precise linkages and its functions 
remains a challenge for research on the topic. The ways in which workplace practices 
contribute to performance are a subject of debate among academics, practitioners and 
policy makers. For instance, some authors report that ‘innovations still affect a 
minority of employees’ (Appelbaum and Batt 1994 :10 reporting from US national 
level surveys during late 1980s and beginning of 1990s), while others find in their 
samples that much higher proportions of workers (between 20 and 25 percent) than 
previously thought are affected by workplace changes (Osterman 1994a). Other 
examples of controversies in the field relate to the efficiency of using innovative 
workplace practices towards improving workplace health and safety (Askenazy 2001), 
or to choosing and using measures of performance (Appelbaum and Batt 1994, Cully et 
al 1999). The latter issue is discussed below in more depth.
In view of the need to advance knowledge, the aim of this thesis is to 
investigate in further detail the link between HRM, and employee and company 
performance. In particular, this chapter reviews empirical economic and HRM 
contributions to research on the impact of HRM workplace practices on company and 
employee performance. A comprehensive set of developments in the economics and
2 Osterman’s (1994a) study is based on a sample o f  694 US manufacturing establishments and data that 
has been collected in 1992.
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HRM empirical literatures is critically presented, alongside some key empirical 
findings in more than two decades of research on performance.
This chapter is structured as follows. In Section 2.2, a discussion of 
challenges encountered in setting up the task of researching the HRM-performance 
relationship is presented. This section reflects upon the intricacies of thinking on this 
research topic, predominantly captured by the lack of consensus in the literature on 
measures of company / employee performance and HRM practices. Suggestions for 
taxonomies of performance measures and HRM measures which have so far been put 
forward in the literature are summarised. This section ends by reporting on the lack of 
consistency in research due to the unsystematic nature of studies on the HRM- 
performance relationship.
Section 2.3 looks at the extant research on the HRM-performance 
relationship. It focuses on some enduring research questions: are there differences 
between the 'old' and the 'new' practices?; what is the incidence of HRM practices?; 
what triggers the adoption or rejection of HRM practices?; and how do HRM practices 
impact on performance? In relation to the latter question, it highlights the impact of 
four types of HRM practices, which are most commonly investigated in the extant 
relevant literature, and are singled out in relation to their impact on company and 
employee performance: (1) financial incentives (e.g. profit-related pay); (2) labour- 
management communication; (3) training; and (4) high-commitment practices.
In Section 2.4, the conclusions, followed by a chapter summary, synthesise 
the main ideas exposed in this chapter.
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2.2 . Challenges in researching the HRM-performance relationship
In researching the HRM-performance relationship, the most prevalent 
methodological challenges arise from mainly two common directions: (1)
inconsistency in the measurement of company / employee performance and HRM 
practices; (2) the unsystematic nature of the HRM-performance studies.
2.2.1. Inconsistent usage of measures of performance and HRM practices
The pervasiveness across studies of inconsistent and distorted measures of 
performance and HRM practices represents the major difficulty when attempting to 
summarise and advance research on the topic. This section looks first at performance 
measures and suggested taxonomies of performance measures in the literature, then 
continues with measures of HRM practices and suggested taxonomies of HRM 
practices in the literature.
2.2.1.1. Inconsistent usage of performance measures and taxonomy 
suggestions
Starting with performance measures, there is a large and confusing choice 
in the range of data that can be collected to report individual and company 
performance. This inconsistency has been a feature of performance studies from their 
emergence. Moreover, the variety of performance measures has continued to expand in 
the literature, stimulated by new management fads and further developments in 
organisations.
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A preliminary point of controversy is that there is no consensus in defining 
performance in a way that is both conceptually sound and empirically functional. HRM 
is said to suffer from a ‘crisis’ of identity and confidence in that HR managers’ results 
are ‘almost impossible to measure and their successes and failures are largely the 
successes and failures of other people’ (Torrington 1998 : 36).
An answer to why it is so hard to define a set of performance measures is 
that, as mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, companies have a multitude of 
activities, hence of objectives, which can all be seen as ultimately related to the quest 
for performance. It follows that researchers choose those measures that are more 
appropriate for their subjects, or work with those measures on which companies have 
collected data. It has been even suggested that finding an ideal performance evaluation 
system may be nearly impossible (Baron & Kreps, 1999).
Among the various measures of performance employed in the empirical 
literature, the following are the most common: productivity, profitability, growth, 
wastage, quality of goods or services, and financial performance (Arthur 1994, Huselid 
1995, MacDuffie 1995, Delery and Doty 1996, Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997). 
Industry-specific measures offer a temporary compromise to this problem (e.g. 
Ichniowski and 1999).
Faced with the issue of inconsistency, few authors have made attempts to 
classify performance measures. Additionally, questionnaire answers provided by
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managers do not help to highlight particular sets of measures most likely to be used.3 
Therefore, there is yet no clearly specified intent to draw up taxonomies for 
performance measures, possibly due to the vast amount of variation on the subject.
This review uses these rare occurrences of classifications in order to 
suggest some alternative points of departure for mapping variety in performance 
measures. Among the earliest attempts of this kind, Kleiner et al (1987) analyse extant 
research and group the performance outcomes most widely encountered into four main 
categories: labour quality, intermediate outputs, outputs, and outcomes (Appendix 
A .l). However, they caution that researchers using these outcomes made no endeavour 
to imply that improvements in labour quality and intermediate outputs result in 
improved outputs and outcomes. Admittedly, the lack of causality is due to researchers 
not having tried ‘to disentangle the complex relationships that link these various 
measures’ (ibid. 323).
Another taxonomy suggestion is made by Locke and Latham (1990): (a) 
measures of output of goods and services, which can be further divided into 
quantitative (units produced, clients served) or qualitative (complaints from clients); 
(b) measures of time (absenteeism, lateness, failure to meet deadlines, loss of working 
time); and (c) financial measures (profits, revenues). These measures can be combined 
into further composite performance indicators that are subsequently influenced by 
measures from different categories, though not necessarily connected to labour market 
outcomes. For example, productivity indicators may be composed of measures of time 
(such as hours of work) and quantitative measures of output of goods and services
3 There is however an emerging consensus in the literature that questionnaire design could be improved 
with regard to standardising answers provided by managers.
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(numbers of units produced). Adding to this attempt, Guest (1997) suggests that where 
quantitative data is harder to obtain, measures of employee behaviour can be collected 
from alternative sources such as: (a) employee self-reports, (b) direct observations (e.g. 
whether the employees are approaching clients and offer to help); and (c) supervisors, 
peers or subordinate reports.
A more recent classification that can provide a starting point for a 
taxonomy is offered by Wright and Gardner (2000). The authors quote Rogers and 
Wright (1998) in their report of performance measures used in eighty empirical 
observations testing the HRM-performance relationship. The Rogers and Wright
(1998) classification includes four categories of measures: (1) human resource 
performance (output per employee being the only employee performance measure 
found); (2) organizational performance (e.g., productivity, quality or customer 
satisfaction); (3) financial accounting performance (e.g., return on assets); and (4) 
financial market performance (e.g., stock price or Tobin's Q). Though it is 
questionable whether labour output can be used as a single indicator for human 
resource performance, the other measures of performance have been widely used in the 
empirical literature.
Several biases exist in performance studies. Preference is given to 
quantitative data collected on performance and especially to financial measures, for the 
reason that the prevalent way of assessing managers’ performance is via financial 
measures. It has been noted that financial measures are given priority in the analytic 
framework for studying performance data which is usually ‘starting with the “hard” 
measures, followed by behaviour, followed by reports or ratings’ (Guest 1997 : 267).
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Moreover, the field of performance studies is polarised towards American research, 
followed by more recent studies developed in the UK, Australia and Germany.
A separate but particularly noteworthy issue is that performance studies are 
biased towards researching company performance while neglecting employee 
behaviour. Guest et al (2000a) contend that studies ‘fail to explore the processes 
whereby HR practices may impact on employee attitudes and behaviour, and the 
possible influence of such attitudes on behaviour and performance.’ (ibid. 2). On this 
note, specific attempts were made to signal a ‘dearth of studies’ on the impact of HRM 
practices on employee outcomes (Wright and Gardner 2000 :17). At a first glance, this 
is evidenced by relatively fewer studies on the impact of HRM practices on employee 
performance. Examples are Rigano and Edwards (1998), Leigh and Gill (1999), 
Adkins and Lury (1999), Galang (1999) or Ramsey et al (2000). Appelbaum and Batt
(1994) note that:
‘... overwhelmingly, the information in both the surveys and case studies comes from 
managers and consultants responsible for implementing changes, not from the 
employees experiencing them. The picture that emerges is necessarily one-sided and 
probably overstates the degree of innovation and change actually taking place. 
Managers rarely report failed efforts, and consultants rarely examine them in their 
reports, but undoubtedly there have been many’ (Appelbaum and Batt 1994 : 58).
The same opinions are shared by Cully et al 1999 with regard to the British 
WIRS series. Thus, it is to be remarked that for the first time in the British WIRS 
series, WERS 1998 has included data on employees, change which is conveyed by the
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alteration of the survey title from Industrial Relations (IR) to Employee Relations 
(ER). An explanation for this bias in research may be the relatively easier access to, 
transparency and objectivity of, data on companies, as opposed to the inherent 
subjectivity of data on employees. This may also lead to a publication bias, as it is 
more likely that studies with successful results get reported.
2.2.I.2. Inconsistent usage of HRM practices measures and taxonomy 
suggestions
It is hard to derive a terminology that could receive researchers’ general 
approval in terms of measuring HRM practices. For a start, there is not even a 
commonly agreed term to define the object of measurement in this case. Studies refer 
interchangeably and sometimes tautologically to ‘HR(M)’, ‘work(place)’ or 
‘organisation’ / ‘company’/ ‘employee’, in combination with ‘policies’, ‘practices’, 
‘management (practices)’ or ‘systems’. Several adjectives, such as ‘transformed’, 
‘new’, ‘innovative’, ‘alternative’ are unconditionally joined to the former series of 
terms, according to authors’ free choice. Furthermore, the range of definitions varies 
with the discipline of the author (Parks 1995). Some congruence exists in the literature 
regarding the term ‘high-performance practices’, particularly when it is employed in 
the phrase ‘high-performance work systems’ (HPWS). As the term implies, it is 
suggested that practices under this denomination may have a positive influence on a 
certain measure of performance.
The term ‘HRM practices’ has been employed in this thesis, as it is 
considered to take the widest and most inclusive angle to company and employee
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related practices. For the sake of conciseness, only ‘practices’ are mentioned, but the 
intention is to include and refer to practices as both modes of behaviour and policies 
defining or regulating their implementation. Additionally, the meaning of HRM 
practices is stretched to allow for the inclusion of practices that may be regarded as 
belonging to industrial relations. Terms that are more specific are employed when it is 
necessary to restrict the focus of ‘HRM practices’ to particular practices such as high- 
commitment or high-performance.
Similarly, there is no universal agreement over which sets of practices are 
exclusively and inexorably defined by the term ‘high-performance’. Practices that 
appear to be generally quoted as ‘high-performance’ are: employee involvement (also 
described as employee participation or employee voice), flexible work systems, job 
security, screening, training, and pecuniary or non-pecuniary incentive pay systems.4 
However, in their turn, these practices may also appear under similar denominations, 
largely employed especially in the management literature but also beyond it. Thus, 
they may be enlisted as part of high-commitment or high-involvement practices. 
However, the term ‘high-performance’ has attracted intensive empirical research, 
hence it will be the second preferred term used in this thesis, especially when reporting 
results from empirical literature.
As with performance measurements, there is no unanimously accepted 
taxonomy of HRM practices in use, yet attempts to create classifications of HRM 
practices are more common. Since these attempts are often combined with, and used
4 This list does not aim to be exhaustive. It includes practices that could raise controversy in terms o f  
being labelled ‘new ’ and ‘innovative’ such as training. Moreover, there is a clear distinction between  
performance policies based on em ployee involvement, and those based on incentive pay systems.
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for testing, the hypothesis that ‘bundles’ of HRM practices work better than individual 
HRM practices, these attempts are presented in the next section.
A feature of the empirical economic literature emphasised in this review is 
the emergent need for a taxonomy of HRM practices. Groups of HRM practices are 
given a variety of denominations and this leads to one of the main methodological 
challenges of understanding the HRM-performance relationship. However, there are 
more attempts to classify HRM practices than performance measures. The most 
common denomination that is applied to HRM practices in empirical research in order 
to refer to the link between HRM and performance, is ‘high performance practices’. 
Notably, however, there are no established criteria for when a practice should be 
denominated as ‘high performance’.
An inherent part of testing ‘bundling hypotheses’ is formed by attempts to 
create classifications of HRM practices. At its simplest, a classification made by Parks 
(1995) deserves attention because it introduces the concept of ‘workplace practices 
spectrum’ (Appendix A.2). The two extremes of this spectrum are ‘traditional’ and 
‘alternative’ HRM practices. She acknowledges that there is no universal approval 
towards employing these precise terms. Bringing together literature from sociology, 
psychology, HRM and economics, Parks (1995) suggests that the two ends of the 
spectrum are best characterised by a set of key words mostly encountered in relation to 
traditional and alternative HRM practices. ‘High-performance practices’ are here 
considered to present most of the characteristics of the ‘alternative’ end of the 
spectrum.
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Among the attempts to create a taxonomy of HR practices, the predominant 
type is a dual classification, for instance distinguishing between: (1) practices that 
affect work organisation, and (2) other human resource management practices that do 
not affect it (Osterman 1994a, MacDuffie 1995, Gittleman et al 1998). Arthur (1994) 
distinguishes between ‘commitment HR systems’ and ‘control HR systems’. Huselid
(1995) refers to (1) employee skill and organisational structure practices (such as 
training, job design and information sharing), and (2) employee motivation practices 
(such as performance appraisal and incentive compensation).
Hunter and Hit (2001) illustrate a similar dual attempt to capture the 
meaning of ‘high-performance workplaces’ as separated from the other types of work 
organisation previously analysed in the literature (Appendix A.3). Here, the 
organisation of work is mainly separated into ‘Taylorist or traditional’, where workers 
perform a limited set of tasks while suspending their independent judgement, and 
‘high-performance’ practices, where workers are multi-skilled, take part in the 
decision-making process and in job rotation. In this view, ‘high-performance practices’ 
have as main attributes high flexibility and high discretion, achieved through 
teamwork, job rotation, employee involvement in decision-making, and the integration 
of technology in production processes (Hunter and Hitt 2001:3).
In comparison to these two-layer classifications, Jalette (1997) analyses the 
impact of practices on performance at credit unions in Quebec, Canada and uses a 
three-layer classification. The summary of findings in this financial sector present three 
groups of practices that have improved performance: (1) mobilization practices, such 
as financial incentives, social activity committee, colloquium and employee suggestion
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system; (2) employee voice, such as problem/grievance systems, labour-management 
communication, written specification of working conditions, health and safety 
committee and training committee; and (3) human resource development practices, 
such as training programmes, succession plans, performance appraisal and information 
meetings.
Becker and Gerhart’s (1996) model, adapted by Wright and Gardner 
(2000), proposes a more in-depth classification of HRM practices on four layers of 
HRM complexity: (1) guiding principles; (2) policy/practice alternatives; (3) product; 
and (4) practice-processes. Appendix A.4 illustrates these four layers applied to the 
HRM practice of performance-based pay. Another four-layer taxonomy is used by 
Becker and Huselid 1998: (1) personnel; (2) alignment; (3) compensation; and (4) high 
performance.
Finally, one of the most detailed classifications of HRM practices is 
presented by Ichniowski et al (1997). Their hierarchy of four HRM systems of 
practices points to the differences across these systems as they evolve from the 
‘traditional HRM system’ to the ‘most innovative HRM system’ (see Appendix A.5). 
This hierarchy is constructed by the authors and tested in their study which finds that 
the most innovative HRM system leads to the highest performance levels. Starting 
from the most basic system, HRM system 1 which is the “traditional” system, HRM 
practices are gradually added or improved until reaching the ‘most innovative HRM 
system’, HRM system 4. For instance, in HRM system 1 there is no teamwork; in 
HRM system 2 there is some initiation of teamwork; in HRM system 3 workplaces
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adopt teamwork; and workplaces in HRM system 4 implement multiple problem­
solving teams.
A major critique of attempts to create taxonomies is that each study tends 
to become particular to the technological context of research and the product / sector 
attributes which authors must consider. For instance, the predominance of 
manufacturing-based studies (for a chronological glimpse of this wide literature see 
Dean and Snell 1991, Snell and Dean 1992, Waterson et al 1999, Appelbaum et al 
2000, Cua et al 2001, Shah and Ward 2003, Patterson et al 2004, Wood et al 2004, 
Wood 2005). Future research is yet to decide whether a clear-cut and non-industry 
specific taxonomy can be created and on how limited its application would be.
The considerable variation in the choice of both performance and HR 
practices measures makes it difficult for researchers to cumulate findings and draw 
conclusions. Becker & Gerhart (1996) note that this lack of replicability and 
standardisation of studies could be overcome if researchers decided upon a set of 
measures that they could design together. Nevertheless, a few examples of studies 
researching determinants and effects of HRM practices on company and employee 
performance are described in Section 2.3.
2.2.2. The unsystematic nature of HRM-performance studies
Research into the relationship between HRM practices and performance is 
unsystematic in many aspects, including level of analysis, data availability, data 
modelling in terms of variables used as determinants, the clarity of the effects of HRM
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practices, choice of managerial implementation of HRM practices, and the HRM 
bundling hypothesis. Consequently, preventing subjective interpretation and judging 
the importance of information remain unresolved methodological issues.
To start with, there is the variation in the level of data analysis: company, 
establishment, firm etc. When the incoherent employment of a very large variety of 
measures highlighted above is combined with inconsistency, this leads to a lack of 
continuity in any particular line of research (Guest et al 2000a, Wright and Gardner 
2000).
The challenge of establishing inter-relational links within extant research is 
fuelled by the coexistence of multiple levels of analysis (e.g. corporate, business or 
plant) and study designs (e.g. cross-sectional, intra industry, case study, meta-analysis). 
An in-depth analysis of research designs is given by Ichniowski et al (1996). More 
studies are needed at the business level, plant level or even at a level of analysis lower 
than that, rather than at the corporate level (Wright and Gardner 2000). Most likely, 
the lack of data is because in competitive circumstances like those faced by British 
organisations, data is especially sensitive and tends to be proprietary, being released 
mainly to consultancies or Government-backed surveys.
With an established tradition of access to good sources of data, American 
empirical research on the impact of HRM practices on company and employee 
performance is impressively rich (e.g. Parker and Slaughter 1988, Osterman 1994a, 
Appelbaum and Batt 1994, Kling 1995, Parks 1995, Ichniowski et al 1996 and 1997, 
Black and Lynch 2001 and 1998, Leigh and Gill 1999, Black and Lynch 2004,
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Askenazy 2001, Delaney and Godart 2001). So, the literature is biased towards a
noticeably larger presence of American based research. In parallel, British research in
the field is also well-established, and very rigorously conducted, with an emphasis on 
utilising the WIRS series (e.g. Heywood et al 1997, Poole and Jenkins 1998, Whitfield 
2000, Addison et al 2000, Addison and Belfield 2001, and Delbridge and Whitfield 
2001). More British-based studies are needed.
To continue, there is a lack of coherence in the empirical economics 
literature on the determinants and effects of HRM practices on company and employee 
performance. In view of the several measurement inconsistencies signalled in this 
chapter so far, this does not come as a surprise.
With regard to analysing the determinants of HRM practices,
understandably, each study attempts to make the best of the data available. Such data is 
sometimes scant or collected for different purposes other than the study (hence 
sometimes inappropriate). For instance, most surveys solicit a yes/no answer to 
whether a practice is implemented. Or, a more qualitative and inquisitive type of 
question could be asked, on the lines of 'how well have you implemented this 
practice?', 'how long has this practice been implemented by you?', 'to what extent has 
this practice been implemented in your organisation?', or 'to what extent do you believe 
this practice has made a difference to your organisation?'. However, there are no set 
models to be followed, whereby, for example, all studies should at least contain a 
certain set of control variables.
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Furthermore, the incidence of some practices is dependent on firm or 
employee characteristics. Research under these contingent assumptions can be 
illustrated by three examples. Regarding firm characteristics, Frazis et al (1998) use 
the BLS 1995 Survey of Employer-Provided Training and find that the incidence of 
formal training depends positively on relative firm characteristics (such as larger size, 
lower turnover, use of contract workers and of ‘more alternative workplace practices’) 
and employee characteristics (more skilled workers are more likely to receive more 
training). Additionally, Black and Lynch (2001) suggest that practices may have a 
different impact on productivity depending on firm characteristics. Their results show 
that joint decision-making and incentive-based compensation work better in unionised 
than in non-unionised firms. On the same note, maintaining traditional labour 
management relations is more detrimental to productivity in unionised than in non­
unionised businesses. The main critique of research contingent on firm characteristics 
is the extent to which they are conclusive to the particular HRM practices assessed.
With regard to analysing the effects of HRM practices on employees and 
companies, this is also often ambiguous and problematic. For an example evidencing 
the difficulties encountered, the hypothesis of HRM-union substitution can be put 
forward. Unlike the green light given by the management literature to this substitution 
as being beneficial for both manager and worker, some studies warn that companies 
may fake the advantage of union deregulation policies when selling such policies to 
their workforce. This could be done by pretending deregulation enables an 
advantageous focus on individualism with increased opportunities for employee voice 
expression. In this context, employee involvement is packaged as a desirable substitute 
for unionisation. However, Bacon and Storey (2000) conducted a three-year detailed
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case study to explore the impact of the shift to partnerships and more individualised 
HR relations with employees in companies which previously used collectivised 
arrangements. In spite of some evidence that the ‘new’ arrangements were breaking 
with the past, these arrangements did not seem long-lasting, nor stable. Instead, both 
attempts at union de-recognition and secure partnership were fraught due to ‘managers 
behaving in a short-term, contradictory and opportunist way’ (Bacon and Storey 2000 : 
423). The new arrangements have rather re-established the trade unions role and added 
to employee voice the dimension of forums, but all these arrangements remained 
‘firmly management-driven’ (ibid : 424).
Moreover, there is random implementation of HRM practices by managers. 
Companies frequently combine HRM practices drawn from different work systems to 
create new models they hope will lead to improved efficiency or quality. The limitless 
possibilities of combining in-house and imported practices makes researchers’ jobs 
even more complex. Among the recent approaches to organising and managing work, 
several have been used with apparent success inside national economies, generating 
worldwide managerial attempts to import and adopt them (Appelbaum and Batt 1994). 
For example, Japanese-originating quality circles, teamwork and continuous 
improvement have generated in America one of the most highly-publicised 
transformations in workplace practices and performance in the 1980s: the New United 
Motors Manufacturing Industries (NUMMI) (see Parker and Slaughter 1988, 
Ichniowski et al 1996 for further details).
A partial solution to the random managerial approach of implementing 
HRM practices could be researching the hypothesis put forward by the contingent
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approach to HRM. The common theme implied by contingency theory is that HRM 
practices lead to high levels of performance on condition that they are aligned with a 
company’s strategic goals and its internal and external environment. For instance, 
MacDuffie (1995) highlights the importance of aligning HRM practices within an 
underlying logic of work organisation. He employs the term ‘flexible production’ to 
describe the process of integrating technology and production with work practices. His 
hypothesis is that the effectiveness of HRM practices depends on their integration 
within the general work organisation. His study finds that bundles of internally 
consistent HR practices improve productivity and quality (e.g. levels of production 
defects are lower). However, in order to enable the conduct of contingency research, 
data needs to be purposeful collected and such data is presently scant.
In the end, several studies have set out to test this ‘bundling hypothesis’, a 
term coined by Leigh and Gill (1999). For instance, Pfeffer (1994), Milgrom and 
Roberts (1995), Wood (1995), Ichniowski et al (1996), Jalette (1997) or Wood and de 
Menezes (1998) show that groups of HRM practices have more impact on 
organisational performance than individual HRM practices. Pfeffer (1994 : 27) notes 
that ‘interrelated practices’ are characteristic for effective companies, and that the key 
to their success is in people management. Wood (1995 : 52) mentions that the 
‘combined effects of such practices [high commitment practices]’ can allow managers 
to elicit high levels of commitment
In particular, Ichniowski et al (1996) conclude that individual workplace 
practices have no effect on performance, but that ‘innovative workplace practices can 
increase performance, primarily through the use of systems of related practices that
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enhance worker participation, make work design less rigid and decentralise managerial 
tasks’ (Ichniowski et al 1996 : 299). The system o f ‘coherent and integrated practices’ 
mentioned includes: extensive recruiting, careful selection, flexible job definitions, 
problem solving teams, gain-sharing compensation plans, employment security and 
extensive labour-management communication.
Appealing evidence is also offered by Huselid (1995) who finds in his 
cross-industry study that annual sales per employee in industries with ‘best’ practices 
are $100,000 higher than in industries with ‘worst’ practices. Marchington and 
Wilkinson (2000) warn that businesses should not adopt a piece-meal integration 
approach to HRM practices, and that the best way is to go for an integrated approach, 
based on HR managers ability to identify and implement HRM systems centred around 
‘bundles’ of practices. If data were collected on HR managers’ perception of the HRM 
systems which work best in their workplaces, it would indeed be interesting to see 
what information could be gathered from this integrated approach to research.
However, there is controversy over the terminology and the methodology 
employed in this line of research, too. HRM practices are analysed in ‘consistent 
wholes’ by Kling (1995), in ‘bundles’ by Black and Lynch (2001 ), in ‘clusters’ by 
Ichniowski et al (1997), or tested as a ‘bundling hypothesis’ in Leigh and Gill (1999). 
With regard to methodological issues, practices are sometimes simply lumped together 
according to researchers’ ad hoc indicators and analysis, or methods such as 
confirmatory Factor Analysis are used (e.g. Kelley 1996). Ichniowski et al (1996) 
caution that these methods assume that HR practices are substitutes, and fail to take 
into account their complementarity. Nevertheless, Ichniowski et al (1997) and Becker
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and Huselid (1998) offer examples of studies underlining complementarity. An 
alternative methodological option is cluster analysis (e.g. Arthur 1994). Another 
suggestion is using multiple methods to test if they point to the same clusters and to 
similar performance influences (e.g. Ichniowski et al 1997).
There is also a clear disagreement over the number of practices in the 
bundling hypothesis. Wood and de Menezes (1998) show that the approach to practices 
included in bundles varies substantially. Indeed, Huselid (1995) finds 13 HRM 
practices, Delery and Doty (1996) provide 7, Wood (1999) provides 17 practices. Even 
in the case of a single author, the range varies: Pfeffer identifies a list of 16 practices in 
his 1994 study, 13 practices in 1995, and then 7 systems of HRM practices in 1998.5
Hence, it could be particularly useful to collect data which also ask 
managers whether they have intentionally implemented a particular practice in 
conjunction with another practice. This would help in the research of a notable 
hypothesis in HRM practices, namely the bundling hypothesis. This is the belief that 
companies benefit from synergetic effects when combining HRM practices.
As a consequence of the inconsistencies exposed above, there is no 
consensus in the empirical literature over which groups of HRM practices determine or 
affect company and employee performance. Loundes (2000) pessimistically concludes 
that no single set of HRM policies applies across workplaces to affect all measures of
5 For a quick reference to the well-known work o f  Pfeffer (1998) see Appendix A .6 which lists the seven  
practices. A lso, Appendix A .7 highlights the critical importance o f  HRM practices to organisational 
performance by presenting a downward performance spiral (follow ing the arrows in a continuous 
movement) which can occur with decreases in performance and inadequate responses from the 
individual em ployees or organisational practices.
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performance in the same way. This highlights clearly the need for more research into 
the subject.
2.3. Researching the HRM-performance relationship: enduring questions
In order to present an even more refined review of the empirical literature, 
this section comprises a succinct summary of core research findings in response to four 
questions that remain on the top of research agendas. In spite of the high interest that 
these questions raise, answers are yet unclear. These four questions are: (1) what are 
the differences between the 'old' and the 'new' practices?; (2) what is the incidence of 
HRM practices?; (3) what triggers the adoption or rejection of HRM practices?; and (4) 
how do HRM practices impact on company / employee performance?
2.3.1. What are the differences between the ’old’ and the 'new' practices?
There is a blurred barrier between the ‘old’ or ‘traditional’, and the ‘new’ 
or ‘innovative’ HRM practices. As mentioned in section 2.2 of this chapter, there is a 
wide variety of terms used with apparent definitional laxity and interchangeably to 
refer to ‘new’ or ‘innovative’ HRM practices. Ad-hoc measures seem to be used in 
order to designate an HRM practice as ‘innovative’ or a workplace as ‘transformed’. 
For instance, Osterman (1993 : 14) estimates that 37 percent of his sample of American 
firms can be characterised as ‘transformed’, i.e. firms where fifty percent or more of 
the workers are involved in any two of the following four practices: self-directed 
teams, job rotation, quality circles, or total quality management.
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Previous sections in this chapter aimed to identify attempts at creating a 
taxonomy for HRM practices whereby the criterion for classification was the 
opposition between ‘old’ and ‘new’ (Parks 1995 in Appendix A.2; Ichniowski et al 
1997 in Appendix A.5) but no particular attention has been paid in either study to 
understanding which or to what extent ‘old’ HRM practices have been transformed or 
replaced by their ‘new’ counterparts. This ambiguity leaves space for legitimate doubts 
regarding the ‘newness’ of some HRM practices such as training, a practice which has 
been around for more than a century.
Nevertheless, other authors signal the presence of a ‘new vision’ in some 
companies (Appelbaum and Batt 1994 : 4) or of a ‘metamorphosis in discourse and 
practice’, which is not only based on the change in titles from industrial relations to 
employee relations, then to employment relations and a range of other terms (Cully et 
al 1999 : 246). In addition to this title change, Cully et al (1999) focus on the WIRS 
series in Britain in order to present a picture of a continuous fall in the ‘traditional’ 
system of British industrial relations (Cully et al 1999 : 293).
This traditional system is claimed to have firmly covered the time span 
from the World War II and up to the late 1980s (Fox 1985). The emphasis was on 
bureaucratic forms of control and tight supervision at work. Or, as shown by Frey 
(1993), the benefits of tight supervision 'crowded out' effort at work, creating a dispute 
between trust in the employees and their loyalty. The shift in managerial practice was 
towards practices that would motivate the employee to participate in organisational 
activities, 'join' the corporate culture, act according to the corporate vision. Generally, 
these practices have moved the management agenda from personnel relations to human
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resource management. The move is widely known to be accompanied by the demise of 
the previous industrial relations framework and of unions. A comprehensive and up-to- 
date picture of this move to HRM practices is presented in Blanchflower et al (2006).
One important factor in this change appears to be via employees being 
enabled (or coerced? - this is still a contentious issue in the literature) to identify their 
interest with that of the organisations, and Osterman (1994) describes this change as 
'an alternative control mechanism'. Lamenting what he perceives as explanatory limits 
of the agency theory when it comes to analysing forms of control in the workplace, 
Osterman (1994) documents that workplace practices have 'transformed' employees' 
willingness to engage voluntarily in 'forms of behaviour which would be extremely 
difficult to induce via better monitoring' (p. 380). Changes in the political, legal and 
social context are mainly summarised in the Conservative government programme 
emphasising individualism and an entrepreneurial culture (Cully et al 1999). At the 
same time, the power of employers has increased at the expense of employees, a trend 
slightly countered by European legislation (ibid.).6
The behaviour in organisation literature documents these changes while
describing their nature as invasive to the individual through the systems of control
implemented in workplaces. For instance, in the mid eighties, culture as control was
compared to a totalitarian system because it ‘can ensnare workers in a hegemonic
system’ (Ray 1986). Subsequently, corporate behaviour, through systems of control,
has led many critics to compare it to ‘an invasive tyranny’ (Kunda 1992 : 20). As
opposed to rational control -  which emphasised quantifiable targets, rigidity and
6 For instance, a piece o f  European legislation limiting the amount o f  working hours has not been 
enforced in UK. Instead, som e employers include an opt-out clause in working contracts, enabling them 
to demand longer working hours.
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formality - the changes were towards managers applying normative control whereby: 
‘managers could more effectively motivate workers by attending not only to their 
behaviour but to their thoughts and emotions’ (Barley and Kunda 1992). Consequently, 
employers and employees have devised mechanisms to escape the tension of control 
usually manifested as stress in the workplace.7
Management practices reflected this change by focusing on more 
individual-centred practices and accentuating the importance of strategy. These 
practices were labelled ‘human resource management’ (Guest 1987) and the change 
was fuelled by pressures from the labour market in the form of global increased 
competition and privatisation of national industries (e.g. in Britain, through the 
deregulation of sectors such as financial services and transportation, the reduction in 
manufacturing and increase in the services sector).
Furthermore, the British economy went through two full business cycles 
during the period covered by one of the most representative series of surveys for 
Britain, namely the WIRS series (WIRS 1980, 1984 and 1990, WERS 1998, and a 
WERS5 survey is available in 2004) (Cully et al 1999). Some HRM practices 
emerging against this backdrop include employee involvement, appraisal systems and 
performance-related pay.
7 One such mechanism is humour:‘he tension that people feel as a result o f  the lack o f  control over their 
lives, created by employment insecurity was lessened by the act o f  laughing together with others who 
were similarly stressed’ (Watson 1994 : 188). Nevertheless, the workplace can interfere destructively 
with the personal lives o f  the em ployees. Hochschild’s study (1983) o f ‘subjectivity as control d ev ices’ 
documents the experience o f  flight attendants who have forgotten how to sm ile other than 
professionally. Sennett (1998) talks about corrosion o f  character in a society where 'flexible capitalism' 
puts the individual under unprecedented tension in the workplace.
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The main changes in the management of employees in Britain as reflected 
by the WIRS series are presented in Appendix A. 8. From a conclusive point of view, 
Cully et al (1999) remark that the general picture offered by WERS 98 is that of 
management trying to retain control and to contain costs. (Cully et al 1999 : 295). 
Employee control is achieved mainly through direct supervision, followed by making 
employees responsible for the quality of their work. Many workplaces choose to take a 
low-wage path and pursue numerical flexibility. Most workplaces monitor financial 
aspects by setting targets and have little authority devolved downwards to line 
managers or employees. A more in depth discussion of further changes in HRM 
practices is presented by Blanchflower et al (2006) who focus on the WIRS series in 
Britain.
In reply to this question, the present thesis attempts to implement a 
categorisation of HRM practices, as well as to understand the following: which HRM 
practices lead to job satisfaction (Chapter III)?; which HRM practices increase 
employee effort and stress (Chapter IV)?; and what is the relationship between the 
implementation of two high-impact HRM practices, training and promotion (Chapter 
V)?
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2.3.2. What is the incidence of HRM practices?
Potentially due to the disparities in definition, measurement and 
questionnaire design, there is contradictory evidence relating to the incidence of HRM 
practices. Ichniowski and Shaw (2003) report on US companies having ‘dramatically’ 
increased the use of ‘innovative’ HRM practices in the past 20 years, yet Appelbaum 
and Batt (1994) remark that few companies implement new HRM practices due to the 
potential obstacles to the diffusion of rapid change (such as employers being wary of 
high transformation costs which could lead to short-term losses in profitability).
This thesis mainly uses the WIRS series in Britain. Evidence coming from 
the WERS 98 dataset regarding the incidence of a pre-selected set of 15 ‘high 
commitment management practices’ is summarised in Table 2.1:
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Table 2.1: Incidence of management practices, by presence of personnel specialist
and integrated employee development plan
Personnel Personnel No personnel All
specialist & specialist specialist or workplaces
integrated only integrated
employee employee
development plan development plan
% o f workplaces (rank is given in brackets)
Largest occupational group has :
Temporary agency 19(13) 18(10) 14(9) 18(10)
workers
Employees on fixed- 38(9) 32 (8) 12(10) 28 (9)
term contracts
Personality tests 17(14) 10(15) 5(13) 11(14)
Performance tests 42 (8) 34 (6) 17(7) 35(7)
Formal off-the-job 51 (6) 30 (9) 18(4) 36(6)
training for most
employees
Profit-related pay 24(10) 14(12) 5(13) 15(11)
Employee share 12(15) 10(15) 1(15) 6(15)
ownership scheme
Regular performance 69 (2) 61 (2) 31(3) 58(3)
appraisals
Fully-autonomous or 44(7) 33 (7) 14(9) 34 (8)
semi-autonomous teams
Single status for 51(6) 42 (5) 22 (6) 40 (5)
managers and other
employees
Guaranteed job security 20(12) 14(12) 1(15) 13 (13)
Workplace has:
Formal disciplinary and 97(1) 95(1) 64(1) 88(1)
grievance procedures
Group-based team 65 (3) 52 (2) 48 (2) 59 (2)
briefings with feedback




Two or more family 59 (4) 45 (4) 15(5) 41(4)
friendly practices or
special leave schemes
Source: Adapted from  Cully et al 1999
The spread of these practices is analysed by focusing, where possible, on 
the core workforce group (that is the largest occupational group) ‘as this is the best test 
of how deeply practices were embedded in the workplace’ (Cully et al 1999 : 80). The 
factors influencing the spread of management practices as identified in WERS 98 are:
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(1) employment size (of the workplace and organization); (2) industry sector; (3) the 
structure of personnel management function (presence of personnel specialist, defined 
in Cully et al 1999 : 49 as the person “primarily responsible” for employee matters at 
the workplace); and (4) unionisation (Cully et al 1999 : 80). Practices were more 
widespread in: (1) large workplaces; workplaces (of all sizes) that were part o f larger 
organisations; (2) in the public sector; (3) where there was a personnel specialist either 
at the workplace or at a higher level in the organisation and where there was a strategic 
approach to employee relations - i.e. ‘evidence of a strategic plan encompassing 
employee development which has been drawn up with the aid o f an employee relations 
manager, and Investors in People accreditation5 (see Table 2.1 for evidence o f the large 
impact on incidence of these factors when jointly present); and (4) where unions were 
present (Cully et al 1999 : 80). Nevertheless, the incidence o f the 15 high commitment 
management practices identified by WERS 98 remains limited: 86% of all workplaces 
covered in the survey have only implemented seven or less o f these practices, as shown 
in Figure 2.1.




□ None to three 
H Four to seven  
■ Eght or more
Source: Adapted from Cully et al 1999
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The corresponding figure for workplaces with no recognised union is even 
higher (95%) (Figure 2.2). Union recognition is positively associated with the 
incidence of high commitment practices, but union recognition has been falling in the 
UK. Even if  around 57% of workplaces implement four to seven practices in both 
unionised and non-unionised companies, companies without union recognition tend to 
be eight times more likely to implement less than three high commitment practices 
(41% compared to 5%), and only one in six companies implementing more than seven 
practices is without union recognition.
Figure 2.2. The incidence of HRM practices in non-unionised British workplaces 
(WERS 98)
No recongised  union
5
□  None to three 
B Four to se v en  
■  Eght or more
The highest incidence of practices is in workplaces with a recognised 
union, but still only one in four companies (25%) have implemented eight or more high 
commitment practices (Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3. The incidence of HRM practices in British workplaces (WERS 98)
R econgised  union
X} □  None to three B Four to se v e n
6 0
■  Eght or more
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The HRM practices most widespread (in almost more than one in three 
firms) according to WERS 98 are: (1) procedures for dispute resolution 88%; (2) 
briefing meetings 59 %; (3) regular performance appraisals 58 %; (4) family friendly 
working arrangements 41 %; (5) single status 40 %; (6) formal off the job training for 
most employees 36 %; (7) performance tests 35 %; (8) fully-autonomous or semi- 
autonomous teams 34 %; and (9) employees on fixed term contracts 28 %.8 Other 
HRM practices have an incidence lower than in one in five firms: (1) temporary 
agency contracts 18 %; (2) profit-related pay 15 %; (3) most non-managerial 
employees participate in problem solving 15 %; (4) guaranteed job security 13 %; (5) 
personality tests at recruitment 11%; and (6) employee share ownership schemes 6%.
The number of studies which focus on the factors that impact on the 
incidence of HRM practices remains low and their results do not convey a unified 
picture (for instance, see Poole and Jenkins 1998; Cully et al 1999; Guest et al 2000a; 
and Ichniowski and Shaw 2003).
While the WERS 98 data presents a very good starting point for analysis, 
more data needs to be collected, ideally with a higher time frequency (e.g. annually), in 
order to gain a clearer picture of the incidence of HRM practices in Britain and the 
changes affecting it.
8 It can be noted that this set o f  practices has not been strictly chosen due their novelty factor.
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2.3.3. What triggers the adoption or rejection of HRM practices?
There is a definite need for further research in order to uncover the factors 
that trigger the decision to adopt or reject certain HRM practices. The research into this 
question is complex, as its investigation relies on more answers to the previous 
question, namely on research on the incidence of HRM practices, as well as on answers 
common to many other questions, such as investigating what triggers change. As such, 
Appelbaum and Batt (1994) document that the desire of American workers to 
participate in organisational change came from: the decline in real wages, high 
unemployment and a desire for more fulfilling jobs (Appelbaum and Batt 1994 : 4).
Studies which address the reasons behind the decision to adopt or reject 
HRM practices are not numerous. Rather than investigate these reasons in depth, 
advice is prescriptive and limited to encouraging firms to follow in the steps of 
‘successful’ firms.
The fact that set-up costs for implementing HRM practices can be 
prohibitive is mentioned as a drawback for adopting ‘new’ practices by Cully et al
(1999). If the successful implementation of an HRM practice is contingent upon the 
presence of related HRM practices or upon a set of firm/employee characteristics, the 
HRM practice may not lead to the expected results, and if these practices fail when 
first implemented, managers may wrongly assume that they do not work and conclude 
against their adoption. Similarly, Heywood, Siebert and Wei (1997) mention that 
payment by results has higher set-up costs than time rates, and these costs may 
consequently be prohibitive.
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A second reason for rejecting the implementation of an HRM practice is 
the existence of first-mover effects. Addison and Belfield (2001) argue that there may 
be first-mover effects whereby establishments which are early adopters of a practice 
experience immediate gains not available to late adopters - e.g. changes in the 
relationship between workplace governance and performance. Some companies may 
have adopted new strategies and cultures that render employee involvement schemes 
irrelevant. Moreover, Black and Lynch (2001) find that the association between HRM 
practices and increased productivity depends less on whether a particular practice is 
adopted, and more on how that practice is implemented.
A third factor influencing the decision of adopting or rejecting an HRM 
practice is ownership change. For instance, Millward et al (2000) find that the most 
common reasons for introducing, as well as for withdrawing, a profit-related pay 
scheme in companies covered by WERS 98 ‘was that the workplace had undergone a 
change of ownership or control’. This reason was mentioned by a quarter of 
workplaces which introduced this practice, and a third of places which withdrew it.
A fourth factor is the presence of incentives to support the adoption, or to 
encourage companies not to adopt a certain HRM practice. Not enough policy back-up 
(such as tax reductions) could constitute an explanation for the low incidence of some 
HRM practices in the UK (Millward et al 2000). However, government policy is the 
main source of change ‘in only a few specific matters’ (Millward 2000 et a l : 233). It is 
found that especially in the private sector change may be triggered by two kinds of 
factors: compositional change (e.g. change within the organisation) and change within
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continuing workplaces (wider patterns of change across organisations) (Millward et al 
2000: 233 - 234).
In the end, some authors maintain that firms may not necessarily follow a 
strict and long-lasting rationale, but rather implement HRM practices in an ad hoc 
manner, following fashions or advice from management gurus or consultancies. 
Moreover, there could be an intentional reason behind following this hypothesised 
approach to decision making: if HRM practices tend to be emergent and implemented 
initially without written descriptions, responsibilities for these practices among 
managers remain unclear while the practices have not yet been fully tested in the 
company, and managers’ direct responsibility in the case of failure could be avoided 
(Tyson 1995). At the same time, an ad hoc style of adoption or rejection presents the 
advantage that HRM practices are more easily subjected to rapid change when 
companies have to adapt to market competitive pressures.
In Britain, Cully et al (1999) make this hypothesis seem even less far­
fetched, as ‘it is reasonable to conclude for most workplaces that the broad approach to 
management is still one of control with high commitment management practices 
adopted on an ad hoc basis’ (Cully et al 1999 : 295). They also remark: ‘a conundrum 
remains: why ... are such practices [high commitment practices] not more 
widespread?’ (Cully et al 1999: 295). In a similar way to the previous research 
question highlighted in this section, there is need for more data to be collected in order 
to enable further research in this direction.
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2.3.4. How do HRM practices impact on company performance?
The main assertion of empirical studies, which are often exclusively non- 
theoretical, is that HRM practices can ‘transform’ organisations into being cost- 
efficient and productive, and increase employee well-being. For instance, Pfeffer 
(1998) reports that, in most of the studies he reviewed, substantial gains of around 40 
percent were the result of implementing what he refers to as ‘high performance 
management practices’. On a similar note, Huselid (1995) uses nationally 
representative data on nearly 1,000 American firms with more than 100 employees and 
finds that a one-percent standard deviation increase in ‘high-performance work 
practices’ translates into a seven-percent decrease in labour force turnover, and on a 
per-employee basis, into: sales increases of $27,000, market value increases of 
$19,000, and profit increases of $4,000.
Yet, there is no obvious answer to this question. Choosing ‘the best’ HRM 
practices, that is those which improve performance the most, remains a puzzling 
problem for both practitioners and researchers (Ichniowski and Shaw 2003). There are 
vast possibilities of combining in-house and imported practices (Appelbaum and Batt 
1994) and this makes the analysis of their impact on performance complex. Moreover, 
in spite of increasing research and debate in the area, managers still doubt the added- 
value that these ‘innovative’ practices bring to their businesses (Ichniowski and Shaw 
2003). Not only do studies focus on diverging HRM practises, but al§o the evidence of 
the impact that practices have on performance varies.
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A few of the most commonly investigated types of HRM practices are 
selected below and their impact on company and employee performance is analysed 
separately. The four types of HRM practices highlighted in relation to their impact on 
company performance are: (1) financial incentives (e.g. profit-related pay); (2) labour- 
management communication; (3) training; and (4) high-commitment practices. Out of 
these, three practices are also highlighted in relation to employee performance: (1) 
financial incentives, (2) high-commitment employee involvement and teamwork, and 
(3) unionisation.
2.3.4.1. Effects on company performance
Profit related pay figures prominently among the most pondered upon 
HRM practices that can determine company performance. Several firm-level studies 
from the UK, the US, Germany and Australia support the hypothesis of a positive 
association between profit related pay and labour productivity (Blanchflower and 
Oswald 1988, Kruse 1992, Loundes 2000, Addison and Belfield 2001, Black and 
Lynch 2001). However, Black and Lynch (2004) report that the link between higher 
company productivity and profit sharing and/or stock option is found not to be 
consistently statistically significant. According to Prendergast (1999), when and where 
incentive pay is used, researchers encounter selection and identification problems, and 
this subfield of research is generally restricted to companies where output is easily 
measurable. Moreover, forms of pay that tie compensation to profit tend to be 
perceived as risky.
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Additionally, financial incentives and management-labour communication 
can influence company performance, but in different ways. Hirschman (1970) defines 
‘voice’ as attempts by employees to change their organisational circumstances rather 
than leave. Voice can be exercised individually or collectively, and it can be addressed 
to the management or authorities beyond the organisation. Seminal work by Freeman 
and Medoff (1984) on the exit-voice theory of trade unions has shown that unionised 
workplaces have a lower labour turnover rate since unions act as a voice mechanism 
through which employees negotiate or express their concerns rather than exiting. 
Jalette (1997) finds that ‘mobilization’ and ‘voice’ groups of HRM practices are 
significantly associated with increases in productivity and profitability. However, the 
‘voice’ set is also significantly associated with increased production costs, which 
implies that sharing control and power with employees is a trade-off and should have 
its limits.9
Labour-management communication features highly as part of one of the 
oldest success stories of companies — especially in the manufacturing sector - which 
were turned around by a skilled selection and implementation of HRM practices. 
Parker and Slaughter (1988) report on what is one of the most highly researched case 
studies during the 1980s on the impact of HRM on company performance. The New 
United Motors Manufacturing Industries (NUMMI) plant was taken over from General 
Motors by Toyota and in two years transformed into a highly performing plant, with 85
9 N ew  research into voice shows that this communication mechanism has still more aspects to reveal. In 
a Canadian case-study, Luchak (2003) finds that the type o f  ‘vo ice’ used by em ployees is mediated by 
their feelings o f  loyalty to the company. The more the em ployees are loyal, the more likely it is that they 
use direct channels o f  communication rather than traditional ‘v o ice’ representation via trade unions. 
Luchak’s (2003) study offers mixed support to the Hirschman (1970) exit-voice-loyalty framework, 
whereby more loyal em ployees voice their concerns instead o f  exiting the company and if  ultimately 
they leave the organisation, they do so from a stronger position.
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percent of the labour force remaining employed. Training, teamwork and labour- 
management communication figure among the main practices implemented.
Training, though controversially presented as an innovative practice, 
appears both positively and negatively related to performance. American research 
conducted by Black and Lynch (2001) finds a clear relationship between increases in 
company productivity and employing skilled non-managerial workers, especially when 
skill is measured in the form of education and computer usage. Parker and Slaughter 
(1988) also found a positive relationship between training and company performance.
In contrast with these results, Jalette (1997) analyses Canadian financial 
institutions and finds that human resource development practices (training, succession 
planning, performance appraisal and information meetings) have diminished profits in 
the short term due to high upfront training costs. The author suggests that institutions 
wait to see the long term effects of training (i.e. the higher likelihood that training 
benefits are visible in the company in the long run), but cautions against the risks of 
higher labour turnover (e.g. the best workers may leave the company after training). 
The study finds that training costs are only marginally compensated by the enhanced 
productivity associated with the introduction of “voice” practices; the overall effect on 
profitability is positive but not significant.
Inconsistent results with regard to the impact of training on performance 
may derive from the fact that analysing training raises the issue of imperfect markets 
whereby increases in wages are at best lagging behind increases in productivity due to 
training (as analysed in Acemoglu and Pischke 1998). Another pervasive issue is the
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need to control for unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of training (e.g. Bartel 
1994 and Black and Lynch 1998 fail to do so).
A set of HRM practices particularly high on the agenda of empirical 
research are practices perceived to increase employee’s commitment to their jobs and 
organisational goals. Arthur (1994) uses cluster analysis to isolate six systems of HRM 
practices, which are then grouped in two broad categories: ‘cost reducers’ (with 
emphasis on workforce control, reduction in labour costs and increases in efficiency) 
and ‘commitment maximisers’ (with emphasis on increasing employee commitment). 
His results suggest that ‘commitment’ HRM practices lead to lower labour turnover 
and scrap rates and higher productivity than the ‘control’ HRM practices. Further, 
Ichniowski et al (1997) find that ‘cooperative and innovative’ practices have a 
significant impact on productivity. These HRM practices include teamwork, incentive 
pay, job security, flexible job assignments, training and communication. However, 
Knight and Latreille (2000) use WERS 1998 and find that high-commitment workplace 
practices do not have a significant impact on rates of disciplinary sanctions, dismissals 
and the incidence of unfair dismissal complaints.
Since employee involvement (El) is usually seen in relation to high- 
commitment practices, it follows that studies mentioning El are relevant to analysing 
these practices. Like most HRM practices, El is loosely defined as a combination of 
forms of communication and effort to boost communication (such as introduction of El 
initiatives in recent years), amongst which are: regular meetings of the entire 
workforce, systematic use of the management chain, suggestion schemes, surveys, 
quality circles (for example, see Addison and Belfield 2001). Black and Lynch (2001)
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find that Total Quality Management has an insignificant, or even a negative, impact on 
productivity unless a high proportion of employees are involved in regular decision 
making. Also, Black and Lynch (2004) support the positive influence of high- 
commitment practices on company performance, amongst which is employee 
participation in meetings. They analyse US data from 1993-1996 (Workforce National 
Employers Survey, in the manufacturing sector) and consider that increases in 
company productivity come from four main practices: quality management, incentive- 
based compensation, employee involvement (especially employee voice) and 
continuous innovation.
In comparison to the studies on company performance summarised above, 
the remaining part of this literature review deliberately brings together a relatively 
higher number of studies on employee performance. Recent interest in isolating the 
determinants and effects of HRM practices on employee performance (e.g. Guest et al 
2000a) may be fuelled by the relative lack in the economic empirical literature of 
studies on employee performance, in comparison to studies on company performance. 
Thus, there is a need in the literature for attempts at redressing this balance by 
presenting a two-sided perspective of HRM practices from both employees’ and 
managers’ points of view.
2.3.4.2. Effects on employee performance
Three sets of HRM practices are highlighted in relation to employee 
performance: (1) financial incentives; (2) high-commitment employee involvement and 
teamwork, and (3) unionisation.
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There is some consistency in research towards the view that financial 
incentives have a positive influence on employee performance. Kruse (1992) reports 
that profit sharing leads to a boost in worker effort and skills. Fernie et al (1994) use 
WIRS3 (1990) to report on how HRM practices can be used to increase the likelihood 
of good relationships in the workplace and improve economic performance. Three 
measures of economic outcomes are employed: (1) productivity compared with similar 
workplaces; (2) productivity changes in the previous three years; and (3) change in 
employment (e.g. labour turnover) in the previous six years. Besides these three 
economic outcome measures, three industrial relations measures are also employed: 
industrial climate ratings, the quit rate, and absenteeism rate. A benchmark for 
workplaces is defined, including: (1) average workplace; (2) strong union; (3) strong 
HRM; and (4) non-union non-HRM. Results suggest that profit-sharing, employee 
share ownership plans, merit pay and other employee involvement techniques boost 
both workplace productivity measures.
However, Addison and Belfield (2001) rework the data used by Fernie and 
Metcalf (1995) and report different results especially on the effects of employee 
involvement. Using the WIRS 1990 Fernie and Metcalf (1995) report that unions have 
a negative impact on workplace economic outcomes (except on quit rates), and that 
employee involvement improves economic outcomes but not so much the industrial 
relations outcomes. However, in their attempt of replicating Fernie and Metcalf (1995) 
as closely as possible albeit using the WERS 1998, Addison and Belfield (2001) do not 
find a negative union effect, a result change which could be attributed to the 
intervening decline in unions. Additionally, they find no consistency in the impact of 
employee involvement on financial performance, possibly due to first-mover effects in
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the market or to new cultures that obviate the need for formalising employee 
involvement.
Financial incentives also work well alongside employee involvement. 
Fernie and Metcalf (1995) use WIRS3 (1990) and find that employee involvement and 
contingent pay are more likely associated with economic outcomes than with industrial 
relations outcomes. Economic outcome measures are productivity levels and changes 
in employment. However the authors caution that ‘most of the channels to potentially 
better outcomes read more like a wish list than a coherent theory of why performance 
might improve’ (Fernie and Metcalf 1995 : 383).
The impact of employee involvement and high-commitment practices on 
employee performance is debatable. Freeman et al (2000) use information collected 
from both companies and employees and find that employee involvement has ‘weak 
and poorly specified’ effects on employee output. However, it is also found that 
employee involvement has a strong and positive impact on employee well-being. 
Concerning the latter result, further research could consider employee expectations 
with regard to these variables (e.g. by using a variant of expectancy theory as outlined 
by Guest et al 2000a). On a similar line of finding positive effects, Guest et al (2000a) 
report on two large-scale cross-sectional empirical studies conducted in Britain. They 
suggest that employees respond positively to high-commitment practices by 
experiencing not only more commitment to their jobs and higher satisfaction, but also, 
as shown by Guest (1999) ‘feelings of fairness, trust and other elements associated 
with a positive psychological contract’ (Guest et al 2000a : 9). Additionally, Jallette 
(1997) finds that a poor HRM and industrial relations climate, usually identified by
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low workplace morale and low commitment, is significantly associated with decreases 
in productivity and increases in production costs.
A positive influence of employee involvement, alongside other HRM 
practices, is also signalled by Gittleman et al (1998). They use the BLS 1993 Survey of 
Employer Provided Training to analyse determinants of worker flexibility. They ask 
establishments to report on the existence of six practices: (1) teamwork; (2) total 
quality management; (3) quality circles; (4) peer review of employee performance; (5) 
employee involvement, and (6) job rotations. Findings suggest that self-managed 
teams, employee involvement in technology and equipment purchase decisions, and 
job rotation may be used to increase worker responsibility and flexibility. 
Unfortunately, this study does not use more specific measures of employee 
performance.
The main implication for further research is that employee concerns, 
attitudes and behaviour should play a larger part as explanatory variables in 
performance studies. Incorporating into the analysis the role of employee expectations 
and aspirations could prove to be a fruitful research path.
With regard to unions, in general, a vast number of studies find a positive 
association between the existence of unions and employee performance. An intriguing 
study comparing the influence of HRM (individualisation) to unions (collectivism) 
concludes that HRM brings little contribution to the industrial relations climate, as 
management-employee relationships are worse in ‘strong HRM’ than in ‘strong union’ 
workplaces, and quit rates are higher (Fernie et al 1994). Loundes (2000) examines the
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1995 Australian WIRS and finds that a unionised workplace may have positive effects 
on employee performance outcomes by lowering quit rates, apparently due to the voice 
effects of allowing employees to express their opinions.
This thesis attempts to contribute to answering the research question of 
how and which HRM practices impact on company and employee performance.
2.4. Conclusions and summary
Stemming from the market-driven attractiveness of the HRM-performance 
relationship, virtually countless empirical studies in both the economics and HRM 
literatures have tried to scrutinise and map this research topic in the past two decades. 
In popular management books, ‘high-commitment HRM’ is touted as the answer to 
virtually every organisational problem, and mentioned as an essential ingredient in 
numerous company success stories. Conversely, research cautions against the view that 
high performance HRM practices are a panacea, and does so as academics themselves 
are puzzled by this research topic.
Various theoretical and empirical attempts to untangle this relationship 
were presented in this literature review. However, no study presumes to have 
rigorously identified a taxonomy for the measurement of either HRM practices or 
company / employee performance. This gives the field of research on the HRM- 
performance relationship its unsystematic trait and constitutes the main challenge of 
research on the topic.
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A core of HRM practices with predictable impact on performance is yet to 
be found. However, the limits of the HRM normative framework do not encourage 
research on this line. The main reason may be that these HRM practices are contingent 
on company, industry or state of the economy, hence the attempt to contend that 
certain HRM practices are universally enhancing performance would be rationally 
flawed. Additionally, Black and Lynch (2001) caution that in order to increase 
performance, the search for better HRM practices is given too much attention in 
empirical studies, to the detriment of the more important issue of how HRM practices 
should be implemented. However, there is yet no consensus in either the economic or 
HRM literatures over which or how HRM practices impact on company and employee 
performance.
There is a need for more interdisciplinary research in order to study both 
the employees and the company with the appropriate set of concepts. The study of the 
individual in psychology and sociology could be extended to the study of the 
employee, while company performance has traditionally been embraced by 
management or economics. In order to understand the mechanisms through which 
HRM relates to performance, an interdisciplinary route has been often advised (for 
example, Becker and Gerhart 1996, Baron and Kreps 1999). To resort to the economics 
field with the aim of studying company and employee performance, may seem one of 
the first and most appropriate research decisions. In addition to economics, attention 
could also be paid to akin lines of research in social sciences, even though they are 
built on divergent premises: sociology, psychology, organisational behaviour. More 
specifically, it has been signalled that the interdisciplinary research framework offering
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the best insight into economic performance should be integrating economics with 
organisational behaviour (e.g. Tomer 2000).
Content manageability and time constraints mean that the focus of the 
thesis is narrowed to using mainly two disciplines: economics (in particular, labour 
economics) and organisational behaviour (in particular, HRM practices). A further 
disclaimer is that, due to the large complexity of concepts related to workplace 
practices, a selection had to be made in order to narrow the scope of this research and 
to increase its efficiency. Hence, this thesis will not discuss issues related to labour 
regulation, law and legislative matters included in HRM practices, nor will it speculate 
upon their impact on company and employee performance.
This thesis aims to place itself at an interdisciplinary meeting point by 
emphasising complementarities between economics and other social sciences, 
particularly HRM, with the intention to enhance the understanding of the link between 
HRM practices and the performance of the employee or company. Thus, this literature 
review chapter continues with a section highlighting the main findings in the empirical 
economic and HRM literature on the HRM-performance relationship.
The need for more research is recurrently mentioned in both economics and 
HRM literature. For instance Kling (1995) insists that ‘studies must be supplemented 
by cross-industry research to assess different sectors in a comparative framework’ 
(ibid. 35). It is indeed surprising to find that despite the large interest in HRM practices 
and the fact that the majority of HRM practices may at some point be labelled ‘high
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performance’, there is scant evidence for their actual effect, for the size of the effect, 
and for their interaction — hence the choice of research topic in this thesis.
Notably, more data is needed to understand the mechanisms which 
determine managers to choose which practices to implement, and the relationship 
between degrees of implementation and performance. In particular, longitudinal studies 
are needed.
Despite a vast literature on the HRM-performance relationship, there is yet 
no clear answer as to what are the differences between old and new practices, what the 
innovative HRM practices are, or how HRM impact on performance. This is mainly 
due to the methodological challenges and inconsistencies highlighted earlier in this 
chapter.
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Summary for Chapter II
• Human resource management is a critical business area that can unlock firm 
competitiveness and improve employee and company performance. From a wider 
perspective, the right mix of HRM practices can lead to a stronger economy and 
higher societal well-being.
• The ways in which HRM practices contribute to performance is an area of debate, 
mainly due to:
o the inconsistent usage of measures of performance and HRM practices; 
suggestions from the literature for taxonomies of performance measures, 
respectively of HRM practices are briefly presented; and
o the unsystematic nature of extant studies: wide variations in level of analysis; 
poor data availability; subjective selection of HRM practices researched and of 
methodology.
• There are enduring questions in the research of the relationship between HRM 
practices and company / employee performance, such as:
o what are the differences between the 'old' and the 'new' practices? The 
differences are blurred, with studies and datasets not having attempted to answer 
this question. There is controversy over whether 'new' HRM practices have an 
insidious effect on employees, at the expense of their well-being at work. This 
thesis attempts to introduce a taxonomy of HRM practices and analyses job 
satisfaction, company and employee effort, employee stress and the relationship 
between training and promotion.
o what is the incidence of HRM practices? With regard to a set of 15 pre-selected 
high-commitment practices, evidence from the WIRS series, the series mainly used
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in this thesis, shows that the incidence is rather limited. More data is needed to 
enable further research into this area.
o what triggers the adoption or rejection of HRM practices? Factors which 
influence this decision are summarised, but more data is needed in order to answer 
this question.
o how do HRM practices impact on company and employee performance? 
Studies show that certain HRM practices can increase company and employee 
performance, and most commonly researched types of HRM practices are: financial 
incentives; labour-management communication; training; and high-commitment 
practices. However there is no consensus over the set of HRM practices that impacts 
on performance, the size of their impact on performance, or over what contingency 




THE IMPACT OF WORKPLACE PRACTICES ON JOB SATISFACTION IN
BRITAIN10
3.1. Introduction
The main objective of this chapter is to present new empirical evidence on 
the impact of HRM practices on workers overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction 
with their pay. The original contribution made is that the choice of HRM practices 
aims to bridge the HRM literature and the economics literature. The chapter 
investigates the link between specific pay methods and job satisfaction, and between 
perceived pay dispersion and job satisfaction, both being hereto under-researched 
areas. A significant contribution is made in the finding that training and learning have 
significant positive effects on job satisfaction, with the extant literature having paid 
surprisingly little attention to this relationship. Additionally, union differential effects 
are tested, and some evidence shows that HRM practices could be performing the same 
functions for some non-union members as unions do. Lastly, data used is collected on 
employees, at a scale of around 19,000 observations. Presenting employees’ side of the 
story is a highly valuable feature of this research on employee relations, since extant 
research is predominantly based on firm level data.
10 A paper based on this chapter has been accepted for publication as Petrescu and Simmons (2008).
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The reasons for researching job satisfaction are multifarious.11 Focusing 
on the workplace, this chapter asks: is the happy worker also a productive worker? Job 
satisfaction can be the motivating key to unlocking employee productivity, 
commitment and loyalty which then translate into higher company performance.
Moreover, the choice of HRM practices implemented in an organisation 
can have an impact on job satisfaction. When different components of job satisfaction 
are analysed (e.g. satisfaction with job autonomy, satisfaction with pay), research 
shows that increases in job satisfaction are associated with the presence of several 
HRM practices as varied as the increase in pecuniary incentives (Akerlof et al 1988), 
better job design (Batt and Appelbaum 1995), higher employee work “freedom” 
(Nguyen et al 2003), or job variety and prestige (Allen and Velden 2001).
The main original contribution of this chapter is aiming to bridge the HRM 
and the economics literatures on job satisfaction. Relatively few studies have sought to 
combine the economics literature with the HRM literature, so aiming to bridge the two 
while researching job satisfaction is a main source of originality for this chapter. 
Another important contribution is the insight offered into the relationship between pay 
methods and job satisfaction, as well as between pay dispersion and job satisfaction. 
This is a hereto under-researched area, with the exception of some studies on the 
dispersion of pay and its influence on job satisfaction.
11 As shown by the industrial psychology literature, job satisfaction has wider implications, beyond the 
workplace (Locke 1976). Job satisfaction impacts on a broad range o f  phenomena including em ployee 
w ellbeing, life satisfaction or longevity. For instance, Palmore (1969) finds that satisfied workers live 
longer and Iris and Barrett (1972) note that job satisfaction is positively related to life satisfaction.
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The existent social sciences literature is by default targeting the analysis of 
attitudinal variables. Additionally, the past two decades have witnessed a burgeoning 
literature on the economics of job satisfaction, adding to the social sciences literature.12 
There is also a large economics and Human Resource Management (HRM) literature 
that emphasises the influence of so-called ‘high-performance workplace practices’ on 
job satisfaction and hence employee performance. Studying the impact of HRM 
practices on job satisfaction is the main aim of this chapter. Moreover, it also analyses 
the relationship between unionisation and job satisfaction to see whether this impact is 
mediated by unionisation.
With regard to the data used, evidence is presented from two nationally 
representative datasets in Britain. The economics and HRM empirical literature on 
workplace relations in Britain are primarily based on the Workplace Industrial 
Relations Survey (WIRS) series, and on a considerably larger number of studies that 
typically rely on case study analyses.13 One dataset used is the 1998 cross-section 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey (WERS), which offers the advantage of 
analysing British industries without the limitations imposed by case studies. The other 
dataset used is the ‘Changing Employment Relationships, Employment Contracts and 
the Future of Work Survey’ (CERS), conducted in 2000. At the time of this research, 
the WERS 1998 is the latest wave in the WIRS series, and the CERS is the latest 
available dataset with information on job satisfaction in Britain. The two datasets are
12 See, for example Clark (1996), Oswald (1997), Robie et a l (1998), Blanchflower and Oswald (2000), 
Clark (2001), Gazioglu and Tansel (2003), Bryson, Cappellari and Lucifora (2003) or Nguyen, Taylor 
and Bradley (2003).
13 Kling (1995), Ichniowski et a l (1996) and Ichniowski et a l (1997), Black and Lynch (1997), Leigh and 
Gill (1999), Appelbaum et a l (2000), and Delaney and Goddard (2001) are examples for the US, 
whereas British research includes Heywood et a l (1997), Poole and Jenkins (1998), Whitfield (2000), 
Addison et a l (2000) and Addison et a l (2001), Delbridge and Whitfield (2001). Case studies have the 
major drawback o f  not allowing for generalisations, which is what the current chapter aims to improve.
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complements in the analysis carried in this chapter in terms of the representativeness of 
their data at organisational level (e.g. organisational size).
The remainder of this chapter is broken down as follows. Section 3.2 
briefly reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on job satisfaction, then 
discusses the literature on the impact of HRM practices in relation to job satisfaction. 
Section 3.3 describes the two datasets used, the hypotheses formulated and the 
econometric methodology. Section 3.4 discusses the findings from the analysis of the 
impact of HRM practices on workers’ overall satisfaction and that with pay. Then the 
same section examines the differences in outcome between union and non-union 
members, followed by a discussion of the impact of pay inequality. Conclusions and 
the chapter summary follow in section 3.5.
3.2. Job satisfaction and role of HRM practices
3.2.1. The study of job satisfaction - rooted in the social sciences literature
Overall job satisfaction is an attitudinal variable that shows how people 
feel about the job as a whole and also about a variety of discrete job aspects. In social 
sciences, where the study of job satisfaction as an attitudinal variable is rooted, it has 
mainly been analysed from the point of view of intrinsic or extrinsic motivators, 
situational theory and in case studies in the HRM literature. The focus has generally 
been on understanding the impact of job satisfaction on a wide range on issues mostly 
related to individual and societal well-being
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One of the earliest definitions in industrial psychology states that job 
satisfaction is ‘a positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one’s job’ 
(Locke 1976 : 1300). Due to its self-reported nature, the study of job satisfaction may 
be said to have found a more comfortable place on psychologists’ research desk rather 
than in economics.
Theories of job satisfaction have been developed mainly by psychologists 
and management scholars. They tend to assign various degrees of importance to 
sources of satisfaction, which can be classified as either intrinsic or extrinsic. Intrinsic 
sources depend on the individual characteristics of the person, such as attitudes. 
Extrinsic sources are situational, and depend on the environment, such as workplace 
climate. Theories which rely on extrinsic sources are more typically adopted by 
economists, albeit using different terminology, whereas intrinsic sources are more 
commonly associated with other social sciences (Luchak, 2003).
Extrinsic theories also have deep roots in the social sciences, and can be 
traced back, for instance, to Herzberg’s (1959) hygiene-motivation theories, which 
develop two distinct sets of factors influencing motivation and satisfaction. One set of 
factors is called ‘motivators’ (i.e., job factors that are work related). These factors are: 
recognition, achievement, the possibility for growth and advancement, the level of 
responsibility and the nature of the work itself. Secondly, ‘hygiene’ factors, which are 
not directly related to the job itself, are also important and relate to the conditions that 
surround doing that job. These include salary, technical support, company policy and 
administration, working conditions, status, job security, and interpersonal relationships 
among supervisors, subordinates and peers. It is very interesting from an economics
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point of view to note that this theory suggests pay is not a good motivator - which is a 
well-established theory in psychological research (see Jenkins et al 1998).
A further strand of this theoretical literature is known as situational theory, 
an example of which is Locke’s value-based theory. According to Clark (1996), this is 
‘a classic reference for the meaning of job satisfaction’. Locke (1976) defines job 
satisfaction as ‘a pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of 
one’s job or job experiences’ (Clark 1996 : 190). Finally, Hackman and Lawler (1971) 
present an alternative facet-based theory of job satisfaction, whereby job 
characteristics, such as task variety, autonomy, feedback, identity and task significance 
influence motivation and job satisfaction.
In the HRM literature, a few sociological and psychological studies have 
focused on the effects of job satisfaction on firm and employee performance. The 
majority of these studies are descriptive and often based on case studies (see the 
reviews in Purcell 1999 and Ramllal 2003), which means that the findings from this 
research cannot be generalised. For instance, Truss (2001) analyses a single firm 
(Hewlett Packard), whereas Rigano and Donna (1998) research the experience of one 
worker.
3.2.2. Job satisfaction as an economics variable related to performance
The business axiomatic assumption that a happy worker is a productive 
worker has been fuelling interest in decades of research into the job satisfaction-job 
performance relationship. As the study of job satisfaction ceased to be the prerogative
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of social sciences, it became embraced by economists and the focus shifted onto the 
link between job satisfaction and company performance -  with recently added interest 
into the link between job satisfaction and employee performance. The recent empirical 
economics literature has made significant developments in the research of job 
satisfaction. The aim is to identify those HRM practices with an impact on job 
satisfaction, since the assumption is that these practices would consequently improve 
employee and company performance. Thus, despite methodological concerns, the 
study of job satisfaction in Labour Economics has developed under the umbrella of 
utility functions, whereby personal or job characteristics are entered into a regression 
equation as control variables, alongside HRM practices.
Traditionally, economists have embraced studies of job satisfaction in the 
workplace with ‘professional suspicion’ (Freeman, 1978: 135) because it is a 
subjective variable. Moreover, in methodology, the use of subjective variables on both 
sides of an estimation equation can be contentious with regard to whether: (a) the 
studies are theoretic or not; (b) the determinants are objective; and (c) models analyse 
subjective outcomes which are economically relevant and yield statistically viable 
results (Hamermesh 2004).14 Whereas other social sciences have been researching job 
satisfaction, Blanchflower and Oswald (2000) describe the study of job satisfaction by 
economists as being ‘still in its infancy’ (Blanchflower and Oswald, 2000 : 8).
An emerging and fast growing empirical labour-economics literature has 
concentrated in the past decade on analysing job satisfaction. The implicit assumption
14 Hamermesh (2004) warns against the use o f  subjective variables on both sides o f  an equation. Whilst 
social sciences have used attitudinal subjective variables in their studies, Hamermesh (2004) warns 
econom ists against duplication o f  results obtained by social scientists, against using subjective variables 
that are not relevant in Economics, and against using incorrect methodology.
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is that those HRM practices which contribute to increasing employee overall 
satisfaction with job, would have a consequent similar positive impact on employee / 
company performance. At the most basic level, HRM practices would motivate 
employees by enabling them to work in an environment where they are highly satisfied 
with their jobs, and so happier employees would then be more productive.
Some of the earliest studies of job satisfaction concentrate on absenteeism 
and financial turnover. Muchinsky (1977) relates job satisfaction to lower absenteeism. 
Freeman (1978) relates job satisfaction to lower employee turnover (as in number of 
employees hired to replace those leaving the organisation).
The recent increasing trend in the economics literature studies the impact 
of HRM practices on performance by using measures of job satisfaction. The empirical 
analysis of job satisfaction either implicitly or explicitly draws on the theoretical 
models discussed above, and in so doing job satisfaction is specified as a function of 
several individual and job characteristics, and interpreted as a utility function (Clark 
and Oswald 1996; Easterlin, 2001; Nguyen et al 2003).
With regard to individual characteristics, research on the determinants of 
job satisfaction shows that women are more satisfied with their jobs than men, possibly 
a reflection of their lower expectations from work, which may in turn be a consequence 
of their relatively poor position in the labour market (Clark 1996, 1997; Groot and 
Brink, 1999). A U-shaped relationship between age and job satisfaction has also been 
observed (Sloane and Ward 2001; Blanchflower and Oswald 2001), and married 
workers are more likely to report a higher level of job satisfaction (Blanchflower and
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Oswald 2001). More highly educated workers report lower levels of job satisfaction 
(Clark and Oswald 1996), possibly because job satisfaction depends on the gap 
between outcomes and aspirations, and the latter increase with the level of education.
Moreover, HRM practices are entered as independent variables into the 
utility function equations with job satisfaction. This is because, as it has been shown in 
Chapter II, recent economic studies investigating the relationship between HRM 
practices and company and worker performance, suggest that some practices have the 
potential to ‘transform’ organisations into being cost-efficient and productive, whilst 
also increasing employee well-being
3.2.3. The role of HRM practices in relation to job satisfaction
There is no pre-defined set of HRM practices analysed in relation to their 
impact on job satisfaction. Nor are there tendencies for standardisation of models 
generated. For instance, different components of job satisfaction are analysed (e.g. 
satisfaction with job autonomy, satisfaction with pay). Research shows that increases 
in job satisfaction are associated with the presence of several HRM practices as varied 
as the increase in pecuniary incentives (Akerlof et al 1988), better job design (Batt and 
Appelbaum 1995), higher employee work “freedom” (Nguyen et al 2003), or job 
variety and prestige (Allen and Velden 2001). Additionally, working in teams, greater 
discretion and autonomy in the workplace and various employee involvement and pay 
schemes, do motivate workers and hence generate higher labour productivity (Cully et
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al 1999; Boselie et al. 2001).15 However, overall job satisfaction need not increase if 
effort is a ‘bad’ and the rational worker’s aim is to maximise the returns from the 
exerted effort.
Certain researchers remain sceptical about the link between job satisfaction 
and performance. For instance, in psychological research, Iaffaldano and Muchinsky’s 
(1985) meta-analysis finds only a slight correlation between satisfaction and 
performance, while Ayman and Chemers (1983) and Butler and Cantrell (1997) 
conclude that the positive relationship holds under limited circumstances. Fisher
(2002) offers a very in-depth and unique insight into the psychological rapport between 
affect (happiness) and productivity, much of which constitutes a slightly unfamiliar 
reading to an economist.
Other studies in both economics and psychology confirm the positive
relation between job satisfaction and performance or financial turnover. The
performance-related outcomes most widely used in the more recent studies of this
relationship have usually been quantitative or qualitative measures of output,
absenteeism and financial turnover. Agho and Price (1992) refer to employee
involvement and organisational commitment, and relate job satisfaction to what is
known in the literature as ‘situational’ variables such as autonomy, routinization and
work group cohesion. Autonomy is defined as the degree to which employees have
freedom to make job related decisions, and is positively related to job satisfaction.
Routinization is the degree to which the employees perform repetitive tasks, and is
negatively related to job satisfaction. Work group cohesion is positively related to job
15 Koch and McGrath (1996) define labour productivity as the ‘extent to which human capital is 
delivering value to the firm’ (Koch and McGrath 1996 : 337), mathematically defined by dividing total 
output by labour input.
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satisfaction. Moreover, some economics studies indicate a direct relationship between 
job satisfaction and reductions in quits, higher financial turnover and higher labour 
productivity (Freeman 1978, Clark 2001, Shields and Price 2002). Clark (2001) creates 
a hierarchy of seven job aspects according to the power they have in a quit equation: 
job security and pay are the most important, followed by the use of initiative, work 
itself, and hours of work.
The latter study is part of a long-established trend in the literature, namely 
to segregate overall job satisfaction into additive discrete parts. Breaking down 
(overall) job satisfaction into facets (e.g. satisfaction with pay, satisfaction with job 
autonomy etc) is a characteristic of research into the role of HRM practices in relation 
to job satisfaction. An early example for this tradition is the operationalisation used by 
Locke (1976). Gazioglu and Tansel (2003) employ four measures of job satisfaction: 
satisfaction with influence over job, satisfaction with amount of pay, satisfaction with 
sense of achievement and satisfaction with amount of respect from supervisors. Using 
maximum likelihood ordered probit analysis their paper updates Clark (1996) and 
obtains results common to the previous literature, but using a different set of variables. 
Also, Bessokimaia and Temnitskii (2001) suggest that the following factors are 
significant in a study of job satisfaction of industrial workers: work itself, job content, 
work organization, job stress, length of workweek, amount of work, use of work time, 
number of holidays, times when shifts begin and end, length of lunch/dinner break, 
wage levels, mechanization of work, hygienic conditions, relations with management, 
relations with co-workers, satisfaction of daily needs, medical services, and working 
conditions in general.
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In Britain, in their presentation of evidence regarding British workplaces, 
Cully et al (1999) mention that the goal of the new policy employment relations at 
present is improving job satisfaction. WERS 98 asked employees whether they were 
satisfied or dissatisfied on four aspects of their working lives: influence they have over 
their jobs, pay, sense of achievement obtained from their work and respect gained from 
managers. The four aspects were compiled to create a summary scale (Cully et al 1999 
: 181), roughly 50% of employees were found to be satisfied or very satisfied on the 
summary scale of job satisfaction, 20% were dissatisfied, and 30% were neither 
satisfied nor dissatisfied.16 Cully et al (1999) conclude that while the main aim of 
employment policy since mid-1960s, namely to reduce conflict at work, has been 
achieved -  as proved by the decrease in incidence of industrial actions to 94% of 
workplaces not experiencing any industrial action in the past five years - the new focus 
should be on job satisfaction (Cully et al 1999 : 298). The WERS 98 shows that 93% 
of workplaces have some workers who are not satisfied with their jobs.
As part of the study of the impact of HRM practices on job satisfaction, 
this chapter looks at pay methods and their impact on job satisfaction. There is a 
longstanding interest, especially amongst economists, in the role played by pay and 
reward structures in determining worker effort and company performance. Reward 
systems have been analysed predominantly by economists. There are relatively few 
empirical as opposed to theoretical studies (Pfeffer and Langton, 1993, Lazear 2000). 
The most notable exceptions (i.e. empirical studies of pay, as opposed to theoretical)
16 The job satisfaction summary scale is generated by summing the scores for each o f  the four individual 
aspects o f  job satisfaction, summation o f  which is then scaled back to the original categories (see Cully 
et a t 1999 : 191, notes 3 and 4). The purpose o f  this exercise was “to give a global picture” o f  job  
satisfaction via a graphical presentation (Cully et a t 1999 :181), and herein lie its limitations.
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are Black and Lynch (2004), Booth and Frank (1999), Cappelli and Neumark (1999) 
and Lazear (2000).
While analysing the link between pay-related HRM practices and job 
satisfaction, studies mostly look at pay-level satisfaction and not at pay methods. 
Therefore, there is a limited number of empirical economics studies looking at the 
effects of pay practices on job satisfaction in companies. For instance, Miceli and 
Mulvey (2000) use two case studies to show that workers satisfied with their pay 
method are more highly committed to their firm, and that worker satisfaction could 
originate from satisfaction with pay systems, but not pay levels. Brown and Sessions
(2003) find that certain performance-related pay methods are associated with higher 
job satisfaction, but that some group-sharing schemes may not eliminate free riding
• 17and could lead to lower work effort and discourage collaboration.
The social sciences observation that pay in itself may not be the best
motivator is consistent with some studies in the empirical economics literature on
pecuniary incentives. Echoing the results from the social sciences, economics studies
show that the link between the level of pay and job satisfaction is not straightforward.
For instance, relative pay, fairness and loyalty may play a bigger part in motivating
employees and determining the effort they deploy (Brown 2001). Brown et al (2004)
find some support for the hypothesis that firms may pay higher wages in order to elicit
more employee effort; they also note that the linkages between wage premiums work
indirectly, via generating higher feelings of commitment and loyalty, and not directly
via higher wages. Meanwhile, Bouwens and Lent (2003) also agree with the efficiency
17 For more studies looking at the impact o f  specific methods o f  pay on satisfaction, see Elvira and Town  
(2001) on favouritism issues raised by individual bonus pay as opposed to piece rates; and Heywood and 
Wei (2004) who offer an extensive study o f  six methods o f  pay, favouring individual performance pay.
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wage theory, but find that the linkage is mediated by the impact of high-powered 
incentives on employee self-selection: these incentives attract better employees who 
then deploy more effort.
Whereas introducing a measure of nominal pay in the dataset would not be 
feasible due to its endogeneity - and, in any case, a continuous wage variable was not 
available in the dataset where only a banded measure of the nominal wage is available 
-  the present chapter seeks to generate knowledge of the relationship between various 
methods of pay and job satisfaction. Indeed, Judge and Welboume (1994) show that 
compensation satisfaction is a multidimensional concept18. Therefore, this chapter 
takes into account different methods of pay such as seniority-based pay and different 
types of incentive-based pay, and posits that it is a valid and relatively novel concern to 
research their impact on satisfaction.
This chapter also proposes to delve deeper into the analysis of varied 
pecuniary incentives, by looking at the impact of pay distribution on job satisfaction. In 
fact, studies on pecuniary rewards show that it is relative income rather than nominal 
income that matters more in employee motivation (Hamermesh, 2001; Clark and 
Oswald, 1996; Shields and Price, 2002).
The evidence on the effects of relative pay on job satisfaction is mixed.
Clark and Oswald (1996) show that workers’ reported level of well-being is weakly
correlated with their relative income, whereas Belfield and Harris (2002) find no
evidence of such a relationship for those working in higher education.
18 For instance, som e em ployees may be satisfied with the nominal wage but dissatisfied with the 
method in which it is implemented in operation, whereas their colleagues may feel the other way around 
(Folger and Konowsky, 1989)
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Relatively little is known beyond particular case studies about the impact 
of pay distribution within a firm on worker performance on job satisfaction.19 ’ 20 This 
is intriguing because there is a growing literature which fervently advocates the 
implementation of contingent, and implicitly variable, pay structures that encourage 
wage dispersion.21 Despite this, it is actually difficult to sign the effect of the pay 
distribution within a firm on workers’ job satisfaction, but the tendency has been to test 
for a negative effect of highly dispersed compensation schemes on performance.22
There are particularly very few studies that seek to examine the 
relationship between the pay distribution within a firm measured via the worker’s 
perception of that distribution, and individual worker performance or their job 
satisfaction.23 An exception is Bloom and Michel (2002) who discuss the advantages
19 For a few  notable exceptions see: Kennedy (1997) warns o f  the negative consequences o f  highly  
dispersed compensation; Brown (2001) focuses on pay referents based on the study by Blau (1994); or 
Bloom  and Michael (2002) analyse pay dispersion in managerial compensation schem es and find it to be 
contingent on managerial tenure. In general, studies that focus on the relationship between pecuniary 
incentives and job satisfaction do not include any measure o f  pay dispersion.
20 It can also be noted that if  one thought to glance at the political domain as a reflection o f  econom ic  
tastes for equality, the observed tendency in western political systems is to move towards socialist 
governments (which might be said to be the consequence o f  a shared societal dislike o f  highly dispersed 
income distributions). But, even if  one were to consider the political scene o f  a country in order to try to 
assess the respective nations’ tastes for equality at some given point in time, it is still difficult to estimate 
equality preferences in the long run. For instance, there is evidence that former communist countries, 
where socialist reforms had imposed egalitarian pay systems, have embraced in the post-communist 
period political reforms leading to higher income dispersion, and that residents o f  these countries have 
adjusted their view s towards being more w elcom ing to inequality (Blanchflower and Freeman 1997). 
There is also evidence that western econom ies which have had no communist influences, such as France 
or the UK, and where one would expect to see rather non-egalitarian systems o f  pay, have moved in the 
past decade towards voting in governments with a rather more leftist / socialist agenda. N evertheless, in 
Britain, the Labour Party’s reforms have been criticised as being influenced by the right-wing policies, 
Thompson describing N ew  Labour’s economic thinking as signalling ‘the death o f  socialist political 
econom y in Britain’ (Thompson 2006: 335). Therefore, it appears that one cannot make inferences with 
regard to a population’s preferences for equality based on the policies implemented by the prevailing 
political party. This is because these policies cannot be said to reflect reliably the preferences o f  the 
society as a w hole (and o f  the employees).
21 However, evidence on the incidence o f  these practices has been continuously accumulating in the UK, 
US and other countries (Addison and Belfield, 2001; Arthur 1992; Bailey et a l 2001; Osterman, 1994; 
Pfeffer, 1998; and Wood, 1999).
22 See Hambrick and Siegel (1997) and Pfeffer and Langton (1993) for a brief discussion o f  why this 
remains a conundrum, as well as evidence that they also test for a negative effect.
23 The benefits o f  including subjective (such as perception-based) variables in research have been 
highlighted ever since Freeman (1978) who remarks: ‘w hile there are good reasons to treat subjective
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and disadvantages of dispersed and compressed ‘actual’ pay structures. Dispersed pay 
structures may induce higher levels of performance as employees have to work harder 
to move up the pay ladder. This is consistent with the notion of promoting the ‘star’ 
workers in a competitive environment and the provision of compensating pay 
differentials for high-risk jobs.
However, dispersed pay systems may also be linked to workforce 
instability and higher turnover. The latter effect is in accordance with the prediction of 
tournament theory whereby the ‘winners’ stay with the company in order to compete in 
further tournaments, but ‘losers’ are implicitly expected to leave or to face truncated 
careers (Bloom and Michel, 2002). On the other hand, compressed pay promotes team 
effort and cooperation by creating a more egalitarian workplace, which tends to reduce 
turnover (Beaumont and Harris, 2003). Nevertheless, compressed pay systems may 
discourage effort above a certain minimal necessary level, and may be perceived as 
unfair because of being open to free-rider problems.
Lastly, one of the main claims of studies on the effects of HRM practices in 
organisations is that they were (intended to be) a substitute for unionisation. In the 
management literature, the HRM trend is presented as a win-win solution, with 
increased organisational productivity for employers and a more favourable working 
climate for employees for instance by improving employee job satisfaction or pay.
However, its advantages remain highly disputed in the economics
literature. For instance, instead of increasing, job satisfaction levels in the Anglo-
variables gingerly, the answers to questions about how people feel toward their job are not meaningless 
but rather convey useful information about economic life that should not be ignored’ (Freeman 1978 : 
135).
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Saxon economies do not appear to have changed; in fact, job satisfaction is sometimes 
found to have decreased (Blanchflower et al 1993, Oswald 1997, Easterlin 2001, 
Bunting 2004, Gallie 2005, Rose 2005). Moreover, Machin and Wood (2004) use 
British workplace data and do not find evidence in support of the HRM / union 
substitution hypothesis, concluding that union decline in Britain is not related to the 
increasing incidence of HRM practices.
Some studies suggest the hypothesis that unions may trigger job 
dissatisfaction. Bryson et al (2003) use the matched employer-employee data available 
in WERS 98 to test the hypothesis that unions may incite job dissatisfaction, more 
specifically to test the implied causation that union membership decreases overall job 
satisfaction and satisfaction with pay. Employees who expressed most satisfaction or 
dissatisfaction about overall job issues tend to be union members, as if non-union 
membership were a more predominant feature of individuals who focus their 
satisfaction or dissatisfaction on one job facet, or who do not even have preferences. 
Indeed, union membership and job satisfaction may be jointly determined, with the 
exception that degrees of pay satisfaction reported are similar for members and non­
members. Authors conclude that membership appears to be endogenous with respect to 
satisfaction, as for a sub-set of union members job dissatisfaction is ‘...innate rather 
than the result of bad working conditions. It is this that leads them to both join the 
union and rank themselves dissatisfied’. Furthermore, Bryson et al (2003) find that 
unions manage to provide their members with a ‘compensating pay differential’ for 
less desirable characteristics of their jobs.
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3.3. Data, hypotheses and econometric methodology
3.3.1. Datasets: CERS and WERS
Two British datasets are used for the empirical analysis: The Changing 
Employment Relationships, Employment Contracts and the Future o f Work Survey 
(CERS in this chapter) and The Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998 (WERS 
or WERS 98 in this chapter).
CERS was commissioned by the Policy Studies Institute as part of the 
Future o f  Work research programme. This data was collected between July 2000 and 
January 2001, and the main aim of the Survey was to identify and describe the key 
changes in British employee relations. Two data collection methods were used: 
interviews and self-completion questionnaires. The one-hour interviews were personal, 
paper-based, conducted in the home, and totalled 2,466. Self-completion 
questionnaires were issued together with the interviews and returned by 2,349 
respondents, which represents a 95-percent response rate. Once respondents with 
missing values on key variables and the self-employed are omitted (334 respondents), 
the sample drops to 1,518.
WERS 98 contains a much larger sample of workers than CERS (19,890 
allowing for missing data), and has the advantage that responses are obtained from 
both employees and their managers. The survey was conducted in the period from 
October 1997 to July 1998. The structure of WERS 98 consists of a cross-section and a 
panel survey. The cross-sectional WERS 98 survey was conducted on 3,200 
workplaces selected from the Interdepartmental Business Register, assuming an overall
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yield of 70 percent. Data was obtained from 2,000 workplaces with 25 or more 
employees, and 250 workplaces with 10 to 24 employees. 24 The survey consisted of 
interviewing the employees, their representative and the employee relations manager of 
the workplace, in order to capture a balanced picture from both employees’ and 
management’s point of view. On employees’ side, a 45 minute interview was 
conducted with either the senior lay representative of the recognised union with the 
largest coverage at the workplace, or with the senior employee representative on a joint 
consultative committee. Additionally, for the first time in the WIRS series, 25 
employees were chosen at random and sent a self-completion questionnaire. All 
employees were sent the questionnaires in workplaces with less than 25 employees. On 
management’s side, the senior workplace manager responsible for the day-to-day 
employee relations matters was interviewed for 90 to 100 minutes, and a data sheet 
was completed. This chapter uses the joint employee-manager questionnaire to get a 
combined picture of employment relations from both perspectives.
An advantage of the CERS data over WERS is that it contains a question 
on overall job satisfaction: “How satisfied or dissatisfied are you with the work 
itself?”, which is reported in Table 3.1.
24 An allowance was made at the Interdepartmental Business Register in the selection o f  workplaces for 
not in scope and non-response.
Table 3.1 The distribution of overall job satisfaction (CERS)
Frequency Percent
Completely satisfied 230 10.79
Very satisfied 730 34.24
Satisfied 831 38.98
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 164 7.69
Dissatisfied 117 5.49
Very dissatisfied 26 1.22
Completely dissatisfied 24 1.13
Total 2,132
Note: 10 respondents did not state their level of job satisfaction.
The majority of the respondents to the survey are satisfied with their job 
(84% report some level of satisfaction; 8% are neutral; 8% report some level of 
dissatisfaction), the modal group being ‘satisfied’ (39%). The distribution of job 
satisfaction observed in Table 3.1 is consistent with other British studies and shows 
that the reported levels of satisfaction are very high (Blanchflower et al 1993, 
Millward et al 1999, Oswald and Gardner, 2001). These results may reflect a self­
selection effect insofar as workers sort themselves into the jobs that they like and quit 
those they dislike. However, this explanation over-states workers’ ability to find a 
suitable job match. There are very few observations in some categories and hence job 
satisfaction is collapsed into five discrete categories (see below).
A drawback of the WERS is that it does not contain an equivalent question 
on overall job satisfaction, but instead asks workers about their satisfaction with their 
pay: “How satisfied are you with the amount of pay you receive?”. An equivalent 
question is asked in the CERS on workers’ satisfaction with pay How satisfied or 
dissatisfied are you with your pay?”, and hence the distribution of workers satisfaction 
with their pay is also modelled, as shown in Tables 3.2A and 3.2B. In CERS, 59%
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report some level of satisfaction with pay, 14% are neutral, and 27% report some level 
of dissatisfaction, with the modal group being satisfied with their pay (46%). In 
WERS, 35% report some level of satisfaction with pay, 23% are neutral, and 40% are 
dissatisfied, with the modal group being satisfied with their pay (32%).
Table 3.2A The distribution of satisfaction over pay (CERS)
Frequency Percent
Completely satisfied 59 2.77
Very satisfied 215 10.08
Satisfied 976 45.78
Neither satisfied not dissatisfied 301 14.12
Dissatisfied 403 18.90
Very dissatisfied 101 4.74
Completely dissatisfied 64 3.00
Total 2,119 99.39
Note: Out of the 2,132 respondents in the dataset, for 1 respondent, the question was 
not applicable, and 12 respondents did not state their level of satisfaction with pay.
Table 3.2B The distribution of satisfaction over pay (WERS)
Frequency Percent
Very satisfied 970 3.43
Satisfied 9,011 31.91
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 6,568 23.26
Dissatisfied 7,885 27.92
Very dissatisfied 3,480 12.32
Total 27, 914 98.84
Note: 1.16 percent of respondents (326) did not answer the question, or answered ‘I 
don’t know’.
Differences between the distribution of the two variables for satisfaction 
with pay may be due to the fact that CERS samples a different subset of employees, 
which is in size only 8% of the WERS sample. Additionally, differences may be due to 
data for the two surveys being collected in slightly different periods of time (WERS: 
October 1997 - July 1998, CERS: July 2000 - January 2001), and, consequently, due to
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Britain experiencing slightly different influences upon its economy, politics and 
society.25
The CERS and the WERS datasets differ in that the former has a larger 
proportion of workers from small firms (i.e. those with less than 10 employees), 
whereas the WERS excludes establishments with fewer than 10 employees. This 
means that WERS excludes in its sampling frame 73% of the total of 1.3 million 
establishments in the UK (Cully et al, 1999). The critical advantage gained from using 
CERS becomes even clearer when one considers the considerable bias in the extant 
economic literature which favours large organisation studies due to easier availability 
of data. However, by number of employees, WERS has taken into account for its 
sampling frame 82% of the total employee population. In conclusion, WERS is more 
representative of the employee population, whereas CERS is more representative of the 
establishment population since CERS includes in its sampling frame those workplaces 
/ companies / organisations (these terms are used in CERS interchangeably) with under 
10 employees. These two datasets can thus be seen as complements in this analysis. 
For a more detailed comparison between the datasets, please see Appendix B.l.
As shown in Figure 3.1, WERS includes more large workplaces than 
CERS, and one could assume that there is a higher scope for more generous pay 
schemes in large workplaces / firms. In fact, one would expect large firms to be 
associated with higher levels pay than small firms. This is a stylised fact of the labour 
market known in labour economics as the firm size wage effect. So, it may be puzzling
25 1997 is when the Labour Party came to power in Britain, whereas by 2001 the effervescence 
surrounding an election would be expected to have become a bit more subdued.
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to note that workers sampled in WERS are less satisfied with their pay than workers 
sampled in CERS.
Nevertheless, the firm size wage effect does not imply that satisfaction 
with pay is also higher in large firms. For instance, even though workers may receive a 
higher pay in large firms, relative-pay comparisons within large firms may leave 
workers feeling “dissatisfied” with a particular level of pay, whilst that same level of 
pay may make workers who are employed in small firms rate themselves as “satisfied” 
with their pay. This is also because there would be a higher likelihood that in a large 
firm one’s level of pay was ranked towards the lower side of within-firm pay 
distribution. This likelihood would be higher if one were part of a more numerous 
workforce, a workforce which is also known to have relatively higher levels of pay 
than the rest of the labour market, such as is the case of large firms.
Figure 3.1 Comparative distribution of organisations (CERS) and workplaces 
(WERS) by employee size (% in sample from CERS and WERS)
_n m" '■■111HU
■ fc  H_ i
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Descriptive statistics for all variables constructed from both datasets are 
shown in Appendix B.2 while Appendix B.3 compares the means for all covariates for 
the CERS and the WERS. Variables for HRM and pay inequality variables are 
constructed from the questions listed in Appendix B.4. Appendix B.3 allows for 
comparison between the sample means for the variables extracted from the two 
datasets. It is clear that the CERS has fewer professional workers and more 
managerial/intermediate technical workers than the WERS.
To allow a comparison of the findings from these two datasets this chapter 
uses a set of covariates that are encoded to be as consistent as possible. In terms of 
HRM practices, the following sets of variables are identified: work organisation, 
supervision, employee involvement/voice, recruitment and selection, training and
learning, and pay practices. In addition, variables for the workers’ perception of pay
26inequality in the workplace and whether the workplace is unionised are included.
Workers in CERS are less likely to work in teams, get involved in 
improvement groups or be in workplaces that offer profit-related pay. Conversely, 
workers in WERS are less likely to be supervised, or work in workplaces that 
encourage both training and skill development. The fact that CERS is representative of 
the population of establishments in Britain whereas WERS is representative of the 
population of workers in Britain makes an analysis of both datasets potentially very 
revealing.
26 The comparison o f  the two datasets can only be performed with respect to the workers’ satisfaction  
with their pay, since the WERS dataset does not include a variable for overall job satisfaction.
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3.3.2. Hypotheses
The first hypothesis of this chapter tests whether HRM practices have an 
impact on job satisfaction, being based on the results of the extant literature and aiming 
to contribute to a deeper understanding of the link between HRM practices and job 
satisfaction:
Hypothesis 1: Certain HRM practices (specifically i f  selected from an 
enlarged set o f  practices that takes into account the extant literature), have a positive 
impact on job satisfaction. In particular, the HRM practices expected to have a 
positive impact are: teamwork, job design, job autonomy, employee involvement and 
communication.
Secondly, based on (a) the assumptions made in the psychology literature 
with regard to the fact that nominal pay itself may not be a good motivator, but that 
other forms of pecuniary rewards are; and on (b) the assumption from the limited 
economics literature, the following hypothesis is tested with the available methods of 
pay in the datasets:
Hypothesis 2: Methods o f  pay other than nominal wages, such as seniority- 
based pay and other incentive-based forms o f pay, have a positive impact on job  
satisfaction.
A third objective of this chapter is to use the available measure of 
perceived pay dispersion in order to analyse the impact of perceived pay inequality on 
workers’ job satisfaction. Acknowledging that it is difficult to sign the expected effect,
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due the limited and undecided literature on this topic, the choice is made to test for a 
negative effect of a highly unequal perceived pay distribution on British employee 
satisfaction:
Hypothesis 3: A perceived high degree o f pay dispersion has a negative 
impact on job satisfaction.
The last objective of this chapter is to investigate whether HRM practices 
have a smaller impact on the job satisfaction of union members as opposed to non­
union members. It could be argued that a lower impact of HRM practices on union 
members would be expected, since union members do already have the advantage over 
their counterparts of using the unions as a ‘voice’ mechanism:
Hypothesis 4: Union membership mediates the relationship between 
workplace practices and job satisfaction, and HRM practices have a lower impact on 
job satisfaction for union members.
3.3.3. Econometric methodology
The unit of analysis in both datasets is the employee. Following the theory 
and previous literature discussed above, job satisfaction, S, can be expressed as:
Sj = 1 3 ^  +(3'2HRM; + P'INEQUALITYj + u s (1)
where X  refers to a vector of worker, job and firm characteristics, including whether 
the worker is a union member, p'are coefficients to be estimated, and i is the subscript 
for an individual worker.27 Worker characteristics include their age, gender, marital 
status, number of children, and highest educational qualification, whereas the job and 
firm characteristics include the workers occupation/skill level and firm size. Unlike the 
previous literature, a vector of variables reflecting human resource management 
practices, HRM, are included in the model. These are classified under the following 
headings: (i) work organisation, (ii) supervision, (iii) employee involvement, (iv) 
recruitment and selection, (v) training and learning, and (iv) pay practices, including 
seniority-based pay and performance-related pay. This classification follows organic 
delineations and aims to bring together in one place the vast majority of HRM 
practices used in the HRM literature which are entered hereby in a labour economics 
model; thus, this study constitutes a bridging point between HRM and labour 
economics. Finally, INEQUALITY refers to the workers’ perception of the pay 
distribution in the firm, and in particular to the extent to which this distribution is 
regarded as too unequal.
Hamermesh (2004) has warned about the inclusion of subjective covariates 
when the dependent variable is itself subjective. In this chapter, the dependent variable 
is subjective, yet so is the independent variable INEQUALITY. The inclusion of this 
particular latter variable can be defended on the grounds that perception of pay is 
probably a most important factor in decisions made by workers with regard to their 
satisfaction with their pay.
27 N ote that an identical specification is adopted for satisfaction with pay.
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It is clear from Tables 3.1 and 3.2A that in CERS overall job satisfaction 
and satisfaction with pay are measured on an ordinal scale,, however, since there is a 
lack of data on some categories of dissatisfaction, it is necessary to combine them. This 
gives the following classification for overall job satisfaction and for satisfaction with 
pay in CERS (more details in Appendix B.5 in Panels 1 and 2):
7 = 5  completely satisfied 
7 = 4  very satisfied 
7 = 3  satisfied
7 = 2  neither satisfied nor dissatisfied
7 = 1  dissatisfied, very dissatisfied, or completely dissatisfied.
In CERS, the questionnaire rates (dis)satisfaction with the job and with pay 
on a three-level scale on either side of neutrality: (dis)satisfied, very (dis)satisfied, and 
completely (dis)satisfied. However, in WERS, the questionnaire rates (dis)satisfaction 
with pay only a two-level scale on either side of neutrality, with the (minimum) 
maximum levels of (dis)satisfaction being “very (dis)satisfied” (see Appendix B.5). So, 
unlike in CERS, in WERS there is less information available in the ordinal scale. 
Hence there is less scope in WERS for collapsing the ordinal scale into fewer levels 
like in CERS.
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The ordinal scale adopted in this chapter for the dependent variable 
“satisfaction with pay” in WERS is actually the same as the ordinal scale in the 
original dataset variable in WERS:
7 = 5  very satisfied 
7 = 4  satisfied
7 = 3  neither satisfied nor dissatisfied 
7 = 2  dissatisfied 
7 = 1  very dissatisfied.
Since job satisfaction and pay satisfaction are ordinal variables in both 
WERS and CERS, an ordered probit model is estimated, which assumes that there is an 
unobserved random variable, 7*, such that:
The observed counterpart to 7* is the categorical variable 7, ordered as
follows:
(2)
Y ' < M  o 
Ho < Y'' < jux
Mi < Y ' < M 2 
Mi <Y* < Mi
1 \ f
2 i f




where /u],/u2,/u3,...,juJ_] are the cut-points, with a constant juQ =0. Since £~jV[0.1] 
then
p(Y = j) = p(<uJ_]< r < JuJ)=
= PijUj-i - p ' x < r - p x <  Mj -  p ' x =
(4)
= P(Mj-\ - p  x  <s</Uj - p  X  = 
=  0> (juJ - P ' X ) - 0 ( j u J_, -p ' X)
where O is the standard normal distribution function.
The likelihood for an individual is then:
A=na j <mduv)
^  mh - 0 'x  (5)
where d tJ -  1 if the /th observation (worker identifier) is in they'th job satisfaction 
category, for z=l,2,...,n and fory=l,2,...,m .
In order to check the consistency of results, this chapter reports results for 
job satisfaction and pay satisfaction in an ordinal scale form, but also in a collapsed 
binary (also called binomial) form. So, in addition to the ordered probit models 
explained above, a binary probit model is used in order to make possible more 
comparisons between the datasets. A binary probit follows the same methodology as an 
ordinary probit where the dependent variable is a dummy variable taking only two 
values: 0 or 1.
For ease of interpretation, the overall job satisfaction responses 
(respectively, the pay satisfaction responses) are collapsed into a binary variable form 
where a value of 1 denotes satisfied or better, and a value of 0 denotes neutrality or
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some level of dissatisfaction. In more detail, the CERS variable for overall job 
satisfaction takes the value 1 for 84 % of the sample, and the CERS variable for 
satisfaction with pay takes the value 1 for 59% of the sample. The WERS variable for 
satisfaction with pay takes the value 1 for 35% of the sample. Appendix B.5 gives a 
snapshot view of the way in which binary and ordinal variables were generated for 
both the ordinal and the binary probit.
In further support of the methodology chosen, it is to be noted that there is 
no standard methodology commonly agreed in the literature.28 In this chapter, marginal 
effects from the ordered probit model and the binary probit model are reported along 
with the p-value on the underlying coefficient estimates. In WERS, the binary and 
ordered probit are both run with the option of clustering by workplace, which ensures 
that standard errors are robust.
It is important to note that in CERS all HRM practices relate directly to the 
individual questioned experiencing the impact of these HRM practices. However, in 
WERS, 8 of the total 19 HRM practices relate only to the presence of the practice in 
the workplace where the individual employee works and it is not clear whether or not 
the specific individual under review is experiencing the direct HRM practice. This is 
because some of the HRM practice variables come from the manager questionnaire
28For instance, a brief review shows that:
- logit models are used by Neumark and Postlewaite (1995), Allen and Velden (2001), Hamermesh
(2001), Brown and Sessions (2003), Nguyen et a l (2003);
- ordered logits are used by Batt and Appelbaum (1995), Blanchflower and Oswald (1999);
- probit models are used by A kerlof et a l (1988), Booth et a l (2002),
- ordered probits are used by Oswald and Warr (1996), Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette (1997), Clark 
(1999), Groot and Brink (1999), Ward and Sloane (1999), Elvira and Town (2001), Belfield and Harris
(2002), Sloane and Ward (2001), Shields and Price (2002), Brown and Sessions (2003), Heywood and 
Wei (2004), Bryson et a l (2005)
- factor or hierarchical analysis is used by Argyle (1989), Blau (1994), Birdseye and Hill (1995), 
Oswald and Warr (1996), Brown (2001), Bhuian and Menguc (2002)
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related to the workplace, rather than the employee questionnaire (see Appendix B.4, 
specifically the questions where the “HR Manager is asked”). Consequently, the results 
reported from the WERS dataset specifically with regard to the following 8 HRM 
practices may be underestimated in the WERS dataset since one cannot be sure 
whether the respondents were actually experiencing the direct impact of: teamwork; 
supervision of work; usage of improvement groups; usage of formal suggestion 
scheme; incidence of profit-sharing schemes; pay based on tenure; incidence of 
performance-related pay; and a measure of pay equality.
3.4. Discussion of results
3.4.1. The effect of HRM practices
This discussion begins with the effect of HRM practices in an ordinal 
probit model and a binomial probit model on overall job satisfaction, as reported in 
Panel A and Panel B of Table 3.3, and then continues with their effect on satisfaction 
with pay in CERS in Table 3.4 and in WERS in Table 3.5. The consistency of results is 
shown in each of these tables (as well as in Tables 3.6 to 3.8), since it can be observed 
that the binary and ordinal probit models report very similar effects, of very similar 
levels of significance.
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Table 3.3 (Panel A) The effect of HRM practices and perceived pay inequality on 
overall job satisfaction (CERS) - Marginal Effects from binomial and ordinal 
probit__________ _____________ _______________________
V A R IA B L E S
Binom ial model Ordinal model
P-values Satisfl
ed




Satisfied N eutral D issatisfied
Work organisation
Teamwork 0.106 0.023 0.087* 0.015 0.025 -0.018 -0.010 -0.012
Supervision
Performance differentiated 0.111 0.054 0.075* 0.017 0.030 -0.020 -0.012 -0.015
from others
Employee can be seen all
the time by supervisor or 0.004*** -0.054 0.006*** -0.025 -0.041 0.030 0.017 0.020
manager
Work progress can be 0.038** 0.028 0.041** 0.019 0.031 -0.022 -0.013 -0.015
visually assessed
Employee involvement /  voice
Information dissemination 0.537 0.016 0.545 -0.008 -0.012 0.009 0.005 0.006
Employee part o f  an 0.251 0.023 0.805 0.002 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002
improvement group
Formal suggestion scheme 0.752 -0.006 0.220 0.012 0.019 -0.014 -0.008 -0.009
Management holds
meetings were em ployees 0.001*** 0.140 0.000*** 0.049 0.091 -0.054 -0.037 -0.049
Recruitment & selection
Initial pay is negotiable 0.051* 0.040 0.032** 0.023 0.035 -0.027 -0.014 -0.017
Training & learning
Employer provided 0.082** 0.033 0.735 0.003 0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002
education or training
Job requires on-going 0.000*** 0.093 0.000*** 0.052 0.109 -0.053 -0.044 -0.063
learning
Seniority-based pay
Pay based on tenure 0.005*** 0.051 0.003*** 0.028 0.043 -0.033 -0.018 -0.021
Perform ance-related pay
Own performance 0.162 0.032 0.578 0.006 0.010 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005
Team performance 0.475 -0.021 0.540 -0.008 -0.014 0.010 0.006 0.007
Company performance 0.862 -0.004 0.258 -0.014 -0.023 0.016 0.009 0.011
Profit-share/share option 0.256 0.028 0.563 0.008 0.012 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006
Perception o f  relative income
Own pay is relatively low 0.000*** -0.103 0.000*** -0.055 -0.101 0.061 0.041 0.054
P erceived workplace inequality
Pay gap is much too big 0.000*** -0.156 0.000*** -0.049 -0.095 0.053 0.039 0.052
Pay gap is too big 0.000*** -0.108 0.000*** -0.043 -0.079 0.049 0.032 0.042
Binomial model: Sample size =  1,518; Log likelihood = -552.22; LR chi2(47) -  250.50
Ordinal model: Sample size = 1,518; Log likelihooc = -1938.79; LR chi2(30) = 314.87
N ote 1: "Satisfied" in the binomial model includes "Completely satisfied", "Very satisfied" and "Satisfied"
N ote 2: "Dissatisfied" in the ordinal model includes "Dissatisfied", "Very dissatisfied" and "Completely dissatisfied" 
N ote 3: The significance level o f  the p-value is signalled using: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1
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In relation to Hypothesis 1, namely that certain HRM practices have a positive impact on 
job satisfaction, the results in Table 3.3 show that after controlling for a wide range of personal, job 
and firm characteristics (reported in Panel B, Table 3.3), several HRM practices have a statistically 
significant effect on job satisfaction.29
Table 3.3 (Panel B) The effect of personal, job and firm characteristics on overall
Binom ial model O rdinal model




Satisfied Neutral D issatisfle
d
Age 0.079* -0 .0 1 2 0.072* -0.006 -0.010 0.007 0.004 0.005
A ge squared 0.080* 0 .0 0 0 0.090* 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gender (male) 0.000*** -0 .0 8 3 0.000*** -0.039 -0.063 0.046 0.026 0.031
Separated, divorced or 0.843 0 .0 0 5 0.728 -0.004 -0.007 0.005 0.003 0.004
widowed
Single 0.252 -0 .029 0.073* -0.021 -0.036 0.024 0.015 0.018
One child 0.955 -0.001 0.257 -0.013 -0.022 0.015 0.009 0.011
Two children 0.591 -0 .0 1 5 0.469 -0.009 -0.016 0.011 0.006 0.008
More than two children 0.800 0 .0 1 0 0.522 0.013 0.020 -0.016 -0.008 -0.010
Degree or higher degree 0.636 0.011 0.670 0.005 0.008 -0.006 -0.003 -0.004
A -level or equivalent 0.128 0 .0 4 4 0.631 0.007 0.012 -0.009 -0.005 -0.006
No qualification 0.037** 0 .0 4 8 0.000*** 0.055 0.072 -0.065 -0.030 -0.033
Professionals 0.388 0.031 0.362 0.018 0.026 -0.021 -0.011 -0.012
Skilled non-manual 0.858 0 .0 0 5 0.518 -0.008 -0.013 0.009 0.005 0.007
Skilled manual 0.225 0.031 0.554 0.008 0.013 -0.010 -0.005 -0.006
Partly skilled/sem i­ 0.058* 0 .0 5 2 0.475 0.011 0.017 -0.013 -0.007 -0.008
skilled
Unskilled 0.617 -0 .0 2 6 0.956 0.001 0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
Union member 0.277 -0 .0 2 3 0.123 -0.016 -0.026 0.018 0.011 0.013
Permanent part-time 0.097* 0 .0 4 4 0.001*** 0.052 0.068 -0.061 -0.028 -0.031
N o permanent job 0.850 -0 .0 0 6 0.908 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.001 0.001
Employees > 1000 0.658 0 .0 1 5 0.350 -0.015 -0.026 0.017 0.011 0.013
5 0 0 - 9 9 9 0.316 0 .0 3 6 0.672 0.008 0.013 -0.010 -0.005 -0.006
1 0 0 -4 9 9 0.668 0 .0 1 2 0.994 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
5 0 - 9 9 0.911 -0 .0 0 4 0.086* -0.026 -0.048 0.029 0.020 0.025
2 5 - 4 9 0.653 0 .0 1 4 0.120 -0.022 -0.040 0.025 0.016 0.021
2 0 - 2 4 0.140 0 .0 5 6 0.648 0.010 0.015 -0.011 -0.006 -0.007
1 1 - 1 9 0.384 0 .0 2 9 0.979 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000
Public sector 0.002*** 0 .0 9 7 0.001*** 0.041 0.060 -0.048 -0.024 -0.028
Other 0.381 0 .0 3 5 0.852 -0.004 -0.006 0.005 0.003 0.003
Binomial model: Sample size = 1,518; Log likelihood 
Ordinal model: Sample size = 1,518; Log likelihood =
= -552.22; LR chi2(47) = 250.50  
-1938.79; LR chi2(30) = 314.87
Note: Base group: Female, married, high school qualification (i.e. GCE/GCSE), no children, permanent full time 
contract, manager, non-union member, private sector and micro firm (i.e. less than 10 em ployees).
29 Since many o f  the findings for the personal, job and firm characteristics are in keeping with the 
existing literature, this discussion does not dwell on them.
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Creating workplaces which embed ‘on-going learning’ has a highly 
significant effect on job satisfaction, insofar as it increases the probability of a worker 
being either completely or very satisfied by sixteen percentage points (see Training and 
learning). This result is consistent with the HRM literature where on-the-job learning 
figures prominently among practices that enhance employee motivation and 
commitment. For instance, Doeringer et al (1998) find that US companies adopting 
Japanese workplace practices tend to emphasise ‘social and organisational learning’ 
and to offer career employment and high wages. In turn, employees reciprocate by 
increased effort and productivity. Interestingly, the provision of employer provided 
education and training is insignificant, suggesting that workers prefer continuous on- 
the-job instruction to off-the-job training.
More importantly, this result is positively surprising insofar as it shows the 
large size of the impact of training on job satisfaction. By uncovering that the impact 
of training and learning practices is the highest out of all HRM practices entered in the 
models, this chapter contributes significantly to a literature that is still developing, 
whereby the link between on-going learning and job satisfaction has been previously 
under-researched. Georgellis and Lange (2007) offer a further up-to-date discussion of 
the novelty factor in researching the impact of training on job satisfaction.
In the model for satisfaction with pay, the training variables are constructed 
so that they are comparable between CERS and WERS (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). Firms are 
classified into those that offer either training or continuous skill development, those 
that offer both training and skill development, which are compared to the base firms 
that offer neither. For CERS there is no statistically significant relationship between
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the training variables and satisfaction with pay (see Table 3.4), whereas for WERS 
workers who receive training and encouragement to develop skills are more satisfied 
with their pay (see Table 3.5). Furthermore, those workers who work in firms that offer 
both training and encouragement to develop skills are more likely to report that they 
are ‘very satisfied’ or ‘satisfied’ with their pay (compare the marginal effects of 0.17 
and 0.08). One explanation for the difference in the results between CERS and WERS 
may be the fact that CERS contains a higher proportion of micro firms, which typically 
offer very little training or opportunity for continuous skill development, whereas the 
WERS includes more medium-large firms, which tend to offer more training.
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Table 3.4 The effect of HRM practices and pay practices on satisfaction with pay
Binom ial model Ordinal model
V A R IA B L ES P-
values
Satisfied P-values C om pletely Very  
satisfied satisfied
Satisfied N eutral D issatisfied
Teamwork 1 0.949 -0.002
Work organisation  
0.894 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.003
Supervision o f  work 0.121 0.048
Supervision  
0.395 0.003 0.007 0.012 -0.004 -0.018
progress
Employee can be seen all 0.240 -0.035 0.763 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 0.001 0.006
the time by supervisor or 
manager
...notice boards 0.473 -0.023
Employee involvement /  voice 
Information dissemination via..
0.095 -0.005 -0.015 -0.023 0.008 0.035
...newsletter or internal 0.085* -0.045 0.035** -0.007 -0.020 -0.031 0.011 0.048
magazine 
...email or website 0.953 -0.002 0.458 0.003 0.007 0.012 -0.004 -0.018
Improvement groups 0.993 0.000
Involvement in decision making 
0.738 0.001 0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.007
formal suggestion schemes 0.884 0.005 0.852 0.001 0.002 0.003 -0.001 -0.004
Meetings where 0.008* 0.093 0.001*** 0.010 0.030 0.056 -0.015 -0.081
em ployees can express 
their views





Recruitment & selection  
0.022** 0.008 0.022 0.033 -0.012 -0.051
Both training and skill 0.900 0.006
Training & learning  
0.540 -0.003 -0.009 -0.014 0.005 0.021
development are
encouraged
Either training or skill 0.478 -0.034 0.496 -0.003 -0.009 -0.015 0.005 0.022
development is 
encouraged
Pay related to tenure 0.000* 
* *
0.102
Seniority-based pay  




Performance rela ted  pay  
0.001*** 0.013 0.035 0.048 -0.019 -0.077
Team performance 0.500 0.030 0.342 0.004 0.012 0.018 -0.006 -0.028
Company performance 0.976 0.001 0.590 -0.002 -0.006 -0.010 0.003 0.015
Profit sharing / option 0.008* 0.111 0.004*** 0.014 0.036 0.047 -0.020 -0.076
schemes





P erceived workplace inequality 
0.000*** -0.025 -0.082 -0.203 0.028 0.283
Pay gap is too big 0.000*  
♦ *
-0.275 0.000*** -0.021 -0.066 -0.138 0.029 0.196
...job  tasks 0.234 -0.040
Job autonomy- influence o v e r ... 
0.672 -0.001 -0.004 -0.006 0.002 0.010
... pace o f  work 0.113 0.056 0.023** 0.007 0.021 0.039 -0.011 -0.056
... how job is done 0.736 -0.011 0.351 -0.003 -0.009 -0.014 0.005 0.021
Union member 0.843 -0.007
Union 
0.964 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
Binomial model: Sample size = 1,496; Log likelihood = -882.06; LR chi2(51) -  273.02  
Ordinal model: Sample size = 1,496; Log likelihood = -1,837.78; LR ch i2(51) = 301.48
Note 1: "Satisfied" in the binomial model includes "Completely satisfied", "Very satisfied" and "Satisfied"
Note 2: "Dissatisfied" in the ordinal model includes "Dissatisfied", "Very dissatisfied" and "Completely dissatisfied"  
Note 3: The significance level o f  the p-value is signalled using: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1 
Note 4: The model also includes controls for age, gender, marital status, educational qualifications, 
occupation, contract type, firm size and sector. These results are available by request.
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Table 3.5 The effect of HRM practices and pay practices on satisfaction with pay 
(WERS) - Marginal Effects from binomial and ordinal probit_________________
Binomial model Ordinal model
V A R IA B L ES P-values Satisfi P-valucs V ery Satisfied Neutral D issatisfied V ery
ed satisfied D issatisfied
Work organisation
Teamwork 0.761 0.005 0.876 0.000 
Supervision
-0.002 0.000 0.001 0.001
Supervision o f  work 0.000*** 0.030 0.003*** 0.004 0.023 0.001 -0.015 -0.014
progress
Employee involvement /  voice 
Information dissemination
N otice boards 0.020** -0.037 0.015** -0.005 -0.027 -0.001 0.017 0.015
Newsletter or internal 0.000*** 0.049 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
magazine
Email or website 0.672 -0.004 0.000*** 0.007 0.038 0.003 -0.025 -0.023
Involvement in decision making
Improvement groups 0.327 0.009 0.367 0.001 0.006 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
Formal suggestion schemes 0.158 0.015 0.096* 0.002 0.013 0.001 -0.008 -0.008
Meetings where em ployees 0.000*** 0.052 0.000*** 0.007 0.045 0.005 -0.028 -0.029
can express their views
Recruitment & selection
Management asks employees 0.000*** 0.029 0.000*** 0.021 0.099 0.001 -0.066 -0.055
about pay
Training & learning
Both training and skill 0.000*** 0.170 0.000*** 0.028 0.138 0.004 -0.091 -0.080
development are encouraged
Either training or skill 0.000*** 0.083 0.000*** 0.013 0.070 0.003 -0.046 -0.041
development is encouraged
Seniority-based pay
Pay related to tenure 0.907 0.001 0.825 0.000 
Perform ance-related p a y
0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.001
Performance related pay 0.246 0.013 0.160 0.002 0.011 0.001 -0.007 -0.007
Profit sharing/ option 0.090* 0.020 0.170 0.002 0.012 0.001 -0.008 -0.007
schemes
Perceived workplace inequality
Pay gap is small 0.915 0.005 0.775 0.002 
Job autonomy - influence over...
0.010 0.001 -0.007 -0.006
...job tasks 0.000*** 0.046 0.000*** 0.008 0.045 0.004 -0.028 -0.028
...pace o f  work 0.000*** 0.057 0.000*** 0.009 0.052 0.005 -0.033 -0.033
...how job is done 0.006*** 0.033 0.004*** 0.004 
Union
0.022 0.002 -0.014 -0.014
Union member 0.733 -0.003 0.129 -0.002 -0.010 -0.001 0.006 0.006
Binomial model: Sample size = 19,890; Log pseudo-likelihood = -12070.64; Wald chi2(46) =1334.56
Ordinal model: Sample size = 19,890; Log pseudo-likeiihood = -27,317.11; LR chi2(46) - 1,928.30
Note 1: "Satisfied" in the binomial model includes "Very satisfied" and "Satisfied"
Note 2: The significance level o f  the p-value is signalled using: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1 
N ote 3: The model also includes controls for age, gender, marital status, educational qualifications, 
occupation, contract type, firm size and sector. These results are available by request.
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Constant direct supervision, where the employee can be seen almost all the 
time by a supervisor or a manager, has a significant negative impact on job 
satisfaction, reducing the probability of being completely satisfied by 2.5 percentage 
points, which is offset by an increased risk of being dissatisfied (see Supervision, Table 
3.3). In contrast, the fact that ‘work progress can be visually assessed’ by a supervisor 
has a small but positive effect on job satisfaction, increasing the probability of feeling 
completely or very satisfied by 5 percentage points. Thus, whereas close supervision of 
work is disliked, perhaps because it is associated with a feeling of being controlled, 
workers do like some feedback on their performance (and it could be that they also like 
to know that other workers are subject to some supervision too), suggesting that some 
monitoring is actually desirable. These findings are consistent with the view that HRM 
practices enhance employee participation, voice and creativity, thereby increasing job 
satisfaction, motivation and workplace performance. However, there is no evidence 
from CERS that these variables affect satisfaction with pay (see Table 3.4), whereas in 
WERS ‘supervision of work progress’ does have a statistically significant and positive 
effect on satisfaction with pay, albeit small in magnitude (see Table 3.5).
Table 3.3 shows that teamwork is only significant at the 10% level and 
although this kind of practice increases job satisfaction, the effects are quite small (see 
work organisation). Working in a team increases the probability of being completely or 
very satisfied by only 4 percentage points. The finding that teamwork has little effect 
on job satisfaction is interesting because it is often advocated as one of the most 
important HRM practices (Osterman 1994, MacDuffie 1995, Pfeffer 1995), and has 
been shown elsewhere to have a significant impact on employee productivity, 
commitment, and job satisfaction (Griffin 1988, Banker et al 1996, Batt and
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Appelbaum 1995). The results are perhaps in keeping with the behaviour in 
organisation literature, which warns of the negative effects of increased pressure from 
peers in the team. Barker (1993) speaks of ‘concertive control’, whereby the 
management’s supervision is multiplied by peer surveillance. Furthermore, Parker and 
Slaughter (1988) introduce the concept of ‘management by stress’ to conjure up the 
effect of Japanese style practices on employee well-being. It is also interesting to note 
from Tables 3.4 and 3.5 that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
teamwork and workers satisfaction with their pay, as one might expect given the 
findings that workers are more satisfied when their own progress and performance are 
monitored.
In the model for overall job satisfaction in the CERS dataset, job autonomy 
as a variable is modelled via a variable in the category work organisation, variable 
which takes the value 1 if work is organised in such a way that individual performance 
can be differentiated from that of one’s peers (see Work organisation, Table 3.3). This 
variable has borderline significance and has a modest effect insofar as it increases the 
probability of a worker being completely or very satisfied by 4.7 percentage points. 
This is a less substantial effect on job satisfaction than has been found for the US.30 In 
the models of satisfaction with pay, job autonomy is reflected in the worker’s influence 
over job tasks, the pace of work and how the job is done. In the CERS, only influence 
over the pace of work has a statistically significant effect on satisfaction with pay 
(Table 3.4), whereas in the WERS all three measures of work organisation are highly 
significant (Table 3.5). In general, workers with greater job autonomy are more
30 See N guyen, Taylor and Bradley (2003) who focus specifically on the relationship between job  
autonomy and job satisfaction in Britain. They find that the impact o f  job autonomy is highly  
statistically significant on all five aspects o f  job satisfaction: pay, fringe benefits, promotion prospects, 
job security and importance / challenge o f  work.
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satisfied with their pay, and influence over the pace of work is amongst the larger of 
the effects. For instance, in the WERS, the marginal effects on this variable sum to 
approximately 0.06 for ‘very satisfied’/ ‘satisfied’. In contrast, the equivalent sum for 
influence over how the job is done is only 0.026, implying that workers are happier 
with their pay when they have more control over their level of effort.
A set of five variables relates to employee involvement or channels through 
which workers can voice their grievances or views (see Table 3.3). These employee 
involvement variables can be placed on a scale from the most passive form of 
involvement (information dissemination) to the most engaging form (management 
holds meetings with employees). This idea of an employee involvement ‘continuum’ 
from most passive to most engaging forms of involvement was initially proposed in the 
Freeman-Lazear model (Freeman and Lazear 1995), and has been tested by Addison et 
al (2000). However, many of these variables have an insignificant effect on job 
satisfaction in the model, the exception being ‘management holds meetings with 
employees’. The variable has a very strong effect in raising job satisfaction increasing 
the probability of a worker being completely or very satisfied by 15 percentage points. 
This finding may reflect a preference amongst workers for a simple and direct channel 
of face to face communication with management.
In the models of satisfaction with pay in Tables 3.4 and 3.5 the information 
dissemination variable is disaggregated, increasing in sophistication from ‘notice 
boards’ to ‘email or website’, whereas the same variables are used to reflect employee 
involvement. There is some evidence that workers are more satisfied with their pay the 
more technologically sophisticated the method of information dissemination used in
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the firm. To see this, compare the negative effect on the notice board variable with the 
positive effect on the email and website variables. With respect to employee 
involvement, workers are more satisfied with their pay when they are able to meet and 
express their views to managers, and the magnitude of this effect is very similar in the 
CERS and the WERS (see Tables 3.4 and 3.5, employee involvement /  voice).
The effect of involvement in negotiation regarding initial pay raises 
workers overall job satisfaction (Table 3.3, recruitment & selection) and, perhaps 
unsurprisingly their satisfaction with pay (Tables 3.4 and 3.5). What is interesting, 
however, is the finding that the effect of negotiation over initial pay is larger for 
overall satisfaction, increasing the probability of being completely or very satisfied by 
almost 6 percentage points, than it is for satisfaction with pay, where it increases this 
probability by 3 percentage points. This finding suggests that allowing workers to 
negotiate over initial pay has spillover effects insofar as workers are more satisfied 
with the job as a whole.
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3.4.2. The effect of pay practices
Table 3.3 shows that seniority-based pay mechanisms, such as pay based 
on tenure, have a significant positive effect on job satisfaction. This is the traditional 
type of payment practice, designed to maximise effort from the firm’s perspective 
while minimising risk for the worker. The probability of being ‘completely’ or ‘very’ 
satisfied is increased by 7 percentage points for workers in these firms. Interestingly, 
there is also a positive and statistically significant relationship between ‘pay based on 
tenure’ and satisfaction with pay in the CERS (Table 3.4) but not in the WERS (Table 
3.5) possibly due to the differences between the datasets with regard to firm size, and, 
consequently, different availability of pay based on tenure.
The results for the CERS may come as a surprise to the advocates of the 
‘new’ performance related pay practices, given the dramatic decline of seniority-based 
pay mechanisms (Omatowski, 1998). However, there is contrary evidence from this 
analysis that workers are more satisfied with ‘new’ pay practices, especially when pay 
is related to individual performance. This type of compensation system links rewards 
to individual performance by comparing their achievement to the goals set at the 
beginning of the year. Thus, although individual, team and company performance- 
related pay practices have no statistically significant effect on overall job satisfaction 
(see Performance-related pay, Table 3.3), individual performance-related pay does 
. increase workers’ satisfaction with their pay in CERS. The effect is large and highly 
significant in CERS, and while the variables in not significant in WERS (compare 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5), the effect is nonetheless positive in both cases. Similarly, where
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the firm operates a profit sharing or option scheme, worker satisfaction with pay is 
enhanced.
The observed link between individual performance-related pay and 
satisfaction with pay in CERS is consistent with the earlier findings here, in that 
workers prefer systems when work can be visually assessed and differentiated from co­
workers. Why then is there no statistically significant relationship between 
performance-related pay and overall job satisfaction? The answer may simply be that 
workers agree with the principle of relating effort to rewards but suffer disutility from 
effort. Furthermore, creating a performance-pay link that is perceived as fair can be 
problematic, especially in the case of subjective performance appraisals where the 
appraisers may be suspected of giving biased judgements (Prendergast, 1999).
In keeping with the existing literature on the determinants of workers’ job 
satisfaction, the model for overall job satisfaction includes a variable reflecting 
comparison income, albeit one based on the workers own perception of their relative 
pay. Table 3.3 shows that where workers perceive their own pay to be relatively low 
this reduces their overall job satisfaction. This is consistent with existing evidence 
(Nguyen et al 2003; Clark and Oswald 1994). In comparison to the estimated effects 
on many of the HRM variables, relative income has a much larger effect, reducing the 
probability of being ‘completely’ or ‘very’ satisfied by over 15 percentage points. 
Thus, although workers are more satisfied with their pay when it is related to tenure 
and/or a system of performance-related pay, the ‘level’ of pay or the additional reward 
reduces overall job satisfaction. The above shows evidence in favour of Hypothesis 2 
related to the impact of pay practices on job satisfaction.
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3.4.3. The effect of workplace pay inequality on job satisfaction
As suggested in the review of the literature there is very little evidence on 
the impact of the distribution of pay in the workplace on job satisfaction. Workers may 
be concerned about inequality in the workplace simply out of a sense of fairness or 
natural justice. Alternatively, a highly compressed pay distribution implies that there is 
little opportunity for advancement in the firm. There may also be a difference in 
attitude regarding workplace pay inequality between union members and non­
members, the former being expected to be more egalitarian.
Table 3.3 shows that after controlling for an individual worker’s 
perception of being low paid, a pay structure that is perceived to be over-dispersed is 
associated with lower levels of job satisfaction (see Perceived workplace inequality). 
These effects are substantial, especially in those firms where the ‘pay gap is much too 
big’, and bring evidence in support of Hypothesis 3. In these firms the probability of a 
worker being ‘completely’ or ‘very’ satisfied is reduced by 15 percentage points. The 
equivalent figure for firms where the ‘pay gap is too big’ is 12 percentage points. A 
highly dispersed wage structure may therefore alienate those workers at the lower end 
of the job-wage hierarchy because they feel under-valued. It is perhaps for this reason 
that Pfeffer and Langton (1993) have suggested that the best system of pay is one that 
is based on a mixture of seniority, productivity and credentials. This finding is 
replicated with respect to workers’ satisfaction with pay in the CERS (see Table 3.4), 
whereas in WERS the only variable that could be included in analysis is ‘Pay gap is 
small’ (Table 3.5). The estimate for this variable is statistically insignificant.
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If the distribution of pay is regarded as unequal and this reduces workers’ 
job satisfaction, then the management needs to either change that distribution by 
altering its pay practices, or (if workers’ judgement is based on a misperception of the 
pay distribution) improve information flows in the firm.
3.4.4. Union versus non-union differences in the impact of HRM practices
The role of unions within the workplace may have been replaced by the 
introduction of HRM practices, which have the potential to increase workers’ job 
satisfaction and performance and hence offer competing services to those provided by 
unions. Although there is some debate about whether this substitution has in fact 
occurred - Machin and Wood (2004) reject the hypothesis of substitution having 
occurred - it is still possible that workers are more satisfied if they can voice their 
concerns, for instance, via one or more of the HRM practices rather than indirectly via 
a union.
Therefore, it is appropriate to assess union vs. non-union member 
differences in the effect of HRM practices on their job satisfaction. This is done via 
binomial and ordered probit models in Table 3.6 for overall job satisfaction and in 
Tables 3.7 and 3.8 for pay satisfaction. The method used is to interact union 
membership with the statistically significant HRM practices identified in the previous 
sections. For instance, the teamwork - union interaction variable, called the teamwork 
(union) variable, is generated via the multiplication of the variable for teamwork with 
the union dummy. Thus, the teamwork (union) variable takes the value 1 if teamwork 
and unionisation are present in an establishment; it takes the value and 0 otherwise, i.e.
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if employees are non-union members (irrespective of whether the HRM practice 
“teamwork” is implemented), or if employees are union members but teamwork is not 
implemented. The coefficients for the union interaction variables show a differential 
for the unionised workers, i.e. an addition to the overall effect of a respective HRM 
practice within a unionised workplace implementing that respective HRM practice. 
Herein, this effect is called the differential union effect. The estimated union 
interaction models are otherwise identical to those in Tables 3.3 to 3.5, except for the 
inclusion of these interaction effects. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the interaction effects of 
perceived workplace pay inequality and union status for the CERS. Table 3.8 reports 
interaction effects in WERS.
A general finding in the case of non-union members is that the impact of 
HRM practices on job satisfaction remains significant on the set of HRM practices 
studied for union-interaction. This impact has the same sign as in previous analysis 
where union interaction was not taken into account. Consistency can also be noted 
between the size of the results on the overall workforce (Tables 3.3 -  3.5) and results 
obtained for non-unionised members and/ or employees where the HRM practice is not 
implemented (Table 3.6 -  3.8). A few notable exceptions, when the size of the effects 
on these latter emloyees are only slightly bigger than for the overall workforce, are in 
the case of relative income being perceived as low, which decreases overall job 
satisfaction by 18.8 pp but only by 15.6 pp for the overall workforce; and the 
perception of the pay gap being too big (10.3 pp reduction in pay satisfaction, 
compared to 8.7 pp for the overall workforce). However, the differential union effect 
for virtually all of the HRM practices the impact on job satisfaction is mostly 
insignificant,.
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Most of the results from Table 3.6, with dependent variable overall job 
satisfaction, suggest mostly insignificant effects for union member interaction. 
However, in the two cases in this Table where marginal effects are significant, union 
members where the HRM practice is implemented (as opposed to non-union members 
and/or employees where the practice is not implemented) are less likely to be 
dissatisfied with respect to perceiving their own pay to be low, and to perceived high 
pay inequality in the firm. The probability of union members where the HRM practice 
is implemented, being ‘completely’ or ‘very satisfied’ is reduced by 9.2 percentage 
points when their perceived relative pay is too low, and by 10.5 percentage points 
when the pay gap in the workplace is perceived to be ‘too big’ (Table 3.6, Perception 
o f relative income and Perceived workplace inequality). However, non-union members 
and/or employees where the HRM practice is not implemented appear to be more 
adversely affected: their job satisfaction decreases by 18.8 percentage points if 
perceived relative income is low, and by 15.7 percentage points if the pay gap is 
perceived as being ‘too big’.
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Table 3.6 Union - non-union differences in the effect of HRM practices on overall job 
satisfaction (CERS) - Marginal Effects from binmial and ordered probit____________
V A R IA B L E S
Binom ial model O rdinal m odel




Satisfied N eutral D issatisfied
Work organisation
Teamwork 0.414 0.019 0.732 0.004 0.006 -0.004 -0.002 -0.003
Teamwork (unions) 0.701 0.014 0.066* 0.037 0.054 -0.045 -0.022 -0.024
Supervision
Performance differentiated from 0.015** 0.068 0.107 0.020 0.036 -0.024 -0.014 -0.018
others
Performance differentiated from 0.438 -0.033 0.579 -0.011 -0.019 0.013 0.008 0.009
others (unions)
Employee can be seen all the 0.053* -0.044 0.125 -0.017 -0.028 0.020 0.011 0.013
time by supervisor or manager
Employee can be seen all the 0.620 -0.020 0.301 -0.018 -0.033 0.022 0.013 0.016
time by supervisor or manager
(unions)
Supervision o f  work progress 0.200 0.030 0.053* 0.022 0.037 -0.027 -0.015 -0.018
Supervision o f  work progress 0.764 -0.012 0.528 -0.012 -0.020 0.014 0.008 0.010
(unions)
Employee involvement /  voice
Involvement in decision making via...
...meetings where em ployees can 0.014** 0.064 0.000*** 0.051 0.098 -0.058 -0.040 -0.052
express their view s
...meetings where em ployees can 0.868 0.006 0.442 -0.015 -0.027 0.018 0.011 0.013
express their view s (unions)
Recruitment & selection
Initial pay is negotiable 0.071* 0.042 0.171 0.016 0.026 -0.020 -0.011 -0.012
Initial pay is negotiable (unions) 0.941 -0.003 0.308 0.025 0.036 -0.031 -0.015 -0.016
Training & learning
Job requires ongoing learning 0.003*** 0.093 0.000*** 0.052 0.111 -0.054 -0.045 -0.063
Job requires ongoing learning 0.960 -0.002 0.993 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(unions)
Seniority-based pay
Pay related to tenure 0.095* 0.037 0.025** 0.025 0.040 -0.030 -0.016 -0.019
Pay related to tenure (unions) 0.310 0.036 0.715 0.007 0.011 -0.008 -0.004 -0.005
Perception o f  rela tive income
Own pay is relatively low 0.000*** -0.100 0.000*** -0.065 -0.123 0.072 0.050 0.066
Own pay is relatively low 0.871 -0.006 0.075* 0.039 0.053 -0.047 -0.022 -0.023
(unions)
P erceived workplac e inequality
Pay gap is much too big 0.000*** -0.192 0.000*** -0.057 -0.118 0.062 0.048 0.066
Pay gap is much too big (unions) 0.157 0.054 0.162 0.036 0.049 -0.043 -0.020 -0.022
Pay gap is too big 0.000*** -0.145 0.000*** -0.054 -0.103 0.060 0.042 0.055
Pay gap is too big (unions) 0.060* 0.066 0.058* 0.045 0.060 -0.054 -0.024 -0.026
Binomial model: Sample size = ' ,518; Log likelihood = - 549.11; LR chi2(58) = 256.73
Ordinal model: Sample size = 1,518; Log likelihood — 1930.54; LR chi2(58) -  331.36
Note 1: "Satisfied" in the binomial model includes "Completely satisfied", "Very satisfied" and "Satisfied"
Note 2: "Dissatisfied" in the ordinal model includes "Dissatisfied", "Very dissatisfied" and "Completely dissatisfied" 
Note 3: The significance level o f  the p-value is signalled using: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1 
Note 4: The model also includes controls for age, gender, marital status, educational qualifications, occupation, 
contract type, firm size and sector. These results are available by request.
I l l
With respect to workers’ satisfaction with pay in CERS (Table 3.7) there 
are no significant differential union effects . In contrast, for non-union members or 
employees where the practice is not implemented the probability of being ‘completely’ 
or ‘very’ satisfied is reduced by 11 percentage points where the pay gap is perceived to 
be ‘much too big’, compared to 9 percentage points where the gap is perceived to be 
‘too big’.
The findings with respect to perceived pay inequality, the differential union 
effect is interesting insofar as it suggests that although many HRM practices raise 
workers’ job satisfaction, , there may be a downside. If HRM practices, especially 
those related to pay, create a more unequal distribution of pay within the firm, then 
workers’ job satisfaction can be substantially reduced. Clearly, it is important to know 
whether this is sufficient to counter the positive effects of the HRM practices, and so 
whether pay inequality reduces worker performance and increases quit rates. 
Moreover, it is useful to assess whether the perception of workplace pay inequality is 
more important than actual workplace pay inequality. A case can be made for either 
variable, and it can be argued that worker perceptions are more relevant where there is 
imperfect information in the workplace, which is likely in larger firms.
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Table 3.7 Union - non-union differences in the effect of HRM practices on satisfaction with
pay (CERS) - Marginal Effects from binomial and ordered probit______________________
Binomial model Ordinal model





Employee involvement /  voice
Information dissemination via...
.notice boards 0.550 -0.024 0.055* -0.007 -0.021 -0.033 0 .0 1 1 0.050
... notice boards*union 0.967 -0.003 0.336 0.006 0.017 0.026 -0.010 -0.040
... newsletter or internal 0.326 -0.040 0.055* -0.008 -0.022 -0.034 0.012 0.052
magazine
...newsletter or internal 0.950 -0.004 0.616 0.004 0.010 0.016 -0.005 -0.024
magazine*union
Involvement in decision making via.
...meetings where 0.017** 0.098 0.001*** 0.012 0.035 0.066 -0.018 -0.095
employees can express
their views




Initial pay is negotiable 0.012** 0.097 0.092* 0.007 0.018 0.028 -0.010 -0.043
Initial pay is negotiable* 0.979 0.002 0.591 0.004 0.011 0.017 -0.006 -0.026
union
Seniority-based p a y
Pay related to tenure 0.013** 0.089 0.004*** 0.010 0.028 0.044 -0.015 -0.067
Pay related to tenure* 0.522 0.039 0.404 0.005 0.015 0.022 -0.008 -0.034
union
Perform ance-related p a y
based on individual 0.021** 0.102 0.006*** 0.013 0.035 0.048 -0.020 -0.077
performance
based on individual 0.857 0.014 0.872 -0.001 -0.003 -0.005 0.002 0.008
performance*unions
Profit sharing/ option 0.010** 0.132 0.010** 0.015 0.039 0.050 -0.022 -0.081
schemes
Profit sharing/ option 0.565 -0.049 0.857 -0.001 -0.004 -0.007 0.002 0.010
schemes*union
P erceived  workplace inequality
Pay gap is much too big 0.000*** -0.379 0.000*** -0.026 -0.084 -0.211 0.028 0.293
Pay gap is much too big* 0.294 0.074 0.562 0.004 0.012 0.018 -0.007 -0.028
union
Pay gap is too big 0.000*** -0.308 0.000*** -0.023 -0.070 -0.150 0.031 0.212
Pay gap is too big*union 0.166 0.091 0.340 0.007 0.019 0.027 -0.010 -0.042
Job autonomy - influence over...
•••pace o f  work 0.061* 0.085 0.015** 0.009 0.028 0.054 -0.014 -0.077
...pace o f work*union 0.290 -0.074 0.321 -0.006 -0.019 -0.033 0.010 0.048
Binomial model: Sample size = 1,496; Log likelihood = -879.90; LR chi2(61) -  277.34
Ordinal model: Sample size -  1,496; Log likelihood = -1,835.13; LR chi2(61) = 306.79_______________________________
Note 1: "Satisfied" in the binomial model includes "Completely satisfied", "Very satisfied" and "Satisfied"
Note 2: "Dissatisfied" in the ordinal model includes "Dissatisfied", "Very dissatisfied" and "Completely dissatisfied" 
Note 3: The significance level o f  the p-value is signalled using: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1 
Note 4: The model also includes controls for age, gender, marital status, educational qualifications, occupation, 
contract type, firm size and sector. These results are available by request.
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Table 3.8: Union - non-union differences in the effect of HRM practices on satisfaction with 
pay (WERS) - Marginal Effects from binomial and ordered probit
Binomial model Ordinal model
VARIABLES P-values Satisfied P-values Very
satisfied
Satisfied Neutral Dissatisfied Very
Dissatisfied
Supervision
Supervision o f  work 0.001*** 0.043 0.010** 0.004 0.023 0.001 -0.015 -0.014
progress
Supervision o f  work 0.651 -0.009 0.966 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
progress (unions)
Employee involvement /  voice
Information dissemination via...
...notice boards 0.060* -0.034 0.019** -0.006 -0.029 -0.001 0.019 0.017
...notice boards (unions) 0.797 -0.009 0.545 0.003 0.014 0.001 -0.009 -0.008
...email or website 0.000*** 0.039 0.000*** 0.006 0.031 0.002 -0.020 -0.019
...email or website (unions) 0.113 0.026 0.131 0.003 0.017 0.001 -0.011 -0.010
Involvement in decision making via...
...formal suggestion 0.293 0.014 0.441 0.001 0.008 0.001 -0.005 -0.005
schemes
...formal suggestion 0.999 0.000 0.384 0.002 0.012 0.001 -0.008 -0.007
schemes (unions)
...meetings where 0.000*** 0.058 0.000*** 0.008 0.051 0.006 -0.032 -0.034
employees can express their
views
...meetings where 0.348 -0.025 0.219 -0.004 -0.022 -0.002 0.014 0.013
employees can express their
views (unions)
Recruitment & selection
Initial pay is negotiable 0.000*** 0.150 0.000*** 0.024 0.111 0.001 -0.074 -0.061
Initial pay is negotiable 0.001*** -0.050 0.005*** -0.005 -0.031 -0.003 0.020 0.020
(unions)
Training & learning
Both training and skill 0.000*** 0.156 0.000*** 0.026 0.129 0.004 -0.085 -0.075
development are encouraged
Both training and skill 0.120 0.034 0.154 0.004 0.021 0.001 -0.014 -0.012
development are encouraged
(unions)
Either training or skill 0.000*** 0.090 0.000*** 0.014 0.074 0.004 -0.048 -0.043
development is encouraged
Either training or skill 0.363 -0.018 0.371 -0.002 -0.012 -0.001 0.008 0.007
development is encouraged
(unions)
Job autonomy - influence over...
■••job tasks 0.000*** 0.059 0.000*** 0.009 0.055 0.005 -0.035 -0.035
■••job tasks (unions) 0.049** -0.034 0.022** -0.005 -0.027 -0.002 0.017 0.017
• ••pace o f work 0.003*** 0.036 0.000*** 0.006 0.036 0.003 -0.023 -0.023
•■•pace o f work (unions) 0.007*** 0.050 0.003*** 0.007 0.037 0.002 -0.024 -0.022
•••how job is done 0.006*** 0.043 0.004*** 0.005 0.030 0.003 -0.019 -0.019
•••how job is done (unions) 0.415 -0.019 0.304 -0.003 -0.016 -0.001 0.010 0.010
Binomial model: Sample size = 19,890; Log pseudo-likelihood = -12054.586; Wald chi2(57) = 1369.75
_Ordinal model: Sample size = 19,890; Log pseudo-likelihood = -27,300.80; LR chi2(57) -  1,975.98
Note 1: "Satisfied" in the binomial model includes "Very satisfied" and "Satisfied"
Note 2: The significance level of the p-value is signalled using: *** for p<0.01, ** for p<0.05, and * for p<0.1
Note 3: The model also includes controls for age, gender, marital status, educational qualifications, occupation,
contract type, firm size and sector. These results are available by request.
114
In more detail, for satisfaction with pay, the sum of the marginal effects for 
the top two satisfaction categories ranges from 0.05 to 0.06. The differential union 
effect is insignificant in both the CERS and the WERS. In terms of skill development, 
it can be seen that where the job requires on-going learning (Table 3.6, Training & 
learning) or where both skill development and training are encouraged by the firm 
(Table 3.8 Training & learning), workers’ overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction 
with pay is much higher for non-members. The sum of the marginal effects for the two 
highest categories of overall satisfaction is 0.16 and is 0.15, both large effects. In 
contrast, the equivalent differential union effect is not significantly different from zero. 
It is also worth noting the positive and statistically significant effects of the 
performance-related pay and the profit sharing variables in the CERS (Table 3.7). 
Both are around 5 percentage points.
One interpretation of these findings is that HRM practices perform similar 
functions for some of the non-union members as unions do for their members through 
bargaining over pay and working conditions. Just as unions are able to successfully 
negotiate over issues regarding pay and conditions of employment on behalf of 
workers, so HRM practices play an important role in raising satisfaction with pay for 
some non-union members.
To sum up, Hypothesis 4 related to union-interaction effects cannot be 
rejected due to the fact that a large number of p-values are insignificant -  in all, only 4 
practices have a differential union effect in the analysis from Tables 3.6 to 3.8.
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3.5. Conclusions and summary
This chapter has investigated the effect of HRM practices on workers’ 
overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay. Two cross-section nationally 
representative surveys are used, enabling an analysis of these dependent variables, as 
well as of a large set of HRM practices. The classification of HRM practices deployed, 
as well as the nature of this study, aims to bridge the extant HRM literature (mainly 
based on case-studies) with the recent developing labour economics literature on job 
satisfaction.
The study of job satisfaction is rooted in the social sciences, where it has 
mainly been analysed from the point of view of intrinsic or extrinsic motivators, 
situational theory and in case studies in the HRM literature. Social scientists were 
interested in the impact of job satisfaction on individual well-being. As the study of job 
satisfaction developed into the economics literature, the focus became the link between 
job satisfaction and company / employee performance. Here, job satisfaction is broken 
down into facets. Recent empirical economics literature on job satisfaction deploys 
utility functions.
To cover the gaps in the literature and increase knowledge on the chosen 
topics of research, four hypotheses are formulated based on the extant literature: (1) 
certain HRM practices (training, job autonomy, teamworking, job design, employee 
involvement, communication) impact positively on job satisfaction; (2) methods of pay 
practices (seniority-based pay, option-share schemes individual performance schemes) 
are positively associated with job satisfaction; (3) a too high perceived pay inequality
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has a negative impact on job satisfaction; and (4) workplace practices have a lower 
positive impact or even no impact on job satisfaction for union members, but they 
mediate the relationship between HRM practices and job satisfaction.
These four hypotheses are tested in econometrics models which control for 
a large number of personal, job and firm-related characteristics. The first hypothesis 
shows that the HRM practices introduced in models have a statistically significant, and 
in some cases substantial, effect on workers’ overall job satisfaction and on their 
satisfaction with pay. Specifically, it is found that workers enjoy on-going learning, 
the impact on job satisfaction for this practice being the highest out of all other 
practices. This brings a much-needed contribution to the area of research concerning 
the link between training and job satisfaction, which has so far received surprisingly 
little attention. Job autonomy and working in teams also enter with positive impacts in 
the models on job satisfaction. Close supervision of work is disliked, but workers enjoy 
some visual assessment of their performance, suggesting that some monitoring is 
desirable. Furthermore, giving workers a ‘voice’ through employee involvement 
schemes has a positive effect on job satisfaction. Managers who hold regular meetings 
with employees to enable them to express their views about work have the most 
substantial effect in raising job satisfaction.
With regard to the second hypothesis, satisfaction with pay is higher where 
seniority-based pay, share option schemes or individual performance-related schemes 
are in place. With regard to the third hypothesis, a pay structure that is seen as too 
dispersed is associated with lower levels of job satisfaction. These effects are large and 
only apply to non-union members. It can be conjectured that, although HRM practices
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have a direct positive effect in raising workers’ job satisfaction, if these policies also 
raise pay inequality in the workplace then there may be an offsetting negative effect on 
satisfaction and performance. Finally, when investigating the differential union effects 
of HRM practices on the job satisfaction, results show that many of the positive effects 
hold only for some of the non-union members, which suggests that HRM practices are 
either a threat or an irrelevance to some union members.
This clearly raises implications for the design and implementation of HRM 
practices, particularly with respect to pay and incentive systems. However, it should be 
noted that the effect of perceived workplace pay inequality, rather than actual pay 
inequality (this data for actual pay inequality is harder to obtain), is measured and it 
may be that the distribution of pay is misperceived. The implication would then be that 
information flows about pay structure should be improved if managers are concerned 
with their workers’ job satisfaction.
Further research avenues that could be explored include splitting the 
samples by gender or industry, or controlling for income.31 Due to the limitations in the 
CERS observations and the design of the WERS, this increased level of analysis was 
not feasible here.
31 Parent (1999) suggests that the influence o f  performance pay schem es differs by gender. Additionally, 
Clark (1997) notes that job satisfaction may also be gender-related.
32 For instance, pay is not recorded in WERS as a continuous variable but in banded levels. Additionally, 
there was no data related to worker specific measures o f  pay dispersion, but rather self-reported 
perceptions o f  organisational pay dispersion.
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Summary for Chapter III
• Job satisfaction can be the motivating key to increasing company and employee 
performance. HRM practices have an impact on job satisfaction, but extant literature is 
not clear as to which those practices are.
• The contributions of this chapter are that it analyses:
- the impact of HRM practices on job satisfaction. Via its choice of HRM practices, it 
aims to bridge the HRM literature with the Labour Economics literature -  an original 
feature;
- an unexpected find, namely that training has a very high impact on job satisfaction 
(the highest of all HRM practices in this chapter), contributes significantly to a 
previously under-researched area in the literature;
- the impact of specific methods of pay on job satisfaction - adding to a small literature 
base;
- the impact of perceived pay inequality on workers’ job satisfaction - adding to a small 
literature base;
- whether HRM practices have a different impact on the job satisfaction of union 
members;
- employee-based data -  adding to a small literature base of studies which take into 
account employees’ point of view.
• The chapter combines and compares two nationally representative cross-section 
surveys in Britain, which complement each other: CERS 2000 with over 2,000 
employee observations, and WERS 1998 (from which the panel for 1998 is also used) 
with over 19,000 employee observations.
• The hypotheses test the following sign of impact on job satisfaction: (1) certain 
HRM practices chosen based on the HRM literature (e.g. job autonomy, employee
119
involvement) - positive; (2) certain methods of pay (e.g. seniority pay) - positive; (3) 
perceiving the pay structure as highly dispersed -  negative; and (4) HRM practices for 
union members -  lower impact than for non-union members. The first three hypotheses 
are validated. There is not enough evidence to support the fourth hypothesis.
• The models generated to study the relationship between HRM practices and job 
satisfaction, include on the left-hand side job satisfaction as dependent variable, with 
overall job satisfaction in CERS-based model, or pay satisfaction in CERS and WERS- 
based models. On the right-hand side are worker, job and firm characteristics; and a 
classification of HRM practices based on HRM literature: i) work organisation, (ii) 
supervision, (iii) employee involvement, (iv) recruitment and selection, (v) training and 
learning, and (iv) pay practices, including perception of relative income and perception 
of pay inequality.
• The main findings are:
- consistency can be noted between the results obtained in all analyses run in this 
chapter with regard to the HRM practices that are significant, and the sign and the size 
of their impact on job satisfaction;
- a significant contribution is made by this chapter to the literature on training and job 
satisfaction, which has so far received very little attention. The HRM practice with the 
single biggest positive impact on overall and pay satisfaction is ‘encouraging on-going 
learning’. In fact, supporting both training and learning can lead to increases by 16 
percentage points in job satisfaction;
- employee involvement, pay negotiation and job autonomy have a significant positive 
impact on job satisfaction. Close supervision of work is disliked, but workers enjoy
some visual assessment of their performance, suggesting that some monitoring is
desirable;
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- a perception of relative pay as being too small, and a perception of pay dispersion in 
the company as being too high, have the biggest negative impact on job satisfaction, 
with the size of effects being around 15 pp. It is important to know whether this may 
counteract the positive effects of HRM practices. Further research, based on more 
informative data, could try to identify the overall net effect of HRM practices when the 
perception of relative pay (ideally, alongside data on the actual pay distribution) are 
also accounted for;
- more research is needed to know whether perception of pay inequality may have an 
even more substantial impact than actual workplace inequality; this study could only 
measure the former;
- satisfaction with pay is higher where seniority-based pay, share option schemes or 
individual performance-related schemes are in place;
- the differential union effects show the least satisfaction with respect to perceived pay 
inequality and relative income;
- one interpretation of the differential union-effects findings is that HRM practices 
perform similar functions for some of the non-union members as unions do for their 
members through bargaining over pay and working conditions. Just as unions are able 
to successfully negotiate over issues regarding pay and conditions of employment on 
behalf of workers, so HRM practices play an important role in raising satisfaction with 
pay for some non-union members.
- Some of the limitations of the research undergone in this chapter relate to: both 
datasets presenting cross-sectional data and not panel data; number of observations in 
CERS not allowing a more in depth analysis (e.g. data split by industry); and the 




THE IMPACT OF HRM PRACTICES ON EMPLOYEE WORK EFFORT
IN BRITAIN
4.1. Introduction
This chapter investigates the impact of HRM practices on work effort, 
reporting separately both employees’ and managers’ perspective in Britain. The main 
focus of this study is on whether and to what extent Human Resource Management 
(HRM) practices impact on measures of employee and managerial-reported work 
effort. An in-depth look into the meaning, conceptualisation, theory and literature on 
effort is intended to contribute to these areas which have previously received little 
attention. Then the chapter questions whether HRM practices are associated with 
increases in workplace effort. The data used is the British Workplace Employment 
Relations Survey 1998 (WERS 98) which contains over 19,000 employer-employee 
matched observations. An attempt is also made to classify HRM practices according to 
a chronological development from traditional to more modem.
The originality of this approach lies in presenting both the views of the 
manager and the employee, thus presenting the employees' usually less seen 
perspective on organisational issues. Data from management and individual employees 
is based on self-reported comparisons between the effort at present and effort at some 
previous point in time. The two measures of effort are essentially reconstructing the 
same object of analysis within the same workplace (since data is employer-employee
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matched) and differences between manager’s and employee’s evaluation of effort 
could then be put down to the sensitivity of their perception.
Most of the extant literature on effort takes the relatively easier task of 
analysing quantitative measures of so called 'extensive' effort, defined as the answer to 
“how much work has been done”. It is mainly the recent labour economics literature 
that, like this chapter, takes the challenge of studying intensive effort, reflected by the 
concentration and degree of intensity of work, and the answer to “how hard the 
employees have been working”. Moreover, subjective constructs of effort are 
deployed, a feature which places the present study at the avant-garde of labour 
economics development.
Another novel feature is that the conceptualisation of effort borrows from 
both HRM and Labour Economics literature. On the one hand, the study aims to 
determine whether HRM practices lead to effort being increased by creating workplace 
settings which encourage employees to deploy more effort. This is rather in the vein of 
the HRM literature where HRM practices are implemented in order to motivate and 
enable human resources to reach their maximum potential in the workplace. The 
assumption is that HRM practices can make employees like their jobs due to the 
implementation of the said practices. The approach is linked to the previous chapter in 
this thesis, on job satisfaction. Chapter III is a chapter built around the hypothesis that 
certain HRM practices have a positive impact on job satisfaction. By the same token, 
here, HRM practices are tested to investigate whether they can lead to employees 
willing to deploy effort at their own discretion.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 contributes to the study of 
effort by offering an insight into the theoretical frameworks of research used on this 
topic and the extant economic and management literature on effort. Section 4.3 
describes the data used, the hypotheses formulated for this study, the variables
generated and the econometric models built. Section 4.4 discusses the results and
Section 4.5 presents the conclusions followed by a chapter summary.
4.2. Theory and literature review on workplace effort
This section assesses the impact of HRM practices on workplace effort, by 
looking succinctly at the theoretical and empirical contributions from the economic and 
management literatures. It starts with an assessment of the meaning and 
conceptualisation of effort, followed by whether effort is to be maximised or 
minimised, and by whom. Then, it presents the relevant theoretical frameworks which 
underpin the hypotheses for this chapter. In the end, a literature review separates the 
extant studies on effort into distinct strands, depending on the HRM practice or factor 
analysed. This section aims to contribute significantly to the study on workplace effort 
which lacks a consistent and clear framework of research.
4.2.1. What is workplace effort?
Researching workplace effort is a complex task which needs to start with 
an assessment of the multiple meanings in use. However, there is widespread use of the 
term ‘effort’, with little reference to its definition and without consensus on the usage 
and meaning of the term. Few studies attempt to make a distinction between effort and
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related concepts of performance, productivity, efficiency, motivation, commitment. In 
spite of a substantial amount of research resources deployed with the aim of 
understanding the “high-performance” workplace, it is quite surprising to notice this 
lack of clarity and consistency in the literature when it comes to utilising the terms 
above. The amount of confusion that this leads to cannot be overestimated.
Amongst the most notable attempts to pin down a shared sense of meaning, 
Guest (1990) mentions a definition given by Baldamus, who defines effort as 'the sum 
total of physical and mental exertion, tedium, fatigue or any other disagreeable aspect 
of work' (Guest 1990: 29). However, researchers are also warned: ‘as it contains many 
subjective elements, this component [effort] defies rigorous definition and is certainly 
unmeasurable' (Guest 1990 : 30). In a more fruitful search for a definition, Andrews 
and Simmons (1995) conclude that the list of interpretations is ‘endless’ and adopt the 
definition: ‘anything that is bargained over in real-world negotiations, apart from 
employment and wages, and is not paid directly’ (Andrews and Simmons 1995 : 315). 
In their paper, effort becomes rather synonymous to ‘working conditions’.
The notion that sits at the heart of the analysis of effort in this chapter is 
captured by the term ‘discretionary’ effort. It is used to refer to effort deployed beyond 
the strictly needed or contracted amount of effort, as Bailey (2000) establishes in a 
substantial chapter. Batt (2004) likens discretionary effort to the ‘goodwill’ of the 
employee’ (Batt 2004 : 118). Berg and Kalleberg (2002) maintain that ‘organizing the 
work process so that non-managerial employees have the opportunity to contribute 
discretionary effort is the central feature of a high performance work system (HPWS)’ 
(Berg and Kalleberg 2002 : 3).
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As perceived from the difficulty of finding a definition, the 
conceptualisation of effort is problematic and research interests differ. Attempts to 
clarify or standardise methods of measurement are not yet common either. So, a brief 
discussion of the conceptual ways of thinking about effort is needed.
Most notably, differences appear along the line of qualitative versus 
quantitative expressions of effort: qualitative measures take into account work 
intensity, while quantitative measures tend to take into account hours of work. The 
point of departure and most substantial element which helps in this discussion is the 
distinction between extensive and intensive effort which can be made in analysing 
effort.33 Extensive effort refers to a quantitative measure of effort, for instance related 
to the length of working day and quantified by working hours. It refers to how much 
work has been done. This can be separated from intensive effort, reflected by the 
concentration and degree of intensity of work tasks within a given amount of time, and 
which acquires a qualitative notion that is more problematic to measure. It refers to 
how hard people work.
Most of the extant literature on effort takes the relatively easier task of 
analysing quantitative measures of extensive effort. The microeconomic studies 
predominantly assess topics related to working hours and overtime, life-work balance, 
time-off arrangements, leisure, family friendly policies, flexible working arrangements. 
The macroeconomics literature looks at the impact of employment legislation on
33 Green (2001 : 56 - 57) and Guest (1990 : 303 - 305) present a more in-depth discussion on the 
conceptualisation o f  effort. Guest (1990) offers a survey o f  the psychological and sociological literature, 
which distinguishes between work effort (seen as the actual deployment o f  work, with no further 
quantification) and work intensity (merely the speed and concentration o f  work).
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labour supply, labour participation and unemployment, or distribution of working 
hours within the population.
It is mainly the recent labour economics literature that, like this chapter, 
takes the challenge of studying intensive effort. Hereby, this chapter attempts to 
research effort by analysing combined data from management and individual 
employees based on self-reported comparisons between the effort at present and effort 
at some previous point in time. Since these comparisons are usually relative to a 
common experience of work intensity, such as within the same establishment, they can 
be considered valid for the purpose of the analysis. In other words, since both the 
employer and manager refer in their estimation of effort to their experience in the same 
workplace, their reports and perception of effort can be used in relation to each other as 
they are reflections of one and the same picture.
The validity of a combined measure of effort should also hold even if the 
type of measures used by the employer happens to be different than those used by the 
employee, for instance if one gives a level-measure (e.g. effort is high) while the other 
gives a process-measure (effort has increased) — the basis of their assumptions is the 
same workplace. The two measures of effort are essentially reconstructing the same 
object of analysis, and differences between manager’s and employee’s evaluation of 
effort could then be put down to the sensitivity of their perception.
A particular case of reconstructing effort from the manager’s and 
employee’s perceptions is when the former rates overall workplace effort, while the 
employee rates individual effort. In these cases, there could be observations where the
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two measures differ not only due to differences in perception, but also due to 
differences in information. For instance, the manager of the workplace may believe 
that overall workplace effort has increased, while individual employees may confess to 
shirking. The principle of extracting a combined measure of effort remains the same, as 
the two ratings are the two sides of the same coin, namely the same workplace. The 
additional advantage of this particular case is that it creates an invaluable opportunity 
to peer inside the organisation, especially with regard to those observations where the 
management’s view is different than that of the employees. This type of analysis is an 
original feature of the chapter.
When it comes to the relatively harder task of analysing and measuring 
intensive effort, the most trodden path in the literature has been to quantify the degree 
of change in work intensity (e.g. Green 2001). Green (2004) is the closest and only 
study to date that looks at effort intensity and its determinants. This chapter advances 
Green (2004) in the following ways. Firstly, it brings together the employees and 
management views. Secondly, it focuses on a much wider array of workplace practices. 
Thirdly, it proposes a test of the historical development of HRM practices directed at 
employee effort, via taking a multidisciplinary approach and allowing the high- 
commitment managerial literature and other social sciences to inform its choice of 
independent variables. Lastly, and maybe most importantly, it attempts to shape a 
unified framework for research on effort seen as a desirable workplace consequence of 
a prolific environment at work, unlike Green’s (2004) view of effort as undesirable 
work intensity.
128
4.2.2. Is effort to be maximised or minimised? By whom?
Most of this literature on effort at work regards effort as an undesirable 
factor especially for the employee.34 This study takes a potential contentious stance on 
effort by asserting it as a desirable outcome for both the employer and, more 
distinctively different than the literature, for the employee. The following substantiates 
and explains this contentious issue. Some of the most evident perspectives of the 
literature on effort in use can be summarised and classified into the following five 
categories:
(1) Productivity perspective: The main view taken by classical economics is that 
employers aim to maximize profits and minimize costs. To increase output per 
employee, in order to maximise the returns to work or increase productivity, more 
output from fewer employees or fewer work hours is needed. In this context of 
analysing productivity, 'effort' is the factor appearing in the denominator part of the
"3 C
output/input ratio, so it is to be minimised if productivity is to be maximised. For 
instance, in the context of growing competition in the market place, British workplaces 
have been continuously scrutinised and compared against their counterparts. Measures 
featured in comparisons, such as GPD per hour (see Figure 4.1) or economic growth, 
look at extensive comparisons of productivity per employee, not taking into account 
the quality of work nor the more complex issues related to the sociology of work (e.g. 
are employees satisfied with their workplace? are levels of well-being high?)
34 For a detailed view  o f  the literature, please see the latter parts o f  this section.
35 If productivity is defined as the ratio o f  output divided by input, and input is the multiplicatio result 
o f  hours x effort per employee x employees, than for productivity to be maximized, effort should be 
minimised. This perspective also makes a limiting assumption that effort is constant across em ployees 
with the same skill levels.
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(2) Employee exploitation perspective: This literature on labour is written based on the 
assumption that employees have to be aware that their behaviour could be manipulated, 
and that they could try to be more in control of their jobs in order to avoid (unfair) 
working pressure imposed by employers. Here, the rationale for minimising effort is 
that employees are being exploited at work. 'Effort' is seen as the result of a 
manipulative or coercive exercise, so the fact that employers want more 'effort' from 
employees is given a bad, alienating and self-interested connotation. The topics of 
research revolve around questioning the fairness, means and sources of exploitation of 
the employee by the employer. Studies assess the factors that are conducive to the 
intensification of effort (e.g. Edwards and Whitston 1991, Green 2001, Strobl and 
Walsh 2002, Green 2004). Similar to the first perspective, the employees are expected
Japan Germany UK (=100) France G7 e x c . USA
UK
Source: Office o f  N ational Statistics
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to aim to minimise effort; unlike the first perspective, the employers are assumed to be 
intent on maximizing effort.
(3) Work as a disutility, and the Agency Theory perspective: Work is presented as a 
disutility for employees because they may gain a higher utility from another activity 
such as leisure. Thus employees intend to avoid or minimise effort, so as to gain their 
work compensation for less work. Employees may shirk, so monitoring is needed (this 
is the essence of the Agency Theory), which is costly for the employers. However, 
some monitoring is unavoidably needed to make sure that the work does get done. In 
this perspective, the employees cannot be trusted to deploy effort unless they are 
closely managed and controlled. Employers aim to maximise effort while minimising 
monitoring costs.
(4) Personnel Economics perspective (linked to employee disutility): Employers 
demand effort which has disutility for employees. Similar to the third perspective 
above, employers consider it desirable that employees deploy effort. However, here the 
view is that instead of the 'stick' approach via monitoring, the 'carrot' approach is used 
by employers: employees are to be compensated for the 'effort' they put in. At its most 
basic, the compensation includes one pecuniary measure, the wage, paid for both time 
at work (extensive margin) and effort while at work (intensive margin). More 
developments in compensation packages have shown that effort can be influenced by 
various pecuniary incentive schemes e.g. deferred pay, performance-related pay or 
seniority pay. The ways in which effort can be influenced by various pecuniary or non- 
pecuniary compensation schemes have been the subject matter of Personnel Economics 
over the last 15 years.
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(5) The HRM perspective: Here the focus is on motivating the employee to deploy 
effort via HRM practices. This perspective shares with Agency Theory and Personnel 
Economics perspectives the interest in increasing employee effort. Unlike the previous 
perspectives, the novel approach here is the assumption that employees can be 
motivated so as to desire to deploy more effort out of their own accord. It is 
hypothesised that if the right workplace conditions are put in place, the employees 
would be satisfied, happy and willing to deploy effort in an environment where their 
own interests are aligned with the organisational interests.
The HRM literature speaks of motivating employees via constructs remote from 
traditional economists' understanding, such as achieving an alignment between 
employees' values and organisational values; organisational culture; organisational 
mission. However, it is from this perspective that some non-pecuniary HRM practices 
have been derived, such as workplace flexibility, job security or job autonomy.
There are reasons to believe that this perspective can be witnessed to have 
materialised in organisations. For instance Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) conduct 
an international study of satisfaction and stress levels at work, and note that ‘First, the 
great majority of workers in the industrial democracies appear to be remarkably 
content with their jobs. The old Dickensian idea that work subjugates people is 
apparently not supported by the data’ (Blanchflower and Oswald 1999 : 1).
Notably, the critical change that can be observed among the five 
perspectives exposed above is in the way they conceptualise 'effort' with regard to 
whether more or less effort is desired, and whether it is desired by the employer or by 
the employee. Initially, 'effort' is as an entity to be minimised by both employer and 
employees. Then, the emphasis shifts on ways in which employers can maximise effort
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despite its undesirable characteristics to the employee. According to different 
perspectives, these ways range from exploitative (via lack of control over one's job), to 
distrustful (via monitoring) and towards compensatory (via pecuniary or non-pecuniary 
benefits). Lastly, the HRM literature, which is built on celebrating and enhancing the 
potential of the employees as valued human resources, puts emphasis on ways in which 
the (ideally) matched objective of both employees and employers is to maximise effort.
Therefore the connotation given to effort in this chapter is a positive one. 
The assumption is that in an efficient organisational environment, characterised by the 
presence of the ‘right’ combination of HRM practices - the determination of which 
forms the core of this study -  employees would ‘naturally’ be more productive. They 
would use their skills, abilities and knowledge to better effect, ultimately working 
harder and willingly deploying more effort. In this vein, it would be counterintuitive to 
argue that having employees declare ‘my job requires that I work very hard’, and 
having managers note substantial upwards changes in ‘how hard people work here’, are 
not desirable and worthwhile objectives -  and these are precisely the measures of effort 
used in this analysis.
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4.2.3. Theoretical insight into the study of work effort
In an attempt to shed more light on the theoretical underpinning for 
researching the topic of effort in the workplace, this review of the theoretical literature 
includes both economic and HRM developments. On the one hand, there are various 
phases in the development of economic theoretical frameworks which could be used to 
attempt to understand effort. On the other hand, in terms of HRM developments, effort 
is seen from the perspective of an assumed and empirically investigated impact of 
management practices on worker and organisational behaviour.
Starting with a presentation of economic theoretical frameworks relevant to 
work effort, these vary from competitive to non-competitive models, from macro to 
micro economic assumptions, and from the objectivism of the Adam Smith’s 
‘invisible-hand’ of market forces to allowing for institutional or behavioural 
influences. A brief review of these frameworks necessarily has at its base the purely 
theoretical assumption of market forces under perfect competition and neoclassical 
economics. Relaxing some of the traditional assumptions leads to a variety of models 
such as: compensating differentials, wage competition models, tournament theory, 
principal-agent models, human capital theory, efficiency wages models, internal labour 
markets and job competition models. Some of these models have an added benefit 
when compared to neoclassical economics, in that they recognise the role of 
institutional forces, and even assume away the restriction to a competitive labour 
market.
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The most basic neoclassical theory relates to effort via postulating that 
work effort be seen as part of the traditional production function. In its simplest and 
widely cited form, a production function is limited to two inputs, respectively capital 
and labour:
Q = F(K, L) (1)
where Q is output (e.g. quantity of units produced), K  is capital input and L is labour 
input. Labour could also be expressed as a product of hours of work H  and N  number 
of workers, giving:
Q = F (K, HN) (2)
Under these basic traditional production function assumptions, the function 
Q is assumed to be single-valued, continuous and at least twice differentiable with 
marginal products being positive and decreasing, giving Q V > 0 , Q \  > 0, Q ’ V < 0 
and Q ”l < 0.
A widely used explicit form for the production function is the Cobb- 
Douglas production function:
Q = a K kl?  (3)
where Q, K  and L have the same meaning as in (1); a is a constant; and a and |3 are 
the elasticities of capital and, respectively, labour with respect to output.
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The attractiveness of a Cobb-Douglas mathematical formulation comes 
from it allowing an easy estimation of returns to scale, for instance the case of constant 
returns to scale is obtained if a + /? = 1. Neoclassical economics models are then built 
assuming perfect competition i.e. prices of output, capital and labour are 
predetermined. A principal theoretical preoccupation in this type of model is 
determining the combinations of labour and capital which iensure the minimisation of 
costs, or maximisation of profits. Or, in practice, a firm’s demand for labour comes 
under wider influences such as the price of labour, production techniques and 
technology, and the labour market environment.
There are known limitations to neoclassical models of the labour market, 
and to their interpretation of effort. Understandably, there are inherent difficulties 
posed by neoclassical models above, and they are associated with aggregating different 
varieties and quantities of labour and capital into only two inputs. The aggregation 
issue can only be solved in the case of one worker and one machine. Or, theoretically, 
these inputs are assumed to be homogenous. Crucially too, labour is only modelled 
from a quantitative-based perspective (e.g. number of hours worked, speed of work, 
number of tasks performed), without considering the qualitative aspects of labour 
effort (e.g. work energy, commitment, care, attention to detail).
Evidence from labour economics studies suggests indeed that neoclassical 
theory is hampered by limitations in ascertaining the level of work effort needed and 
the factors likely to influence it. For instance, it cannot explain why the market may 
not clear even in the long-run, an observation attributed to markets compensating the 
non-wage job attributes. According to Hyclak et al (2005) : 171, the idea of wage
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compensating differentials is traceable as far back as to the work of Adam Smith. In an 
empirical study, Fairris (2004) notes that in unionised markets, market forces may not 
lead to equilibrium in the labour market, since unions impact on wages. Therefore, 
applications of neoclassical economics have introduced the notion of compensating 
differentials: higher wages given in return for accepting to carry on hard, risky or 
unpleasant jobs. Indeed, Fairris (2004) finds that wage compensating differentials, 
mostly related to health and safety, tend to be present in unionised workplaces, whilst 
nonunionised workplaces have no such compensating differentials.
Positive steps in the conceptualisation of effort are made in models where 
the analysis takes into account the employee’s perspective on behaviour. Though effort 
E is still conventionally measured in rather quantitative terms -  as opposed to 
incorporating qualitative terms - such as efficiency units of labour, the standard 
production function can be re-written as:
Q = F(K ,E N ) (4)
giving at the level of an individual employee, the utility function:
U = F (W, E) (5)
where W is wage. Here the assumption is that effort impacts negatively on utility, so U 
is assumed to be strictly concave with UE < 0, Uww< 0, Uee < 0, Uee~ U we> 0, and 
Uw > 0. Workers have increased satisfaction from minimising levels of effort with 
regard to maximising rewards. The right balance has to be found with regard to amount
137
and intensity of effort, since too little effort leaves workers bored, whilst too much 
effort leads to stress. On employees’ side, the deployment of effort depends on the 
price of and reward of effort, worker preferences and their abilities (skills, knowledge, 
resources). The advantage of this model is creating a framework which takes into 
account that the employee’s individual characteristics and behavioural preferences 
influence the amount of effort deployed.
Wage competition models further the theoretical developments of the 
traditional economic models. While remaining within a traditional economic 
perspective, they use supply and demand curves and postulate that an equilibrium point 
will be reached when supply and demand for work effort meet in the labour market. 
Workers sell effort and firms buy it. Employers are competing for the highest quality 
and intensity of effort at the lowest wage, while employees bargain to obtain the 
highest wage for a minimum of effort. At the right level of wage, equilibrium is 
assumed to be reached, whereby sellers and buyers of labour are satisfied that their 
needs have been met in the market. The advantage of this theoretical perspective over 
previous models is that it takes into account the employees’ side of the bargain, 
additionally suggesting a negative-utility connotation to effort similar to the utility 
function model described above.
Additionally, tournament theory (see Lazear and Rosen 1981) is also 
formulated on the hypothesis that effort is to be encouraged via competition. In 
contrast to wage competition models designed for the macroeconomic level, this model 
has had higher applications at the microeconomic level. The main assertion is that hard 
working individuals compete for ‘prizes’ inside the company. If employees are
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homogenous, the theory predicts that total amount of effort exerted would be highest. 
Sunde (2003) tests this theory in the context of tennis players and finds that if 
tournament participants are heterogeneous there is lower effort exertion during the 
tournament, but that incentives set in the form of prizes matter for effort exertion. 
Tournament theory puts firmly into perspective the importance of analysing the impact 
of employee incentives when trying to understand the factors influencing workplace 
effort.
A well-established approach to studying work effort has been to assess the 
interaction between effort and the probability of being caught shirking. This economic 
theoretical framework is proposed by principal-agent models (Hart and Holmstrom 
1986, Jensen and Meckling 1976). According to this model, the manager (the 
principal) tries to minimise the cost and amount of the monitoring and supervision 
which are needed in order to gain satisfying evidence on whether the employee (the 
agent) deploys enough effort on the job or shirks. The assumption is that effort would 
not be maximised in the absence of supervision and monitoring, and that effort is not
36easily observed other than via supervision and monitoring. As opposed to motivation 
through rewards and incentives (e.g. in the tournament model), this approach looks at 
practices related to employee monitoring, discipline and control under the assumption 
that employees would not have an intrinsic desire to work at the peak of their 
performance if they were given complete autonomy.
However, merely deterring people from shirking goes a very short distance
towards motivating employees to work at their best. In fact, those employees who only
36 Different forms o f  technology and different occupations w ill require different HRM systems for 
supervision and monitoring. The first hypothesis analysed in this chapter attempts to look at these 
differences.
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work because of the fear of being caught shirking, could not be expected to be one and 
the same as those who would deploy discretionary effort. In other words, practices 
which would attempt to merely deter shirkers by intense monitoring, could stifle the 
creativity of employees who would otherwise have the freedom to show initiative at 
work. Being considered relevant for ways in which workplace effort is elicited, this 
theoretical view is partially analysed in this chapter in a model that assesses the 
efficacy of alternative HRM practices of supervision and quality monitoring.
Within the 1960s humanist movement which maintains a focus on the 
employee in the workplace, Becker’s (1964) human capital theory postulates that a 
positive link between labour productivity and worker’s skill, education, work 
experience and training should be expected. Effort is assumed to be higher in 
companies that invest in human capital, have a trained workforce and encourage skill 
development, while lower levels of pay may then be explained by lower quality of 
labour inputs. This theoretical framework has been influential in the way effort is 
modelled in the literature and in this chapter, in that employee education and training 
are controlled for.
Theoretical models of effort-wage relationships that set out to maximise
effort include efficiency wages (for a theoretical description see Akerlof and Yellen
1986 -  this model was popular in the 1970s and 1980s) which postulates that offering a
wage above the market going rate allows a company to recruit and maintain a better
quality of hard working employees.37 It is assumed that workers respond to higher
levels of pay by increasing their levels of effort, yet some authors show that pecuniary
37 Efficiency wages models were used by authors including: Ramaswamy and Rowthorn 1991, Drago 
and Heywood 1992, Martin 1997, Fehr and Gachter 1998, Hinks 1999, Golsmith et a l 2000, Strobl and 
Walsh 2002, A lexopoulos 2003, Strand 2003, Brown et a l 2004, Fehr and Gotte 2004.
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incentives alone can only go so far in motivating employees.38 Similar to principal 
agent models, in efficiency wage models effort cannot be fully observed. The 
distinction is that efficiency wage theories see effort as a gift-exchange model, which 
has different implications than agency theory for views on the impact on HRM 
practices on effort. This chapter cannot test the efficiency wage theory, due to lack of 
distinctive employee-wage observations (wage is banded in WERS) as well as due to 
using a cross-sectional database. However, its implication is that pecuniary incentives 
increase employee effort in a direct relationship. This is tested in the way the model of 
effort is constructed, namely by assessing the impact of a large selection of pecuniary 
incentives on subjective constructs of effort.
Alternative theoretical views to neoclasical economics have been put 
forward in an attempt to capture the reality that market forces may not be the only 
factors that determine labour levels or work intensity in a purely “open” market model. 
These include internal labour market models, job competition models, dual labour 
markets and market segmentation.39 These models depart from the neoclassical 
equilibrium theory of demand and supply meeting in the market and generating an 
equilibrium wage where the market clears. Instead, they attempt to underpin the ways 
in which wage adjusting mechanisms work in a non-competitive setting, so they 
assume the existence of institutional forces at play in addition to market forces.
Internal-labour markets assume that the allocation of workers to jobs and 
their wage setting is achieved mainly based on administrative rules within the firm,
38 In response to higher wages, Fehr and Gotte (2004) find that in a model o f  incumbents who are loss- 
averse and reference-dependent, preferences can account for both the increase in working time and the 
decrease in daily effort.
39 For internal labour markets, see Doeringer and Piore (1971).
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even though the outside-firm wage is still important as there is always the latent threat 
to quit. Consequently, workers are more likely to have long-term employment whereby 
they get accustomed to the organisational culture, to develop specific knowledge via 
on-the-job training (especially in blue collar jobs), and to be promoted according to an 
internal promotion ladder with lower-level jobs being the only entry-point for workers 
from outside the firm.
Institutionalists suggest that discrimination or market segmentation (based 
on unionisation, culture or social status) are also important factors. Job competition 
models assume that individual characteristics and especially the cost of training are the 
basis of people being allocated a place in a job queue, from which employers pick 
those workers who need the least amount of on-the-job training.40
Turning to the HRM literature, it has to be noted that it has as its central 
purpose the development of the human resource from the management’s productive 
perspective. Employee morale, motivation and commitment are central themes of most 
modem research. HRM theories emphasise the importance of generating an 
organisational climate with a committed, loyal and motivated workforce, which 
identifies with the organisational culture and works hard. The assumption is that HRM 
practices can increase work performance if they persuade employees to 'identify' with 
the values of their organisation.
For instance, in the management literature, the most relevant debate to the 
topic of workplace effort has been put forward by theorising the views on employee
40 For job competition models, see Thurow (1975).
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behaviour which underpin managerial practice. McGregor’s (1960) theories X and Y, 
as well as Ouchi (1981)’s theory Z differing essentially in the assumptions made for 
intrinsic employee behaviour. These much popularised views assume that employees 
are homogenous in their predicted behaviour towards labour, but that specific 
managerial practice can trigger the desired high-effort behaviour. More explicitly, if 
employees are expected to inherently dislike work, then management practices have to 
be of the type that constrict and pressurise employees into doing it (Theory X). 
Alternatively, if this Tazy-employee’ assumption is relaxed towards the view that 
employees may like work, since it fulfils psychological needs and could bring 
satisfaction (Theory Y), management practices would be attempting to offer job 
variation and autonomy.
In the more advanced view applied in Japanese management, Theory Z 
implies that employees increase effort in response to well-being programmes. 
Therefore, management could obtain high workplace effort if certain loyalty-inducing 
practices were in place, such as: long-term employment; individual responsibility; 
collective decision-making; implicit and informal control; explicit and formalized 
performance measures; appropriate evaluation and promotion; moderately specialized 
careers; and a holistic concern for employee well-being including the employees’ 
family. Theory Z comes closest to the spirit of this chapter, in that it attempts to 
identify sets of management practices which lead to higher employee effort. However, 
its limitations are its national-applicability and time relevance. With regard to the 
former, Ouchi (1981) designed it with the aim of forming the best mix of practices in 
the American and Japanese companies, not British as is the aim of this chapter. With 
regard to its age, theory Z was put together more than two decades ago.
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The main drawback of the HRM theories is that corporate performance
appears to maintain a central role in analysis, and that the employee-issues should
deserve more attention - Guest (2002) also notes this issue. In contrast, this chapter 
highlights the importance of not only bringing in the employee’s side of the story, but 
of finding a way of bridging the employee’s and manager’s perspective in one common 
measure of effort.
To conclude, the theoretical frameworks presented above trace the 
evolution of thought with regard to conceptualising models of employee behaviour. 
They construct a mosaic of assumptions with regard to factors that impact on 
workplace effort. This chapter adopts the perspective that effort is to be maximised, as 
a desirable and natural by-product of a contented workforce.
4.2.4. A review of the literature on effort
Research on the topic of work effort (with this exact denomination) has 
been a recurrent but not clearly discernible theme in the Economics, Human Resource 
Management (HRM) and wider managerial and social science literatures. These 
literatures have developed frames of reference for the analysis of effort, but with rather 
divergent concerns.
One purpose of analysing effort in the economics and HRM literature is to 
identify ways of obtaining a productive workplace, while the interest in ways to 
increase effort per se, by getting to the roots of individual behaviour, becomes 
secondary. On the contrary, psychologists and sociologists have a manifested interest
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in understanding behaviour per se; still, direct references to work effort via applying 
the knowledge of these disciplines to the workplace tend to take second place. 41 Thus, 
this chapter aims to fill the gap in the literature by using the econometrics apparatus to 
understand the underlying factors that lead to individuals deploying effort at work, 
pushing the boundaries of extant studies.
While theoretical assumptions adopted in the extant literature vary, the 
common denominator in the empirical research on effort is to look at the impact of 
organisational factors on effort. A few main strands can be identified in a review of the 
literature, hence the studies presented below are grouped accordingly. The literature 
review starts with the assessment of pecuniary incentives, continues with ways of 
organising work and methods of communication, and finishes with studies on firm 
performance that come somewhat closer to the topic of research in this chapter.
Traditionally economists have studied effort, mainly under the 
denomination of productivity. The majority of the empirical studies in this literature 
focus on pecuniary incentives in their most basic form, i.e. wages (e.g. Haskel and 
Martin 1996, Fehr and Gotte 2004, Lopez-Tamayo and Surinach 2005, Millea and 
Fuess 2005). The majority of this literature analyses the relation between work effort 
and the role of pecuniary incentives in soliciting more effort. Millea and Fuess (2005) 
conduct a 50-year study of the manufacturing sector in the US and find that there could 
be a bi-directional relationship between pay and productivity, with pay acting both as 
an anterior incentive and posterior reward to effort.
41 Studies approaching the study o f  effort from an attitudinal or even psychological perspective include: 
Clark (1999), Brown (2001), Bowles et a l (2001), Dubinsky and Skinner (2002), Fisher (2002), Minkler 
(2002), Bartel el a l (2003), Fershtman et a l (2003), Goette and Huffman (2004), Bandiera et a l (2005).
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Advances in the pecuniary incentive literature in relation to work 
productivity involved analysing forms of contingent pay (such as piece rates, seniority 
pay, group or individual performance-related pay) and forms of financial participation 
(gain sharing).
On contingent pay, Bandiera et al (2005) find in a British case study that 
piece rates (which are a form of absolute incentives) can solicit at least 50% higher 
productivity of an average employee when compared to relative incentives, an example 
of the latter being that a worker’s pay depends on how she performs relative to her 
peers. This study takes into account the effect of social preferences on methods of pay, 
which is why its conclusions differ from the studies that traditionally extolled the 
benefit of relative pay (e.g. Lazear and Rosen 1981). Other studies, in line with the 
general literature, find that piece rates may raise productivity but may lower 
profitability, while time rates have the opposite effects (e.g. Freeman and Kleiner 
2005). Additionally, a large literature analyses the impact of pay for performance on 
effort, with various results (Lazear 1996, Heery 1998, Booth and McCulloch 1999, 
Lazear 2000, Frick and Prinz 2003, Marsden 2004). As noted by Marsden (2004) it 
may be that the role of pay for performance in increasing productivity is mainly to act 
as a trigger for renegotiating performance norms (for instance, via goal-setting and 
appraisal procedures) than to be a motivator for effort. The impact of skill-based pay 
on effort also seems to be mediated by social factors such as the perception of fairness, 
which are higher when these pay schemes provide training and are better understood 
and communicated (Lee at al 1999 presenting an American case study).
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Still on the topic of pecuniary remuneration, a large variety exists amongst 
the schemes of financial participation analysed in relation to their impact on 
productivity or effort. Such schemes include gain sharing (Blanchflower and Oswald 
1988, Pendleton 1997, Kim 1999, Heywood et al 2003, or Freeman et al 2004) or stock 
options and employee ownership (Bai and Xu 1996, Pendleton 1997, Leadbeater 1997, 
Pendleton 2001, Freeman et al 2004). Such studies also find mixed answers to the 
question of how employee participation schemes impact on effort. For instance, 
Pendleton’s (2001) study on WERS 98 in Britain finds little support for the traditional 
theoretical arguments regarding the impact of profit sharing and other forms of 
participation on employee behaviour. Instead, Pendleton’s (2001) findings are more in 
line with the industrial relations literature and supportive of the notion of ‘bundling’, 
suggesting that ‘the relationship between “traditional” forms of employee 
representation and more innovative human resource management practices may be 
complementary rather than zero-sum’ (Pendleton 2001 : 116).
A more recent trend in the economic analysis of pecuniary incentives and 
effort has been to look at the impact of relative pay (via analysing comparison income, 
pay inequality and pay dispersion) as well as at the pecuniary side of fringe benefits 
(such as commission, bonus, pension schemes, health insurance or parental leave).42 
Bloom (1999) suggests that a more compressed within-firm pay distribution is 
positively associated with individual and organisational performance. However, in the 
area of Sports Economics, Gardner (1999) finds that pay for performance discourages 
increased effort due to creating a very wide pay dispersion, whilst Knowles et al
42 Studies on income, pay inequality and pay dispersion include Layard (1980), A kerlof and Y ellen  
(1990), Ramaswamy and Rowthorn (1991), Pfeffer and Langton (1993), Clark and Oswald (1996), 
M oene and Wallerstein (1997), Bloom (1999), Winter-Ebmer and Zweimuller (1999), Brown (2001), 
Kugler (2002), Shaw et a l (2002), Grund and Sliwka (2003), Frick and Prinz (2003), Beaumont and 
Harris (2003), Maureen (2004).
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(2003) report that not having pay linked to performance is also conducive to de­
motivated players.
This literature finds that attitudinal variables, in particular perceptions of 
fairness play a crucial role in mediating the impact of dispersed-pay schemes and 
effort. For instance, Maureen (2004) finds that labour supply falls for the average male 
employee in response to lower fairness perceptions in less egalitarian distributions of 
pay. With respect to fringe benefits, a literature specifically targeting individual 
bonuses is yet to be developed. A case study on performance related pay mechanisms 
by Engellandt and Riphahn (2004) find that effort is higher if performance evaluations 
are more heterogeneous and individual “surprise” bonus payments are used more 
frequently.
Another strand in the literature looks at the impact of work organisation on 
effort. The themes under investigation include the traditional economics view that 
companies try to achieve a balance in the organisation of work between the cost of 
supervision (acting as deterrent to shirking behaviour) and employee job autonomy. 43 
More recent advances in this literature suggest that the empirical relevance of the 
principal-agent theory (see Eisenhardt 1989), postulating companies may increase 
effort under tight but low cost monitoring, could be increased by taking into account 
the role of the psychological contract between principals and agents. As such, 
increased monitoring may be interpreted by employees as managerial distrust, leading 
to reduced work effort.44 In other words, too much monitoring can be
43 For more details on the usage o f  this traditional economics view , see Weaver (1977), Frey (1993), 
Osterman (1994), Belfield and Marsden (2002) or Freeman et a l (2004).
44 Two studies that address specifically the issue o f  trust in the workplace are Frey (1993) and Kalleberg 
et a l (2004).
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counterproductive, stifling creativity, putting boundaries to innovation, and 
jeopardising work efficiency.
Alternative ways of monitoring, initially perceived as less invasive, stem 
from organising work in teams and using peer pressure to influence the quality and 
quantity of work effort.45 On the one hand, the impact of teams on labour productivity 
appears to be positive (Banker et al 1996), especially in the case of self-managed teams 
(see Batt 2004) or if associated with unions (McNabb and Whitfield 1997) where 
teams can reverse the otherwise negative impact of unions. On the other hand, some 
authors raise suspicion regarding the actual amount of autonomy given to the employee 
in teams (Geary and Dobbins 2001) or point to the negative consequences of a 
pervasive peer scrutiny on work motivation. Kandel and Lazear (1992) suggest that 
peer pressure can mean that effort is greater in large firms than in small ones, possibly 
due to worker sorting or to free riding being more likely to occur in larger firms.
A related literature on the analysis of the ways of organising work looks at 
the effects of empowerment, flattened hierarchies and flexible workplace practices on 
effort. Flexibility is seen as an important factor in counteracting the potential negative 
impact of unionisation on labour productivity (McNabb and Whitfield 1997), and a 
large literature on work-life balance (WLB) and work sharing issues shows that there 
are large benefits to be gained from implementing flexible working hours and working- 
from-home policies, along with risks of employee stress and burnout in the case of
45 For studies analysing the impact o f  teams and team briefing on effort, see: Kandel and Lazear (1993), 
Banker et a l (1994), McNabb and Whitfield (1997), Geary and Dobbins (2002), Harley (2001), 
Ichniowski and Show (2002), Frick and Prinz (2003), Batt (2004), Deery and Iverson (2005).
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poor company management of time and objectives. 46 47 48 49 A caveat mentioned by 
Macinnes (2005) is that it cannot be assumed by default that work-life balance policies 
are in the interest of workers with families, since family members may need more 
income and hence be willing to work more working hours. Indeed, Pannenberg’s 
(2005) West Germany study presents a compelling argument in favour of working long 
hours (even if unpaid), as it suggests that over a 10-year period of working unpaid 
overtime, real labour earnings can increase on average by at least 10 percentage points 
above the earnings of their co-workers.
The relationship between type of contract and effort has also been 
analysed, with evidence to show that temporary contracts may lead to one working 
more overtime than if hired on a permanent contract (Engellandt and Riphahn 2005) 
and confirming the popular view that temporary contracts are less desirable due to 
lower levels of job satisfaction, receiving less training and lower pay (Booth et al 
2002).50 Fixed-term employment is found to be a stepping-stone for women (Booth et 
al 2002), and there does not appear to be a difference in how hard people work if
46 For studies on work sharing issues see: Andrews and Simmons (2001), Bell and Freeman (2001), 
Budd and Mumford (2001), Campbell and Green (2002) Gray (2002), Felstead et a l (2002), Oswald 
(2002), White et a l (2003), Barnard et al (2004), Berg et a (2004), Boheim and Taylor (2004), Goette 
and Huffman (2004), Andrews et a l (2005), Pannenberg (2005), Macinnes (2005).
47 For benefits o f  implementing flexible working hours and working from-home policies, see for 
instance White et a l (2003) who find that flexible hours systems and personal discretion over starting 
and finishing times tend to reduce the negative job-to-home spillover. However, certain ‘high 
performance’ practices are associated with negative job-to-home spillovers (i.e. ‘the imposition o f  the 
public sphere on the private’ White et al 2003: 191) and these practices are found to be: appraisal 
systems, group-based forms o f  work organisation and individual incentives.
48 For studies on work pressure, stress and the analysis or effort intensification, see Green (2001), Strobl 
and Walsh (2002), Berg and Kalleberg (2002), Hamermesh and Lee (2003), Green (2004) , Gallie 
(2005)
49 For a study on em ployees suffering from overworking, Campbell and Green (2002) use the British 
Household Panel Survey between 1991-1996 to show that there long-term returns o f  working long hours 
become negative beyond 47 hours for women and 59 hours for men. They suggest that increasing UK  
wage inequality may have had an upward impact on work hours, because the incentives to work longer 
hours were greater for women than for men.
50 For studies on the relationship between type o f  contract and effort, see Carmichael (1999), Higgins et 
al (2000), King (2000), Booth et a l (2002), Felstead et a l (2004), Green (2004), Purcell et a l (2004), 
Engellandt and Riphahn (2005), Forder and Slater (2005).
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employed on a fixed-term as opposed to permanent contract (Green 2004). However, 
Green (2004) concludes that there appears to be ‘a small association between the 
decision to deploy more nonstandard workers and the intensification of work’ (Green 
2004 : 731).
In a different strand of the literature, communication and consultation have 
been analysed in relation to organisational performance and effort (Muchinski 1977, 
Snell 1991, Peccei et al 2003). 51 With varying degrees of information disclosure by 
management, it appears that the positive effects of communication are lower if unions 
are strong, but that the effects ‘vary depending on the level of employee organisational 
commitment, type of information disclosed and performance outcome involved’ 
(Peccei et al 2003). Soliciting information from employees, employee involvement in 
decision making and problem solving appear to lead to additional benefits for 
employees and to make the workplace more productive (Zwick 2004), though there is 
controversy over this issue (Freeman and Kleiner 2000).
The role of information and knowledge dissemination and consultation, 
closely related to practices that stimulate training and learning, as factors of production 
that lead to increases in effort and work efficiency is highlighted in studies such as 
Hull(2000), Martin (2003) Cassidy et al (2005) or Fung (2005).52 In particular, the 
positive role of technological change and information and communication technology 
in the knowledge economy is assessed in Hamermesh and Oster (1998), Hunter and
51 For studies on em ployee participation and involvement, see Addison et a l (2000), Freeman and 
Kleiner (2000), Delbridge and Whitfield (2001), Felstead and Gallie (2004) or Zwick (2004).
52 Studies that show the positive effects o f  encouraging training and the acquisition o f  skills on 
organisational performance are: Black and Lynch 1998) Heyes and Stuart (1998), Burke and Baldwin 
(1999), Whitflied (2000), Green et a l (2003), Conti (2005). In particular, two studies analyse the impact 
o f  achieving the status o f  Investors in People on organisational performance : Grugulis and Bevitt (2002) 
and Hoque (2003).
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Lafkas (1999), Cappelli and Carter (2000), Black and Lynch (2001), Bradley (2002), 
Atrostic and Nguyen (2005), Hempell (2005), Ilmakunnas and Maliranta (2005), 
Matteucci et al (2005).
Another closely related branch of the communication-and-consultation 
literature is constituted by studies that accentuate the importance for work productivity 
of maintaining a grievance-free workplace and good management-employee relations 
(e.g. Edwards and Whitston 1991, Edwards 1995, Gazioglu and Tansel 2002, Deery 
and Iverson 2005). A step in researching the above literature is to focus on the 
influence of unions on firm performance and related organisational outcomes. 53 ’ 54 
This has been a wide issue of interest especially with the advent of high-involvement 
HRM practices. More modem HRM practices, targeting individual or group 
commitment, involvement and financial participation, were hypothesised to displace 
unions or other forms of representation and collective voice. However, Machin and 
Wood (2004) and Poole et al (2005) find limited evidence that HRM practices have 
replaced union bargaining. They conclude that an increased incidence in HRM 
practices is not conducive to, and is not paralleled by, a decline in the number of 
unionised workplaces. Moreover, Machin and Wood (2004), using two waves of the 
WERS series, find that the incidence of HRM practices is similar in union and non­
union workplaces, irrespective of their age. Hence, some studies related to unionisation
53 For som e main studies assessing the impact o f  unions on firm performance, see Freeman and M edoff 
(1984), Nolan and Marginson (1990), Machin and Stewart (1990), M etcalf (1993), Machin and Stewart 
(1996), McNabb and Whitfield (1997), Booth and McCulloch (1999), Moreton (1999), Addison and 
Belfield (2002), Hirsch (2004), Bryson et al (2005).
54 For the literature assessing the impact o f  unions on other organisational outcomes, such as level o f  
pay, pay distribution, absenteeism or quit rates, see Arthur (1992), Andrews and Simmons (1995), 
Fernie and M etcalf (1995), Green and McIntosh (1998), Booth and M cCulloch (1999), Cappellari et a l 
(1999), Deery et a l (1999), Charlwood et a l (2000), Knight and Latreille (2000), Deery et a l (2001), 
Bryson et a l (2003).
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and collective bargaining seem to imply that these are not factors which mediate the 
impact of HRM practices on workplace effort.
As a final literature strand highlighted here, in most of the recent labour 
economics studies work effort can only be said to have been tangentially analysed, 
namely to the extent that effort can be equated to firm performance. Therefore, it is to 
this limited extent that studies questioning the impact of HRM workplace practices or 
HRM systems labelled "high involvement", "high commitment" or “high performance” 
on firm performance can be considered implicitly relevant to the discussion of effort 
(examples include Arthur 1994, Huselid 1995, MacDuffie 1995, Koch and McGrath 
1996, Youndt et al 1996, Huselid et al 1997, Addison 2005 or Bryson et al 2005). It is 
this literature that also proposed that studies of the impact of HRM practices on 
performance may benefit from analysing ‘bundles’ of practices, and not HRM 
practices in isolation.55
To conclude this subsection, a few notable limitations of the literature are 
that most of the workplace studies relate to the US, and that there is an over-reliance on 
addressing particular industries, especially those involved in manufacturing. Despite a 
burgeoning multidisciplinary literature analysing the impact of high-performance 
practices on company performance, the picture coming from research on effort in 
Britain remains fragmented, unclear, under-researched and hence in need of further 
study.
55 See Jackson and Schuler (1995), MacDuffie (1995) Milgrom and Roberts (1995), Perotin and 
Robinson (2000), Ahmad and Schroeder (2003), Ichniowski and Shaw (2003), Laursen and Foss (2003).
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Finally, the main drawback of the relevant extant literature is the lack of a 
unified premise for researching work effort. Instead of converging towards a coherent 
approach in the independent variables tested, factors that determine work effort tend to 
be unrelated and the choice of variables does not portray an established direction of 
research. To this purpose, this chapter attempts to combine the approaches suggested 
previously, by analysing the impact of sets of HRM practices on effort and relying on 
both economics and HRM perspectives. The logic for choosing the set of HRM 
practices used relies on the strands of the literature revealed above. For instance, in 
response to the literature on flexibility at work, a clear set of HRM practices related to 
workplace flexibility is introduced in the analysis. It is hoped that this approach goes 
some way towards solving the ‘shopping-lisf dilemma encountered by researchers 
when confronted by multidisciplinary and seemingly unrelated determinants of work 
effort. The economic literature also lacks studies at the individual employee level. 
However, labour economics has recently made several attempts to get inside the 
notorious ‘black-box’, and this study takes this challenge one step further in exploring 
individual levels of effort intensity.
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4.3. Data, hypotheses and econometric estimations
4.3.1. Data and hypotheses
In order to examine the impact of workplace practices on work effort, 
stress and overtime, the data used in this chapter comes from the Workplace 
Employment Relations Survey 1998 (WERS 98) and the cross-sectional survey is 
used. British workplaces were sampled randomly from the official Inter-Departmental 
Register (of 1997), with the stratification of the sampling frame established by 
workplace size and industry sector. In relation to the former, this survey covers all 
workplaces in Great Britain employing 10 or more employees. In relation to the latter, 
all industry sectors are covered except agriculture, fishing and deep coal mining. The 
size of the final sample was of 2,191 workplaces, as a result of a response rate of 80.3 
per cent.
The survey was conducted using structured questionnaires that were 
administered for each workplace to a managerial respondent, an employee 
representative and, for the first time in 1998, to employees. The managerial respondent 
is defined in WERS to be “the senior manager dealing with personnel, staff or 
employee relations”. Hence, to this extent of uncertainty regarding the location of the 
manager in relation to the workplace for which she is responsible, it should be 
acknowledged that the manager who is interviewed may be at a certain organisational 
distance (for instance, on a different site) from the employee respondent interviewed in 
the workplace. Nevertheless, the common ground between the employee and the 
manager is still formed by the employment relationship context of the same workplace.
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If the workplace size was under 25, the employee questionnaires were 
distributed to all employees in the workplace. Otherwise, a maximum of 25 employees 
were sampled from each workplace. Appendices C.l and C.2 offer a more detailed 
look at the composition of the sample according to the number of respondents per 
workplace. This chapter uses 28,215 respondents in employment, of age between 16 
and 65, of which 51% are female.
The WERS 98 cross-section covers three elements: (1) the management of 
the personnel function, via face-to-face structured interview and self-completion 
‘Employee Profile’ data sheet; (2) industrial relations issues such as representative 
structures, via face-to-face structured interview with the most senior representative of 
the largest recognized union at the workplace; and (3) employees’ perspectives on the 
job, via a self-completion questionnaire. Of these, the management and the employee 
questionnaires are used in this chapter in order to analyse effort based on the separate 
views of the employee and the manager.
The fundamental question asked in this chapter is: are workers motivated to 
exert effort through management practices, and if so, how? The tested hypotheses 
propose that workers are motivated by groups of management practices such as 
pecuniary incentives, communication, training, or supervision and monitoring. In 
relation to the theoretical frameworks and the literature reviewed so far, three 
hypotheses are formulated in this chapter, as follows.
Based on principal-agent economic theory, it is hypothesised that effort can 
be increased through better monitoring that deters shirkers. Certain systems of
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monitoring may be more efficient, and analysis is conducted to ascertain which quality 
and supervision monitoring practices are efficient in soliciting work effort.
Hypothesis 1: HRM practices related to supervision and quality monitoring have a 
positive impact on effort: the higher their incidence, the higher the employee effort.
For Hypothesis 2, the source of inspiration is in particular the study 
conducted by Ichniowski et al (1997) where 4 systems of HRM practices were 
identified, ranging from the more traditional to the most advanced. The main limitation 
of this study is that it was only conducted in the steel industry. Therefore, this chapter 
attempts to find whether HRM practices can be grouped in systems across industries, 
and whether some of these systems can be said to be more advanced and to have a 
higher impact on effort.
The first part of the hypothesis is also based on the studies from the 
literature review that emphasise the likelihood that certain HRM practices are 
complementing each other within the same organisational setting. It is expected that 
the analysis of HRM practices incidence reveals a pattern of HRM practices grouped 
into clusters.
At the same time, for the second part of the hypothesis, a large number of 
practices from multiple areas of management are hypothesised to impact on effort, 
such as pecuniary incentives, training or non-pecuniary incentives. This is in 
accordance with theoretical frameworks of study presented in the previous subsection, 
including effort as an argument within a production and a utility function, tournament
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theory, human capital theory or efficiency wages. Institutional economics also informs 
the decision to include as wide a variety of practices as allowed by the dataset, in the 
hope of not missing out any practices which could impact on effort.
Moreover, still for the second part of this hypothesis, this study makes an 
attempt to classify HRM practices in groups and to test their impact on effort. This is in 
accordance with the distinct branches of the literature emphasised in the literature 
review. Besides the Ichniowski et al (1997) arrangement of HRM practices in a scale 
from traditional to advanced HRM practices, this attempt is heavily influenced by 
Bailey (2000). In the latter study, a historical perspective over the chronological 
development of work reforms is outlined. It evolves from human relations, to group 
relations, to systems models of horizontal fit, and ends with modern-day high 
performance workplace systems and technological environments. Based on Bailey 
(2000), it is expected that a positive trend in the evolution of workplace modem HRM 
practices has taken place, in that more modem practices would be associated with 
higher performance and workplace effort.
Therefore, this chapter advances a conceptual framework for the study of 
work effort based on a chronological development of HRM practices along six types, 
starting with the earliest incentives used in order to motivate work effort: (1) pecuniary 
incentives mainly wages; (2) work organisation and supervision practices; (3) 
communication and consultation practices; (4) pecuniary incentives other than wages; 
(5) non-pecuniary incentives; and (6) training.56 The hypothetical HRM practices
56 For more information, see this list presented in Figure 4.8, and the corresponding enlarged framework 
with all the HRM practices used in this chapter categorised by type in Appendix C.3
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framework is tested in this chapter by classifying the HRM practices available in the 
dataset used for this chapter within the six types.
Hypothesis 2 a: Certain groups o f HRM practices increase workplace effort: 
complementarities exist.
Hypothesis 2 b: Progress is hypothesised to have taken place in HRM: relatively more 
modern groups o f HRM practices (e.g. workplace flexibility or job autonomy) are 
expected to have a higher impact on effort than relatively more traditional practices 
(e.g. rewarding effort via pecuniary incentives).
4.3.2. Presentation of the dependent variables
Two dependent variables are used in this study. The first attempts to 
measure effort as reported by the employee, and the second attempts to measure effort 
as reported by the manager. .
The dependent variable for the level of employee effort is encoded from a 
self-reported measure of individual employee effort. The information is collected for 
each of the 28,125 employees. The variable is constructed using the answers to the 
question asked of the employee: ‘Do you agree, or disagree, with the following 
statements about your job?’, one of the statements being that ‘my job requires that I 
work very hard’. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of employees according to their 
perception of the level of individual effort their jobs make them deploy in the 
workplace. Just over a quarter of respondents (29%) strongly agree with this statement,
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and almost half (49.6) agree with this statement. The ordinal variable generated takes 
the value 2 for the former case, 1 for the latter case, and 0 otherwise.
This particular way of collapsing the original 5 scale variable was chosen 
in order to allow for observing the impact of HRM practices on two different levels of 
positive answers, namely “strongly agree” as differentiated from “agree”. Therefore, an 
ordered probit, rather than a binomial probit is implemented in this chapter, in order to 
take advantage of the large amount of answers in the categories “strongly agree” (28%) 
and “agree” (50). If a binomial dependent variable were used, the differences between 
these two categories would have been lost.
The shortcoming of this variable is that, given the nature of this question, it 
appears that the employee has no discretion or choice regarding whether to exert effort. 
This is because the questionnaire statement in WERS 98 relates to the demands of the 
job rather than the level of effort chosen by the employee.
Table 4.1. The employee’s perception of the level of individual effort
Question: ‘Do you agree, or disagree, with the following statements about your job?’. 
Statement: ‘my job requires that I work very hard’
Answer Frequency Percent Value of the dependent 
variable
Strongly agree 7,842 28.27 2
Agree 13,756 49.60 1




Note: 1.71 percent (or 480) of respondents did not answer the question or answered ‘I 
don’t know’.
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The dependent variable for the change in the overall workplace effort is 
encoded from a self-reported measure of overall workplace effort. The information is 
collected from each manager, with one manager interviewed for each establishment 
survey. Then, the information is allocated to each of the employees surveyed who 
worked with the respective manager. This is a simple procedure of attaching an 
observation equal to the observation reported by their manager, to each and all of the 
employees surveyed within an establishment. For instance, if the information obtained 
from the manager of establishment X is that ‘overall workplace effort has gone up a lot 
in establishment X’, this entry is attributed and inputted to each and all of the entries 
corresponding to the employees interviewed from organisation X.
The dependent variable is constructed using the answers to the question 
asked of the manager: ‘for each item [of the check-list] tell me if there has been any 
change at this workplace compared with five years ago, and how substantial that 
change has been, using the categories on this card’, one of the items on the card being 
‘change in how hard people work here’. After allocating the answers of the manager to 
the employees working beneath each respective manager, the dependent variable 
showed that: in the case of 44% of the 28,125 employees, their manager believed that 
workplace effort has ‘gone up a lot’; for 38 % of respondents their manager believed 
that workplace effort ‘gone up a little’; and for the remainder of the employees, their 
manager believed that workplace effort either stayed the same, has gone down a little 
or has gone down a lot. Table 4.2 shows the distribution of employees according to 
their manager’s perception of change in the effort at their workplace. The ordinal 
variable generated takes the value 2 for the first case, 1 for the second case, and 0 for 
the remainder. The rationale for choosing this particular way of encoding the data, that
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is conducive to an ordinal rather than a binomial probit, is the same as in the case of 
the dependent variable for employee effort explained above. By keeping a 3-level scale 
as opposed to a binary dependent variable, differences between effort going up “a 
little” (38%) and “a lot” (44%) can be distinguished.
Table 4.2 The manager’s perception of the change in workplace effort
Question: ‘tell me if there has been any change at this workplace compared with five 
years ago, and how substantial that change has been’ with regard to ‘how hard people 
work here’
Answer Frequency Percent Value of the 
dependent 
variable
Work effort has gone up a lot 11,134 44.26 2
Work effort has gone up a little 9,472 37.65 1
Work effort has stayed the same, Work 
effort has gone down a little or a lot, or 
Work effort has gone up a lot
4,549 18.09 0
Total 25,155 100
Note: 0.6 percent (or 166) of respondents did not answer the question or answered ‘I 
don’t know’.
In short, the two dependent variables represent an individual level effort 
measure as reported by the employee, and a change in the level of workplace effort 
measure as reported by the manager. The two complement each other, being the two 
faces of the same coin: assessment of effort within the same establishment. The unique 
advantage of this original approach of analysing both dependent variables is that it 
allows the researcher to spot, pin-point and target the factors that lead to discrepancies 
in the reported measures of effort.
With regard to the independent variables, Appendix C.3 shows the variable 
labels, type and means for the independent variables used in this study, while 
Appendix C.4 does the same for the control variables, namely the employee, job and 
firm characteristics. It has to be observed that there is a hidden wealth of information
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contained in Appendix C.3 in what concerns the differences between aspects of the 
workplace where both the employee and the manager have provided answers -  with 
these differences being at the heart of the analysis conducted in this chapter.
Whenever the dataset allowed it, two variables measuring a workplace 
aspect from the employee’s, and respectively the manager’s perspective, were created 
as similar as possible in order to allow for comparisons.57 This means that certain 
limited degrees of comparisons could be made, using the means and the standard 
deviations of the variables in Appendix C.3. For instance, only 54% of employees 
report that they have job autonomy, whereas 62% of managers consider that their 
employees have job control.
4.3.3. Econometric methodology
Following the empirical and theoretical literature presented above, effort, 
Ei (or w), which can be regressed as either a measure of employee effort Ej (and 
respectively a measure of workplace effort Ew), is :
E\ (or w) =  PT Xjj (or jw) +  P*2 H R M jj (or jw) +  u i (or w) (6 )
where X  refers to a vector of worker (i) and job (j) characteristics and workplace 
characteristics (w); H R M  refers to a vector of HRM practices; and u is the error term.
57 Unfortunately, the dataset did not allow this in the majority o f  cases, since the W ERS employee 
questionnaire, comprising o f  only 6 pages, is still much less developed than the questionnaire distributed 
to the management respondent which has 113 pages in length.
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In this study, worker characteristics include their age, ethnic background, 
gender, marital status, number of children, highest educational qualification, union 
membership and tenure. It is hoped that by including in the model controls for 
individual tenure, occupation and highest educational qualification, the model also 
controls for worker ability and sorting, guarding at least to some extent against 
endogeneity. Job characteristics consist of occupational level and type of job contract. 
Firm characteristics include the firm size, sector, industry, and a dummy taking the 
value 1 if the workplace is “in the production sector” (this sector is defined in WERS 
98 as “manufacturing, or electricity, gas or water supply, or construction”.
This chapter uses order probit models, run with the option of clustering by 
workplace. The methodology related to ordered probit methods has been explained in 
Chapter III on job satisfaction and is not replicated here. With the exception of one 
model which uses factor analysis to identify systems of HRM, this chapter reports 
coefficients, p-values and marginal effects from ordered probit models. Being a 
relatively basic methodology, factor analysis is also not detailed in this methodology 
section.58
Advancing the previous literature on work effort, and especially Bailey 
(2000), a vector of HRM variables is included in the analysis, as presented in Table
4.3. The assertion made in the literature and tested here is that more modem practices 
which are higher up in the hierarchy (e.g. group 5: non-pecuniary incentives) would 
have a higher impact on effort than more traditional practices (e.g. group 2: work 
organisation)
58 Please see Stata user guides available online for a succinct view  over the purpose o f  this methodology  
which is mainly to indicate the way in which a set o f  variables can be grouped in subsets o f  a stable 
configuration while avoiding collinearity issues.
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Table 4.3 Taxonomy of HRM practices: 6 groups
Groups of HRM practices Subgroups and examples of HRM practices
1. Pecuniary incentives wage
2. Work organisation - workplace organisation (e.g. team objectives, 
company strategic plan)
- supervision (e.g. quality monitored via inspectors or 
customer surveys)
3. Communication and - communication (e.g. keeping everyone up to date
consultation with changes, using meetings to share information) 
- consultation (e.g. not making any changes unless 
consulting with employees)
4. Pecuniary incentives 
other than wage
pay varies according to skill, or pay equality
5. Non-pecuniary - flexibility (e.g. working at home available, job
incentives control)
-job security (e.g. guaranteed job security)
- more recent organisational policies (e.g. company 
car, private health insurance, other ‘perks’)
6. Training training paid by the employer
In order to test Hypothesis 1, namely that more supervision leads to more 
effort, ordered probit models for two distinct types of supervision are run with the 
dependent variables related to effort (Tables 4.6 and 4.7). Table 4.6 focuses on the 
supervision question asked of the manager regarding ‘ways of making employees 
aware of their job responsibilities’ — ‘ways’ which could be considered as proxies for 
HRM practices regarding supervision. Table 4.7 reports on ways of supervising 
workplace activity.
In order to test Hypothesis 2, namely that clusters of HRM practices tend to 
appear as the incidence of HRM practices is observed, and that more modem practices 
have a higher impact on effort than traditional ones, three models (Tables 4.8 - 4.10) 
are constructed.
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In Table 4.8 an ordered probit model uses the dependent variables related 
to effort to test the impact of 3 systems of HRM practices on effort. The 3 systems are 
obtained via observing inter-group correlations during factor analysis. After analysing 
correlation indices between all HRM practices available in the dataset, and combining 
this information with the incidence of practices in organisations, satisfying statistical 
consistency was obtained for the three systems described in Table 4.4 with regard to 
the respective practices being complementary.59
Table 4.4 Distribution of firms according to the incidence of three HRM systems
HRM practice HRM System 1 HRM System 2 HRM System 3
Training present present not present
Consultation present present not present
PRP present (either present or not) not present
Job Control present (either present or not)
(either present 
or not)
Percentage of firms in 
sample 17% 25% 58%
In Tables 4.9 and 4.10, the employee respectively the manager reported 
effort dependent variables are used in ordered probit models to assess the impact of a 
large array of HRM practices. In each of the two tables (Table 4.9 and 4.10), the HRM 
practices are based only on the questions asked of the employee (when the effort 
measure is employee-reported) and of the manager (when the effort measure is 
manager-reported). Additionally, the HRM practices are introduced in the model 
following the hypothesised development in HRM, according to Table 4.3. Due to the 
fact that wage would be endogenous in the models with effort as dependent variable, as 
well as due to the fact that pay levels are not recorded as a continuous variable in
59 The details o f  this procedure are available from the author. Due to their substantial length, they are not 
presented here.
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WERS98, pecuniary incentives such as the wage are not present in either models. Both 
of the models start instead with group 2 of HRM practices from Table 4.3, that is work 
organisation
All models are estimated with data being split firstly between the private 
(65% of observations, or 18,409) and the public sector (35% of observations or 9,806 
employees), and secondly (within each sector) between professional (including 
professional, associated and managerial occupations) and non-professional 
occupations, with observations shown in Table 4.5 below.
Table 4.5 Levels of data split (Percentage of total sample within each category)
Private sector Public sector Total (rows)
Professional occupations 5,980 4,488 10,468
22% 16% 38%
Non-professional occupations 11,991 5,059 17,050
44% 18% 62%




Results are shown in Tables 4.6 -  4.10 which report marginal effects from 
ordered probit models. Models are all run with the five levels of data, split respectively 
for: (1) the entire sample; (2) professional employees in the private sector; (3) non­
professional employees in the private sector; (4) professional employees in the public 
sector; and (5) non-professional employees in the public sector.
4.4.1. The effect of supervision HRM practices on effort
Hypothesis 1, that monitoring could increase effort, is tested in Tables 4.6 
and 4.7 which assess the impact of two sets of manager-reported supervision practices: 
one related to ways of making employees aware of their job responsibilities and the 
other related to quality monitoring. The two dependent variables for effort are 
employee-reported individual perception of the level of effort required on the job, and 
manager-reported workplace change in effort.. A general finding for both tables is of 
some supporting evidence for accepting Hypothesis 1, in that supervision has a positive 
impact on both measures of effort, but practices differ in their impact on individual 
effort and workplace changes in effort, as well as within sub-samples of the data 
categorised by sector and type of occupation.
Starting with an overview of Table 4.6, the first set of HRM practices, 
related to supervision is comprised of 8 ways in which managers were prompted by the 
questionnaire to assess how their company is ‘making employees aware of their job
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responsibilities’.60 The 8 possible answers were: (1) supervision; (2) job descriptions; 
(3) standard operational procedures; (4) induction; (5) staff manual; (6) individual 
objectives; (7) team objectives; and (8) competency standards. Out of these 8 HRM 
practices, when looking across all the five levels of the data split (see Table 4.5), three 
practices are marginally significantly or significantly related with employee effort 
(namely, supervision, individual objectives and competency standards) and five are 
significantly or marginally significantly related to workplace effort (namely, job 
descriptions, standard operational procedures, individual objectives, team objectives 
and competency standards). Notably, all of the 8 supervision HRM practices are 
insignificant across the whole un-split sample of employees; it is only when data is 
split into levels that the three HRM practices appear as significant or marginally 
significant. However, for workplace effort, all but one (the exception is usage of job 
descriptions) of the five significant or marginally significant HRM practices are so 
across the whole sample of industries and occupations, albeit the size of the 
coefficients is under 1 pp.
The HRM practices that are insignificant in Table 4.6 are using induction 
and using the staff manual to make employees aware of their responsibilities. It may be 
that practices of longer-term application than at job induction, and practices that 
encompass more visible approaches to supervision than the staff manual, work better in 
making the employees aware of their responsibilities.
There are some marked differences between practices that have an impact 
on employees stating that their jobs require them to work hard and practices that have
60 The exact question is: ‘What are the main methods by which [em ployees in the largest occupational 
group] are made aware o f  their job responsibilities?’.
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an impact on changes in workplace effort. Only using competency standards and using 
individual objectives work for both employee effort and changes in workplace effort. 
Supervision has an impact at the individual level but not at workplace level, and at 
individual level it is only effective for non professionals in the private sector, 
increasing the likelihood of employee reporting that their jobs require them to work 
hard, but with small size effects. Team objectives, standard operational procedures and 
job descriptions (the latter only in the public sector for non professional employees) 
only have an impact on changes in workplace effort, but not on employee effort.
Moving away from the overview of Table 4.6 and towards the specific 
regression in the private sector, on professionals, the only practice that has an impact 
on individual effort is competency standards, increasing the likelihood of employees 
reporting that their jobs make them work hard by 5 pp. With regard to workplace 
effort, using competency standards is marginally significant and has a positive but a 
lower size impact of 3.1 pp. In the category of non-professionals in the private sector, 
using supervision and individual objectives are both marginally significant for 
employee effort with a positive coefficient size around 3 pp. For workplace effort, 
standard operational procedures are also marginally significant, but with a negative 
coefficient size - however the size if under 1 pp.
In the public sector and with regard to professionals, workplace effort 
seems to be slightly hampered when standard operational procedures are in place, with 
a 2.1 pp higher likelihood of managers to declare that workplace effort has decreased. 
Non-professionals in the public sector are mainly responsive to competency standards, 
with significant increases of 6.3 pp in individual effort. For workplace effort job
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descriptions are significant and positive, while individual objectives is only marginally 
significant and negative, but both have very low impact sizes (under 1 pp).
To summarise by sector the results from Table 4.6, it can be noticed that 
the highest impact on effort in the private and the public sectors comes from 
competency standards. The coefficient sizes are positive and are the highest in Table 
4.6, yet they are not very large, at only 5 or 6 pp. In both sectors, standard operational 
procedures may have some negative influences on workplace effort (2.1 pp in the 
public sector for professionals). Summarising the results by respondent across sectors, 
it can be noticed that individual effort increases if supervision, individual objectives 
and competency standards are used; and that workplace effort increases if team 
objectives, competency standards and job descriptions are used, but the impact of all 
these practices is rather small. It may be that, whilst practices of work supervision do 
seem to have an impact on work effort and the findings allow this study not to reject 
Hypothesis 1, they are not necessarily the best and most effective tool to encourage 
increases in employee effort or workplace effort.
Turning next to Table 4.7, it includes a set of 6 HRM practices encoded 
from answers provided by managers to the question: ‘How do you monitor the quality 
of the work undertaken at this workplace?’. The six possible answers are: (1) customer 
surveys; (2) external audits; (3) individual employees; (4) inspectors; (5) manager / 
supervisor; and (6) records on faults / complaints. All but the latter have some positive 
effect on individual effort, the highest impact being from external auditors for 
professionals in the private sector (7.6 pp), but the lowest effect also being associated 
with this practice (in the public sector for professional workers: decreases of 6 pp). For
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workplace effort, two practices are insignificant: using records of faults / complaints, 
and using individual employees to monitor quality of work. The reason why using 
records of faults / complaints appears to be insignificant across all regressions 
presented in Table 4.7 may be that a focus on avoiding the failures does not work - 
instead, the five other practices which are not necessarily focused on keeping track of 
failure, seem to work better.
It becomes apparent in the first instance when regressions are run on the 
whole sample (i.e. with the data not split) that customer surveys and inspectors are 
associated across both employee and workplace measures of effort with increases in 
effort. The largest impact is a highly significant 7.6 pp increase in workplace effort in 
the case of using customer surveys, followed by a marginally significant increase of 
4.4 pp in the case of using inspectors to monitor the quality of work.
More effects appear when the sample is split by sector. Starting in the 
private sector, professionals’ effort is almost equally responsive to monitoring via 
customer surveys and managers / supervisors (increases of 4 to 5 pp for individual 
effort). The highest increase in Table 4.7 for individual effort comes from using 
external auditors, at 7.6 pp. For their non-professional counterparts, individual effort is 
responsive to monitoring via individual employees and inspectors, both with 
coefficient sizes of around 2 pp, whereas workplace effort is responsive to using 
customer surveys (7 pp) but significantly negatively affected by the use of external 
auditors (a decrease of up to 14 pp for workplace effort). The latter effect may be 
explained by the fact that the external auditing process could be perceived as slowing 
down the progress of work due to the administration and additional processing of
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documentation required, as well as having the effect of changing the behaviour of 
employees towards the externally imposed objectives.
In the public sector, professionals appear to deploy high levels of 
workplace effort if the manager or supervisor are used to monitor quality, but this 
increase of 17 pp is only associated with workplace effort going up “a little”, whereas 
workplace effort has a negative likelihood of 2.2 pp to be going up “a lot”, and a 8 pp 
likelihood to stay the same or decrease. Where external auditors are used, there is a 
marginally significant negative impact on individual effort of 6 pp.61
Similarly to private sector non-professionals, non-professionals in the 
public sector workplaces are more likely to see their effort improving “a lot” if 
customer surveys are used (14 pp). They dislike the practice of monitoring quality via 
supervisor of manager, which is significant but only increases the likelihood of the 
workplace seeing “effort going up a little” (by 12 pp) whereas it decreases the 
likelihood that effort goes up a lot by 2.1 pp. It may be that the assessment of quality 
by manager or supervisor leaves the door open to subjective or inconsequential 
evaluations of quality, leading to decreases in effort, whereas the use of customer 
surveys appears to be overall the best solution to monitoring quality in such a way as to 
solicit more effort. Individual employees are more likely to report that their jobs 
require them to work hard if inspectors are used to monitor the quality of work.
61 For an example with regard to the influence o f  external auditors, in response to universities being 
audited via the Research Assessm ent Exercise, a change o f  behaviour in British Academia could be that 
lecturers devote less time to teaching and more time to publishing in the journals that are generally 
considered high ranking.
173
Overall, Table 4.7 shows that the only category of respondents who are 
likely to feel that their jobs require them to work harder as a result of having the 
manager or supervisor assess their quality of work, are individual professionals in the 
private sector. There is a lot of variation in the practices that are likely to make 
employees state having to work hard. With regard to changes for the better in 
workplace effort, the practice that appears most significant (7.6 pp likelihood that 
workplace effort has gone up a lot for the whole sample) is the usage of customer 
surveys, albeit not in professional occupations.
4.4.2. Complementarities and the effect of HRM practices development on
effort
To test Hypothesis 2a, that complementarities exist within HRM practices 
and that more modem groups of HRM practices have a positive impact on effort than 
more traditional practices, three models are run in Tables 4.8 -  4.10.
Table 4.8 uses three systems of HRM practices to determine whether they 
have an impact on effort. The systems have been identified via factor analysis, 
whereby a large exhaustive set of HRM practices obtained from the WERS 98 survey 
were analysed to see how their incidence is reflected in companies. Based on the 
review of the literature which found positive relationships between workplace 
performance and training, consultation, and to some extent job autonomy and pay 
related to performance, the hypothesis is that the more these practices are implemented 
(i.e. System 1 in Table 4.4), the bigger the impact on effort.
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Indeed, an overview of all results depicted in Table 4.8 suggests that the 3 
HRM Systems (System 3 is the base variable used as comparison) have a significant 
impact on both measures of effort. The biggest marginal effect is an increase of 5 pp 
(and almost 7 pp)if System 1 is implemented across the whole sample (respectively in 
the non-professional private sector), when compared to having implemented HRM 
System 3 (the base variable). Results also show that System 1 tends to have larger 
positive effects than System 2. The latter can be interpreted as support for the 
hypothesis that the more a company implements the 4 practices from System 1, the 
higher the likelihood of increased work effort - especially so for the private sector. 
However, it can be remarked that in the public sector only System 2 has an impact on 
effort.
Continuing the assessment of Hypothesis 2, and moving next to part 2b, 
Tables 4.9 and 4.10 introduce an employee-only, and respectively a manager-only, set 
of HRM practices. The dependent variable is employee-reported effort in the 
employee-only model, where 10 out of the 11 practices are significant in at least at one 
level of data analysis. Similarly, the dependent variable is manager-reported effort in 
the manager-only model, where 16 out of the 28 practices are significant at least at one 
level of data analysis. Therefore there appears to be further support for Hypothesis 2b, 
in that HRM practices have an impact on measures of employee and workplace effort.
HRM practices are entered into the regression in accordance with Table 
4.3, but without a measure of pecuniary incentives, since it would have been 
endogenous and, in any case, such a measure was not available in the data. This order 
is: work organisation; communication; consultation; pecuniary incentives other than
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wages; non-pecuniary incentives; and training practices. 62 Base variables are not 
indicated for Tables 4.9 and 4.10 since the vast majority of these variables are dummy 
variables.
With regard to the 11 HRM practices used as independent variables in 
Table 4.9, these practices enter as consistently significant across sectors: flexible 
working hours available, and the two practices related to training and learning. The 
availability of flexible working hours is associated with a negative impact on 
individual effort (a decrease of up to 7.3 pp in the likelihood that professionals in the 
public sector report high levels of effort). This result is not necessarily counterintuitive 
if one assumes that ideally employees would like to minimise effort. Yet, under the 
alternative assumption that a satisfied employee deploys more effort, this result raises 
the question of whether, overall, reducing the number of working hours via flexibility 
leads to an overall reduction in effort, even though productivity may be higher (which 
is a hypothesis that could only hold up to the point where diminishing returns to work 
set in).
Gray’s (2002) study on the impact of family-friendly policies on 
performance, also using WERS 98, offers a partial explanation for this result: the 
incidence of family-friendly policies is found to be positively correlated with company 
performance but notes that ‘employers offering policies which enable employees with 
families to maintain a full-time presence in the workplace e.g. a workplace nursery, 
have better performance than those which offer policies which result in reduced-
62 Employee-reported answers for HRM practices in these categories could not be found in all cases, due 
to the limited scope o f  the employee questionnaire. For instance, there is no employee-reported variable 
that could be categorised as a pecuniary incentive other than the wage.
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visibility e.g. working from home, part-time work’ (Gray 2002 : abstract). 63 Similarly, 
it may be assumed that flexible work hours, as well as job autonomy (which also enters 
negatively in relation to effort especially for professionals in the public sector), lower 
the likelihood that individual effort is high to the extent that these two practices allow 
for reduced-visibility at work.
The other two practices that are consistently related to individual effort 
across all sectors relate to measures of the same variable, the base category being ‘both 
training and learning are encouraged’. Therefore, the negative sign with which these 
two variables enter in the regression points out the positive impact of learning and skill 
development on individual effort, while showing that in the absence of both learning 
and skill development, the likelihood that employees consider that their jobs make 
them work hard could decrease by as much as almost 8 pp (in the professional public 
sector). Where significant, communication and consultation-related HRM practices are 
positively related to individual effort, but marginal effects are relatively lower, peaking 
at 4.8 pp in the professional public sector.
Table 4.9 only offers limited support to the hypothesis that, as one 
advances in the hierarchy of HRM practices shown in Table 4.3, HRM practices offer 
more effective incentives. Especially with regard to the analysis of individual effects, 
results may rather constitute a warning to taking the effects of HRM practices for 
granted in assuming a priori that new or more modem HRM practices would improve 
individual performance.
63 Gray (2002) does not investigate the impact o f  this practice on employee effort, so a direct comparison 
is not possible.
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A discussion o f personal, firm and job characteristics in Table 4.9
With regard to the impact of personal, job and firm characteristics on 
individual effort, female workers appear to report higher levels of individual effort. 
This is in line with the literature on gender-discrepancies, which highlights the fact that 
women may over-report effort (Bielby and Bielby 1988). It could also be the case that 
women tend to be more likely to be employed in the service than in the production 
sector, with Green (2004) reporting that effort intensification in Britain has also 
occurred more in the service than in the production sector.
In comparison to respondents aged between 25-39 (lower prime), the age 
at which respondents seem to report high effort levels is the 40-49 (upper prime), 
especially for professionals in the public sector. This finding is in line with the intuitive 
assumption that accumulated experience in professional occupations is transferred into 
productivity towards the upper prime age, when family responsibilities may still be 
high.64
Family responsibilities may also explain why married people work harder 
than their counterparts, and why not having children enters negatively in the model 
(i.e. respondents without children are less likely to deploy high effort when compared 
to the base variable which consists of respondents with children). This is also in line 
with the literature on the effects of marriage on effort (see Neumark and Postlewaite 
1995 or Mehay and Bowman 2005). Considerably high marginal effects are noticed for 
those of ethnic background other than white, a finding which could be speculated as
64 On the role o f  accumulated experience, Bagger (2004) finds that higher returns for the relatively older 
em ployees stem more from market experience rather than from seniority.
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the consequence of these respondents being under relatively higher perceived pressure 
to work hard, possibly to fight off discriminatory assessments of their performance (see 
Elvira and Town 2001 for an account of racial workplace discrimination), or to 
outperform their white counterparts (especially if say, effort at work were to be related 
to securing long-term employment for respondents interested in remaining in Britain).
The higher the educational qualification, the more likely it is that the 
respondent reports working hard. Notably, having a higher degree in the professional 
public sector is related to 8 pp higher likelihood to work hard. This finding is also in 
line with the literature (for instance, see Chevalier et al 2005).
Firm size effects are shown to be inversely related to effort, in that, in 
comparison to firms of 100-500 employees, higher firm sizes (over 500 employees) 
lead to a lower probability of reporting that individual effort is high. There is no 
observed significant effect of lower sized firms on effort. Thus, at the level of 
individual effort, this study fails to confer support to results reported by Green (2004) 
who suggests that technological changes, potentially leading to lower effort, are more 
prominent in establishments with less than 100 employees.
Controversially, temporary and fixed-term workers appear to be less likely 
than permanent workers to report high levels of individual effort. The same holds for 
part-time when compared to full-time workers. These results differ from some of the 
studies on the impact of the type of contract on effort.
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Union membership appears to have a positive and highly significant 
relationship to effort, with relatively large marginal effects (up to 11 pp in the 
professional public sector). Industry type also has a large effect on effort, in particular 
with workers employed in education being 20 pp more likely to strongly agree that 
their jobs require them to work hard.
Unsurprisingly, the level of skill and occupation are also strongly related to 
effort: being a professional or a manager may increase the likelihood of reporting high 
levels of effort by up to 12 pp, respectively 19 pp. Working in the private sector is 
associated with a marginally higher likelihood to report high levels of effort (2 pp). 
The variables reported towards the end of Table 4.9 have been used to split the data at 
the respective level, hence results are only reported in the main model with all 
respondents.
Table 4.10 continues the analysis of the impact of HRM practices on 
effort, changing the focus from the employee-reported individual effort measure to a 
model where only the manager-reported dependent and independent variables are 
included. In terms of assessing whether more recent HRM practices have a higher 
impact on increasing workplace effort, again there does not appear to be sufficient 
evidence to support this hypothesis, since the relatively large marginal effects on effort 
observed in the Table are distributed rather equally along the hypothesised HRM 
progress spectrum consisting of the six groups of HRM practices in Table 4.8.
The largest impact on workplace effort comes from workplaces having pay 
equality. Other practices that also enter in a positive relationship with workplace effort
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are briefings, workplace strategic plan, asking employees to help outside their job 
descriptions (thereby potentially increasing the desire to acquire new skills and the 
opportunities for personal development); informing employees about the investment 
plans; profit related pay, profit sharing or Employee Shared Ownership Schemes 
(ESOP); using recruitment tests to screen job applicants; providing training; non- 
pecuniary benefits such as car allowance and private health insurance; benchmarking 
(18 pp); and Just-In-Time (17%) (the latter two being significant only for the non­
professionals in the public sector).
The only two practices that are significantly related to workplace effort but 
impact negatively on employee effort are whether employees have job control (up to - 
11 pp in for professionals in the public sector) and whether employees have 
guaranteed job security (up to -11 pp in for non-professionals in the public sector). 
This is in line with the findings from Green (2004), and even more so with King (2000) 
who offers an in-depth discussion on the topic and concludes by advising that 
communication HRM practices need to be deployed in order to minimise the negative 
consequences of white-collar jobs insecurity or increased flexibility.65
65 In more detail, Green (2004) notes that ‘there is no evidence as to whether job insecurity actually does 
generate harder work’ (Green 2004: 720). An alternative view, identifying significant effects o f  job  
security, is presented by Blanchflower and Oswald (1999) who find that job  satisfaction is higher for 
those with secure jobs.
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4.5. Conclusions and summary
This chapter aims to determine sets of HRM practices that could lead to 
higher employee and company work effort, as well as looking at the impact on effort of 
practices such as supervision and quality monitoring. The cross-section British 
Workplace Employment Relations Survey 1998 has been chosen for this study as it has 
the advantage that responses are obtained from both employees and their managers. 
This advantage is used to assess which practices impact solely on employee or on 
workplace effort, and which impact on both. Results suggest that certain HRM 
practices have a significant impact on the employee and workplace effort measures 
included in this study.
To test the hypothesis that monitoring has a positive impact on effort, this 
study attempted to uncover those HRM practices related to supervision which have an 
impact on employee and organisational effort. HRM practices related to supervision 
have been analysed in two separate sets: methods of making employees aware of their 
job responsibilities, and ways of monitoring work quality. A general finding for both 
tables is of some supporting evidence for accepting Hypothesis 7, in that supervision 
has a positive impact on both measures of effort, but practices differ in their impact on 
individual effort and workplace changes in effort, as well as within sub-samples of the 
data categorised by sector and type of occupation. The HRM practices with a positive 
impact on effort are: setting competency standards and using customer surveys. There 
appear to be strong negative effects on workplace effort if external audits are used, and 
if the supervisor or the manager is single-handedly monitoring quality. These results 
appear to contradict the assumptions of the principal-agent theory.
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The principal implication for the management of a workplace is that a right 
balance has to be struck, in that: (1) too much monitoring can be detrimental to effort; 
(2) some monitoring practices do not have a significant impact on employee and 
workplace effort; (3) there is considerable variation between practices that have an 
impact on individual effort and those that have an impact on the workplace effort; (4) 
there is considerable variation in impact of supervisory HRM practices across sub­
samples when data is split by sector and occupation; and, finally, (5) monitoring itself 
may not be enough to ensure high levels of employee effort or workplace effort (since 
coefficient sizes are overall not very large).
Three systems of HRM complementary practices most likely to have an 
impact on effort are identified. They include various levels of incidence for job control, 
consultation, performance related pay and employee-paid training. Training, and 
communication and consultation appear to have a strong and consistent impact on 
individual effort. Pay equality, benchmarking and strategic planning play a major role 
in increasing workplace effort. This evidence validates the practices most widely 
adopted in organisations.
An analysis separating different categories of HRM practices in order to 
assess whether the historical development of HRM practices (as presented in Bailey 
2000) would also be matched by continuous increases in the efficiency of HRM 
practices, does not lend support to this hypothesis. Instead, HRM practices most likely 
to have an impact on individual effort comprise: allowing for employee job control, 
consultation, performance related pay and employee-paid training. In fact, training and 
communication and consultation appear to have a strong and consistent impact on
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individual effort as well as workplace effort, while benchmarking and strategic 
planning play a major role in increasing workplace effort. However, some practices 
which decrease the amount of supervised control, such as job autonomy, lead to 
decreases in individual effort, but working from home is associated with higher 
individual effort.
Data limitations imposed by the WERS 98 could be overcome by future 
datasets incorporating a more explicit measure of employee effort intensity, and a 
similar one from the perception of the manager (ideally both measures being a level or 
a change type of measure), whilst copying the most important feature of the WERS 98: 
the ability of researchers to match the employee and the managerial response to the 
same workplace.
It is believed and hoped that the wealth of information made available via 
conducting this present research may be beneficial not only to the practitioners in 
management (and ultimately to employees), but also to governing bodies and policy 
makers.
Summary for Chapter IV
• This chapter investigates the determinants of work effort in Britain. 
Specifically, the study aims to determine whether HRM practices lead to effort being 
increased by creating workplace settings which encourage employees to deploy more 
effort.
• Data limitations imposed by the WERS 98 could be overcome by future 
datasets incorporating a more explicit measure of employee effort intensity, and a
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similar one from the perception of the manager (ideally both measures being a level or 
a change type of measure), whilst copying the most important feature of the WERS 98: 
the ability of researchers to match the employee and the managerial response to the 
same workplace.
• The contributions of this chapter are that it:
analyses the impact of HRM practices on the separate views of the employee and 
managerial-reported work effort with regard to the same place of work; 
analyses intensive effort, as opposed to the majority of extant research which is 
based on extensive measures of effort;
uses subjective constructs of effort - a feature which puts this analysis at the 
forefront of modem developments in labour economics;
attempts to bridge the HRM and economics literature by using a conceptualisation
of effort perceived as desirable by employees and employers;
advances a conceptual framework for the study of work effort based on a
chronological development of HRM practices. It generates a classification of HRM
practices;
- contributes to the study of effort by sourcing and presenting the main theoretical 
and empirical developments that can generate a framework of research; this input is 
much needed to research effort which is a complex and unclear area;
- uses employee data, enabling the presentation and analysis of the employee side of 
the story. This differentiates this chapter from the extant literature. It also adds to a 
small basis of studies which have taken into account employees' perspective.
• The dataset used is the cross-section of the WERS 1998, which offers over
19,000 employer-employee matched observations in Britain.
• The hypotheses are:
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(1) concentrating on HRM practices related to supervision: HRM practices related 
to supervision have a positive impact on effort; and
(2) using a framework for classifying all available HRM practices in the dataset, it 
is hypothesised that a) complementarities exist in HRM practices; b) the 
development of HRM practices is along progressive lines, with more modem 
HRM practices having a higher impact on effort.
• Two dependent variables are used: a level measure of effort intensity based on 
how hard individual employees perceive that their jobs make them work; and a change 
measure of workplace effort based on the perception of the manager of the workplace 
where the employee interviewed is working, with regard to how much a change there 
has been in the respective workplace effort.
• The main findings are:
supervision and control at work have a positive impact on measures of employee 
effort and workplace effort. Practices with highest impacts are setting competency 
standards and using customer surveys;
- the main implications for practitioners, as well as for the research framework that 
future studies into the impact of supervision on effort could use, are as follows: (1) 
too much monitoring can be detrimental to effort; (2) some monitoring practices do 
not have a significant impact on employee and workplace effort; (3) there is 
considerable variation between practices that have an impact on individual effort 
and those that have an impact on the workplace effort; (4) there is considerable 
variation in impact of supervisory HRM practices across sub-samples when data is 
split by sector and occupation; and, finally, (5) monitoring and supervision 
practices on their own may not be enough to ensure high levels of employee effort
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or positive changes in workplace effort (since coefficient sizes reported in this 
study are overall not very large).
implementing a system of practices which comprises training, consultation, 
performance-related pay and employee job control can increase effort by up to 11 
pp, whereas not implementing learning or training in the workplace can decrease 
the likelihood of employees working hard by 8 pp. It seems that governmental 
approaches to training and skills for the workforce (e.g. The New Deal), aiming 
towards making continuous learning a focus in Britain, are heading in the right 
direction;
not enough support is found to suggest that more advanced practices have a higher 
impact on effort. This constitutes a warning for HRM practitioners and HRM 
researchers that HRM progress cannot be taken for granted i.e. those practices 
heralded to be the “most modem” or “the newest” are not necessarily having (the 
highest) impact on employee and workplace effort;
- the single largest impact on workplace effort comes from the workplace having pay 
equality. HR managers in charge of devising their pay systems could take this 
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CHAPTER V
TRAINING AND PROMOTION IN THE BRITISH LABOUR MARKET: 
DETERMINANTS, INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND IMPACT ON WAGES
5.1. Introduction
Do current employers offer training to employees whom they intend to 
promote? Do previous training or promotion, with the current or previous employer, 
matter for the likelihood of being offered more training or promotion? This chapter 
uses a panel of individuals from the 13 waves of the British Household Panel Survey 
(1991-2003) in order to focus on two workplace practices, training and promotion, 
and assess the way employers offer episodes of training and promotion. Splitting the 
data by gender, sector and occupation, estimates for probit, bivariate probit, and fixed 
effects models are obtained in order to analyse the determinants, interrelationships, 
and wage impact of recent training and promotion with a person’s current employer.
The need for this research is threefold. Firstly, there is a gap in the 
empirical economic literature related to the assessment of the link between training 
and promotion. With some exceptions, very little empirical research has singled out 
joint analysis of these two practices. When this is the case, previous studies mostly 
concentrate on training and promotion practices considered separately.66 To this
66 For instance, a search on Academic Search Premier and Business Search Premier Databases, which 
contain peer-reviewed journal content from more than four decades ago, shows that less than five 
articles in the economic domain contain the words “training” and “promotion” in their title. Further 
information on these articles shows that none investigates empirically the link between training and 
promotion in a model controlling for their interaction. To date, the studies that come somewhat closer 
to the research topic o f  this chapter are: Prendergast 1993 and 1999 (theoretical), Pergamit and Veum  
1999 (empirical), Paulson Gjerde 2002 (empirical), Booth et a l 2003 (empirical), Eguchi 2004  
(theoretical), Melero 2004 and Owan 2004 (theoretical).
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extent, models which analyse the incidence of training tend not to refer to prior 
promotion, while models that examine promotion prospects tend not to focus on prior 
training. To decide whom to train and promote remains, however, a complex and 
costly issue for firms. This chapter aims to fill the gap in the empirical literature by 
estimating probit and bivariate probit models in which training can affect promotion, 
and promotion is allowed to affect the incidence of training.
Secondly, this chapter expands existing knowledge of training and 
promotion by adding both a time dimension, and a sense of whether training and 
promotion have occurred within the same employment relationship. The former is 
achieved by exploiting the distinctive potential of the data used here, which records 
multi-spell observations for each time an individual enters and leaves employment. 
The latter consists of an original approach of generating combined dependent 
variables on training and promotion episodes. These measure whether an episode of 
training (respectively of promotion) has occurred, and also take into account whether 
an individual has changed employer in between the training or promotion episodes.
Thirdly, this chapter brings to light new empirical evidence from the 
British Household Panel Survey (BHPS). This is a multi-purpose dataset that offers a 
wide range of employment related information, as well as a long record of data 
collection, but whose explanatory potential with regard to training and promotion has 
not yet been fully explored. To date, Booth et al (2003) offer the only other study 
utilising the BHPS, their research concentrating on gender differences in models of 
promotion and wages.
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The importance of training in increasing productivity has been well- 
documented in the economic literature that analyses its impact on country and 
company performance (see Appendix D.l for examples of studies on training 
according to the country where they apply). A notable overview showing the positive 
link between training, and individual and company performance is given by Bartel 
2000. However, the empirical economic literature on training has consistently 
signalled that for more than two decades, not all employees have benefited equally 
from training. Most notable differences have occurred by gender and by previous 
accumulation of human capital, including both education and previous training. The 
impact of training on earnings also remains a topic of debate, with some research 
claiming that too few studies attempt correct estimations (Frazis and Loewenstein 
2005). Research challenges arise due to difficulties in differentiating between social 
and private returns to training, or specific and general human capital, in the assumed 
context of imperfectly competitive markets.
The issues highlighted above set out this chapter’s agenda of research with 
regard to training, namely attempting to expand the current knowledge of the training 
incidence and provision in the British labour market.
The second workplace practice researched in this chapter is promotion. 
Unlike training, promotion does not benefit from the same level of attention with 
regard to its regulation in the workplace, nor in British government policy initiatives. 
As noted by Pergamit and Veum (1999), the reason for this relative lack in the 
empirical attention may be due to the poor quality of the data available on the 
complex processes which lead to promotion (e.g. in-house politics of power which
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could be confidential or hard to isolate for research). Researchers on promotion tend 
to have preferred the theoretical side of analysis, with the empirical side needing to be 
more developed. A succinct review of the literature suggests that there appear to be 
relatively fewer empirical studies on promotion than on training, with the majority 
dedicated either to signalling mainly gender-based differences in promotion prospects, 
or to the impact of promotion on earnings (Lewis 1986, Lazear and Rosen 1990, 
Macpherson and Hirsh 1995, Hersch and Viscusi 1996, McCue 1996, Francesconi 
2001, Booth et al 2003 -  see Appendix D.2 for a selection of promotion studies by 
country where they apply). A characteristic of empirical research on promotion is that 
initial empirical studies have predominantly concentrated on the American labour 
market, with most authors preferring to use case study data.
The research challenge of finding and using relevant data on promotion is 
only partially resolved by the BHPS dataset. Unlike the post-1997 substantive 
expansion of the BHPS questionnaire on training, to date there is no question in the 
dataset specifically designed to ask employees whether they have been promoted. 
However, this chapter successfully models a combined dependent variable for 
promotion, generated from the self-reported reasons of changing job, and from 
whether a change of employer has occurred. This dependent variable is used to assess 
the determinants of promotion in models controlling for training. The link between 
promotion and training, and the impact of promotion on wages are also estimated.
67 From wave 8 onwards, the questions on training were considerably expanded to permit investigation 
into intensity, duration and location o f  training spells. This chapter focuses on all 13 waves (1991 - 
2003), hence these time-truncated variables are not used here due to the need o f  consistency in 
measurement.
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The chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 presents details of the 
theoretical models underpinning the research, outlines a review of the relevant 
literature on training and promotion, sets out the theoretical model that serves as the 
conceptual basis for this chapter, and states the set of hypotheses tested. Section 5.3 
describes the data used, the variables generated, and the methodology for the 
estimation of the econometric models. Section 5.4 discusses the results and places 
them in the context of the extant literature. Section 5.5 presents the conclusions of this 
research and opportunities for further research, followed by the chapter summary.
5.2. Theory and literature review
This section continues to assess the role of training and promotion in the 
workplace, by looking succinctly at more theoretical and empirical contributions from 
the economic literature. It then builds a theoretical framework for the empirical 
analysis conducted in this chapter, which is used alongside the literature reviews in 
generating the hypotheses tested.
5.2.1. A review of the literature on training
An extensive and growing literature has been generated to explore the 
economic consequences of training. In accordance with the seminal contributions 
made by Becker (1962 and 1964), an established path in this literature has been to 
analyse the benefits of training mainly in relation to the theoretical model of human 
capital accumulation. Training is split between specific and general in order to decide 
who should pay for it and the optimum amount of investment. As Becker (1964)
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concludes, an employer is only likely to pay for training that is specific to the firm, 
and not for skills that can be used outside it if the incumbent is poached by rival firms.
Problematically for researchers trying to disentangle the effects and types 
of training, specific training (or experiential learning) can also lead to accumulation of 
general human capital for employees, who may then choose to put their skills in 
practice at a different firm than the one who provided for their specific training. 
Developments of the Beckerian framework of human capital include the hold-up 
problem (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998) which refers to firms and employers under- 
investing in training in the context of imperfect competition. Acemoglu and Pischke
(1998) offer an analysis of the hold-up problem in a model with asymmetric 
information and its consequences with regard to training.
This is especially the case when general and specific skills are difficult to 
separate, hence firms fear that they are paying for employees to acquire transferable 
skills while rival firms are able to exploit the externalities arising from such general 
training. Therefore, in the hold-up scenario, both parties under-invest in specific 
human capital (Felly and Harris 1996).
There is reason to believe that if some certainty were to exist regarding the
post-training continuation of employment, for instance via promotion, investment in
68training would be higher, since the hold-up problem would be minimised. This 
could start to explain the discrepancy in training incidence between permanent
68 In the American market, Finegold et a l (2005) finds that training decreases labour turnover.
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employees and those in part-time, temporary or in more flexible employment 
contracts.69
Conversely, a policy linking promotion to training in order to minimise 
turnover, could have the effect of employers cherry-picking their employees by 
training only those whom they intend to promote, or promoting only those who train. 
Indeed, Vignoles et al (2004) provide evidence that employers may be rational in the 
way they allocate employees to training programmes, since returns to training are 
shown to be bigger for those receiving it than for those who do not get chosen.
Apart from the few studies mentioned above - see footnote 70 which lists 
studies coming close to this chapter only to the extent that they make partial attempts 
to link training and promotion in a single analysis - no other empirical research looks 
at the link between training and promotion in detail.
Thus, with regard to training, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate 
its determinants and incidence in relation to promotion, as well as the impact of 
training on wages. The hypotheses tested on training are constructed by also taking 
into consideration three of the most notable trends signalled in the literature so far, 
which are succinctly described below.
First, in the British labour market of 1980s, studies have documented 
gender differences in access to training, which can indicate that women are being 
discriminated against, or that they have different training needs and preferences
69 Empirical evidence in support o f  this relative underinvestment comes from USA  and across Europe. 
For instance, see Arulampalam and Booth 1997, or Loewenstein and Spletzer 1999.
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(Green 1991, Arulampalam and Booth 1997). In the 1990s, this gender gap is 
expected to have faded, with increased female labour participation and the expansion 
of institutional forces advocating the role of education and training such as the 
National Vocational Qualifications System, Investors in People, and other Youth 
Training Schemes. Nevertheless, the jury seems to be out on whether these schemes 
have proven to work well in the long run (for some critical evaluations and opinions, 
see Bradley 1995, Grugulis and Bevitt 2002, Grugulis 2003 or Hoque 2003).
A second long-documented source of discrepancy in training incidence 
comes from a positive association between education/ skill level and amount of 
training obtained (from mid 1970s with Rosen 1976 to more recent studies such as 
Frazis et al 1998, Vignoles et al 2004, Gershuny 2005 or Ariga and Brunello 2006). 
This discrepancy could lead to the creation of a virtuous cycle for workers with 
complex skills, for whom higher access to training translates into even higher 
productivity and human capital. On the contrary, individuals with basic skills would 
tend to be trapped into a vicious cycle of lower training incidence. Even if one were to 
use a utilitarian perspective and propose that the latter is acceptable (say, by arguing 
that the jobs of those unskilled would not require much training), the issue remains of 
concern, be it at least in view of favouring a fair society and of allowing everyone to 
benefit from social returns to training. An even more contentious point is that the ‘egg 
and chicken’ dilemma arises, in that it could be hard to determine whether those with 
poor skills are rightly doing the jobs appropriate to their potential, or whether they are
70trapped in those jobs due to not having opportunities to tram.
70 For a study that takes into account the effects o f  education on training, see Ariga and Brunello (2006) 
who find that Thailandese firms tend to compensate with on-the-job training in the case o f  those with 
lower education in order to offset the unwanted consequences o f  wide human capital differences (i.e.
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The effect of training on wages has been a third widely documented area 
of research. Barel (1995), Booth et al (2003) and Vignoles et al (2004) are but a few 
of the studies that offer compelling evidence on employer-provided training leading to 
higher worker wages, with Dearden et al (2006) offering some of the most recent 
evidence that investment in training translates into increases in hourly wages.
This subsection turns next to reviewing the literature on promotion, the 
second workplace practice analysed in this chapter.
5.2.2. A review of the literature on promotion
The theoretical study of job assignment to workers has been a long­
standing feature of labour economics. Promotion is a significant signalling tool for 
employees, as well as for current and future employers, which could denote a wide 
range of positive personal characteristics such as high ability, knowledge, skill, effort, 
dedication or commitment. In the case of current employees, promotions can be seen 
as a form of reward, as an assurance that efforts are monitored and recognised, as a 
better job match, or as a way to secure higher earnings.71 Within organisations, 
promotions represent for current employers a significant non-pecuniary means of 
motivation to increase effort or skill acquisition, also forming a sense of hierarchy and 
control. Additionally, the event of being promoted with a current company signals to 
rival firms or future employees that the respective employee has a higher than average 
actual and potential ability (Waldman 1984). If the employer has the means to hold
widening income gaps in a developing country). It is suggested that on the job training ‘partially offsets 
the existing differences in education’ (Ariga and Brunello 2006 : 626).
71 In a US case study, Lazear (1998) reports that ‘stars’, namely employees who get promoted, may 
earn as much as 4.4 times their initial pay, whereas the increase for ‘losers’ is only 2.3 times their 
initial earnings.
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onto the current employer, then ‘labour raiding’ -  whereby a firm intends to actively 
‘steal’ an employee of another firm -  can only occur if the employee is a better match 
with the hiring firm. Therefore, promotions are a critical tool in employee retention. 72
Some of the most quoted theories of promotion have modelled it as a 
‘prize’ won in company ‘tournaments’ for productivity (Lazear and Rosen 1981) or 
for revealed job ability (Lazear and Rosen 1990), as company ‘internal job ladders’ 
(Doeringer and Piore 1971), or as job assignment to different ladders (Katz and 
Gibbons 1992, Sattinger 1993).73 The latter model considers the method by which 
tasks are assigned to employees, whether by taking into account comparative 
advantages or not. If coupled with the model of human capital investment -  where 
Becker (1964) demonstrated that specific training makes an employee more valuable 
to the firm -  this theoretical framework suggests that the probability of being 
promoted should be positively linked to human capital accumulation, thereby clearly 
indicating that the link between training and promotion merits empirical investigation. 
Conversely, the workers who have given up leisure and invested effort to acquire 
higher firm specific skills, should have a greater probability of promotion, otherwise 
the worker would have an incentive to participate in training investment. 74 However, 
a problem signalled by Kahn and Huberman (1988) is the two-sided uncertainty, 
defined as (1) the firm having an incentive to renege on promoting an employee who 
has obtained training, so that the firm does not have to pay the higher wage associated 
with promotion; as well as (2) the employees losing the incentive to train if they think 
that the firm may renege.
72 The literature on ‘raiding’ is well-established. See Owen 2004 and McCannon 2007.
73 For an in-depth review o f  theoretical models for promotion and o f  their empirical offspring, see 
Gibbons and Waldman 1999.
74 The most notable model on promotion which incorporates the effect o f  leisure has been developed by 
Mincer (1974).
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A solution is suggested by Prendergast (1993) who assumes that firms 
could attach wages to different tasks (and not to different workers). Prendergast’s 
(1993) model shows that a task-based wage scale would generate incentives for 
employees to acquire skills, because of the firm’s commitment that training would 
translate into promotion to a higher wage. Prendergast (1993)’s theoretical model has 
two assumptions.
Firstly, firms do not have the opportunity to develop reputations such as 
for not reneging on initial promises of promotion. Secondly, building trust in the 
company-employee relationship is essential for the model to create incentives for skill 
acquisition. In order to study this theoretical model empirically, its assumptions need 
to be relaxed, mainly by replacing the firm’s absolute promise of post-training 
promotion with a probability of such promotion.
Since increasing skills still would make promotion more probable, and 
employees know this (that is, firms can develop a reputation), employees compete for 
training even though there is no certainty of a promotion at the end of a training 
episode. After training, the company may layoff those employees not promoted, or 
these employees may voluntarily decide to leave the company, both options being 
costly to the firm’s reputation and resulting in the loss of potential profit from leakage 
of trained labour.75
To decide whom to train and promote, this model extension would thus 
need to incorporate an additional element of mutual trust as a further determinant of
75 The fact that employees not promoted would be laid-off is what Kahn and Huberman (1988) referred 
to as the up-or-out contract.
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promotion over and above firm specific skills, such as ‘loyalty’ and ‘commitment’ to 
the organisation, attributes which are also revealed in the training process. Hence, 
promotion and training appear to be two processes intrinsically connected within 
firms, which brings further support to the need for research conducted in this chapter.
With regard to determinants of promotion, this chapter aims to expand the 
current understanding of factors leading to different promotion probabilities. Possibly 
the most entrenched finding in the empirical literature is gender-biased probabilities 
of promotion (e.g. one of the most recent additions to this literature comes from 
Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 2006), with women being discriminated in opportunities 
for promotion. Additionally, as highlighted in Booth et al (2003), the gender- 
disadvantage may not tell the whole story, because women could also be 
disadvantaged in the salary rewards to promotion relative to their male counterparts.
Finally, the theoretical pursuit of understanding the connection between 
training and promotion is advanced through the work of Gibbons and Waldman
(1999) and Bernhardt (1995). This chapter borrows from their contributions in order 
to construct its rationale for analysis. Therefore, their contributions are singled out 
and presented in the next section, as the theoretical framework for this chapter’s 
empirical analysis.
5.2.3. Theoretical framework for analysing training and promotion
Gibbons and Waldman (1999 : 2382) offer a theoretical model of job 
assignment which assumes that a worker’s ability is determined by tenure and the
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stock of training. In this model, a firm is assumed to have only two jobs, job 1 and job 
2. The ability of worker, judged by their productivity, i is denoted by 77,-.
In the first instance, worker i is assigned to job j  and produces output aj + 
bjrji. Let a\ > a2 and b \< b 2 and let 17* solve
a\ + b\rj* = a2 + b2rj*.
Then workers with ability rj, < rj* are more productive in job 1 and workers with 
ability rjj> rj* are more productive in job 2 .
The employer could learn gradually about the worker’s effective ability 
from noisy observations, without any training. Eventually, a worker’s labour market 
experience rises to a sufficiently high level that expected ability increases beyond rj * 
and it is optimal to promote a worker from job 1 to job 2 .
However, the firm could alternatively select those workers it perceives as 
potentially benefiting from training. Through the training process the worker 
augments her human capital and the firm observes the suitability of the worker for job 
2. Suppose without training it takes k years for a worker to reach r f  ability level and 
suppose further that the error term has variance v. If the training process reduces the 
risk of a poor job match, the variance attached to the effective ability level, as 
observed by the employer, is reduced to v ' . 76 The employer incurs a cost of training C 
which is a function of innate ability 6 and the stock of on the job training T. The
76 See Owan (2004) for a model o f  promotion where the worker’s ability is distinguished from the 
quality o f  job match. That is, a worker can have high ability but low quality job match.
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employer can equate the marginal benefit of training to the marginal cost (df/dT = 
dC/dT) but there are other benefits to training which should also be accounted for. 
Essentially, the firm trades off the higher probability of an incorrect match and the 
length of time that a bad match persists, which combine to cause output to be less than 
optimal, against expenditure on training. Training lowers the variance of expected 
output since it enables the employer to promote a worker with lower variance of 
expected ability and the probability of incorrectly promoting a worker of lower 
effective ability will be reduced.
Training also has the advantage for the employee of reducing the length of 
time needed to reach the critical ability level >7* which would trigger promotion. 
There is the disadvantage for the worker that a firm will choose to train more than one 
worker to fill one promotion vacancy and will then generate a tournament to select the 
best worker.
In this setting, promotions offer an incentive to work harder. In the limit, 
if promotions were solely determined by effort incentives then effort (proxied by 
variables such as amount of overtime worked (as in Landers et al 1996) would be a 
significant determinant of promotion while training would be unimportant. The 
worker’s choice of participation in a training competition will depend both on self­
belief about one’s own ability and the worker’s belief about the credibility of the 
firm’s promotion promise. Essentially, the worker needs to believe that the 
mechanisms by which the worker reveals the benefits of training to the firm are 
interpreted identically by the employer, and that subjective elements of discrimination 
and favouritism do not intrude (Prendergast, 1999).
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Another role played by promotion is noted by Bernhardt (1995). The 
training activity provided by one firm can be observed by other firms. This allows all 
firms, not just the incumbent, to update the value of an employee’s expected 
productivity -  at least under the assumption that some component of the training is 
actually general or transferable. Bernhardt (1995) points out that the firm investing in 
training can protect its investment by following it with a promotion. Promotions can 
ward off employee poaching / raiding and decrease the attractiveness of recently 
trained employees by signalling to other firms that there is reaffirmed commitment 
from the incumbent firm to utilise its trained workforce. At the same time, promotion 
could also prevent the newly trained employees from moving to rival firms, by 
reducing the probability of a voluntary quit to seek better external opportunities.
The theoretical contributions above are used as the main tools to 
conceptualise the intricate links between training and promotion. For instance, using 
the model offered by Gibbons and Waldman (1999), for a worker / who has innate 
ability 6t determined inter alia by education and is observable to the firm, the 
effective ability in period t is given by a random effects model:
r\it = 6flxit, Tit) + $it
where:
Xu = labour market experience;
Tit = the stock of on the job training; and 
= an i.i.d random error.
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Similarly, a fixed effects estimation of wage in this chapter attempts to 
measure the impact of the stock of training and of tenure on earnings -  the latter 
being, conceivably, related to worker’s ability.
To conclude, the studies discussed in this section serve as the conceptual 
basis for this chapter. Additionally, they support and highlight the need for more 
empirical investigation into training and promotion. This chapter attempts to do just 
that.
5.3. Data, hypotheses and econometric estimation
This section implements the suggestions from the literature and theoretical 
framework. It presents the data and variables used in this chapter, followed by the 
methodology used, namely the econometric estimation of training, promotion and 
wages.
5.3.1. Data and hypotheses
The British Household Panel Survey has been conducted annually in 
Britain since 1991 as a multi-purpose panel study. 77 It is a household based survey, 
interviewing each adult member of the sampled households, which then generates a
77 Studies that have used the BHPS for the analysis o f  training are Booth and Bryan (2002), Booth e t al 
(2003), Melero (2004), Almeida-Santos and Mumford (2005 and 2006). Studies that have used the 
BHPS for the analysis o f  promotion are Francesconi (2001), Booth et a l (2003) and Melero (2004). For 
further studies using the BHPS: http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/vola/app5_2.php
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representative sample of around 5,000 individuals followed yearly.78 The sample 
obtained is a stratified clustered design based on the Postcode Address File. All 
individuals present at those addresses in 1991, at the first wave, were considered panel 
members.
This chapter uses the first 13 waves covering the period from 1991 to 
2003. Statistical software (Stata 7) is used to obtain a panel of individuals that 
incorporates spells of employment. Only individuals in paid employment and with age 
between 16 and 65 are kept in the panel. The final sample consists of 60,253 
observations (spells of employment) containing information mainly based on the 
BHPS employment sections which record multiple spells for each of the 10,763 
individuals observed over the period of 13 years (waves A to M). These 13 datasets 
have been merged based on the personal identifier, and the employment history 
records have also been merged to generate a single dataset. The resulting panel is an 
unbalanced panel, because individuals are being observed coming in and out of 
employment for a different number of times during the 13 year observation period. 
More than three quarters (78%) of the observations in this sample come from 
individuals with 6 or more spells of employment. The data may also be described as 
rather dense, in that there is a frequent succession of spells per individual. As such, of 
any two consecutive spell of employment, less than 100 spells have a gap of more 
than 6 years, and most (over 90%) gaps are of less than 2 years. Appendices D.3 and 
D.4 offer a brief first insight into this panel, by presenting numbers and percentages
78 At three points in time (1999, 2000 and 2001), the sample has been increased by the addition o f  
households from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. However, the necessary condition o f  
consistency with previous waves meant that these additions where dropped from the panel generated 
for the purpose o f  this chapter.
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associated with the split of the sample according to gender, sector and whether the 
employment is in professional or non-professional occupations.
Based on the literature on training and promotion reviewed above, and on 
the theoretical model exposed in the previous subsection, this chapter tests four 
hypotheses, as follows:
o Hypothesis 1: Employers offer training to those whom they intend to promote,
therefore the probability of recent training (and the number of training episodes) is a 
reflection of the incidence of promotion. There is expected to be a positive and 
significant relationship between the probability of being trained at present, , and the 
history of training and promotion episodes.
o Hypothesis 2: Employers use training as a filter for searching for promotable
employees, therefore the probability of being promoted is higher after training. Recent 
training has a positive and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of being 
promoted.
o Hypothesis 3: The occurrence of training has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the level of wages.
o Hypothesis 4: The occurrence of promotion has a positive and statistically
significant effect on the level of wages.
Three dependent variables are generated for recent training with current 
employer, recent promotion with current employer, and for weekly wages. With 
respect to training, respondents are asked whether they had received work-related
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training in the previous year.79 Initially, the dichotomous variable Training dummy is 
coded 1 if a respondent received any form of work-related training in the period 
elapsed from last interview. Based on the same question, the stock of training up to 
present spell is also measured in this chapter by the variable Total Trained t-1. It is to 
be noted that the letter t denominates spells of employment, that is an episode of 
employment, and not years. Then, using the information on whether the respondent 
has changed employer, the dependent variable for training Training with same 
employer spell t is created, encoded to take the value 1 if such training has occurred. 
Table 5.1 shows the distribution of observations according to the incidence of 
training. The distribution is rather equal by gender, however, those in professional 
occupations tend to have almost twice as much training than those in non-professional 
occupations.
Table 5.1. Incidence of recent training with current employer, by absolute
number and percentage in the respective category
In Dataset Trained with current employer
N % N %
Male 29,638 49.19 9,045 30.52 
of male
Female 30,615 50.81 9,584 31.30 
of female
Private sector 41,882 69.51 10,654 25.44
of those in private sector








79 The exact question asked is: “Since September 1st last year, have you taken part in any training as 
part o f  your present employment?”. More than one variable is used to encode training, with particular 
attention paid to the fact that for years 1991-1997 (waves A-G) training is encoded differently than for 
years 1998 -2003 (waves H-M).
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Two additional training variables are generated in order to distinguish 
between training provided by the current employer and by previous employers: 
Training with same employer in spell t and Training with previous employer in spell t. 
In turn, for each of the latter two variables, the following training variables lagged by 
one or two employment spells are generated: Training with same employer in spell t- 
1, Training with same employer in spell t-2, respectively Training with previous 
employer in spell t-1, Training with previous employer in spell t-2.
With respect to promotion, each year individuals are asked if they 
changed their job in the period elapsed from the last interview and, if so, the reasons
OA
for this. ‘Promotion with current employer’ is one reason given for a job change, so 
the binary variable, Promotion dummy, takes the value of 1 where this is observed. 
The same approach - described for training variables in the paragraph above, whereby 
the information of whether the person changed employer or not was used for training 
variables - applies to the generation of promotion variables. Hence, the dependent 
variable for promotion is Promotion with same employer (in) spell t, encoded to take 
the value 1 if such promotion has occurred. Table 5.2 shows that the distribution of 
employees according to promotion as the dependent variable, with females receiving 
slightly less promotions than males, and with professional occupations receiving 
almost three times as much promotion than non-professional occupations.
80 The exact question asked is: “Would you look at this card and please tell me which o f  the statements 
on the card best describes why you stopped doing that job?”, and the variable for promotion is obtained 
from the answer “was promoted”. This question was asked consistently from 1991 -  2003 (waves A- 
M). On the interview card, the other reasons for stopping the previous job were: “left for better job”, 
“made redundant”, “dismissed or sacked”, “temporary job ended”, “took retirement”, “stopped for 
health reasons”, “left to have a baby”, “children/ home care”, “care o f  other person”, or “other 
reasons”.
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Table 5.2. Incidence of recent promotion with current employer, by absolute 
number and percentage in the respective category____________________________
In Dataset Promoted with current employer
N % N %
Male 29,638 49.19 2,005 6.67 
of male
Female 30,615 50.81 1,668 5.45 
of female
Private sector 41,882 69.51 2,633 6.29
of those in private sector
Professional 21,227 35.23 2,203 10.38
occupations




It should be stressed that previous employment spells could be with the 
same employer if the worker takes a break from current job in order to return later. 
For instance, women who take maternity leave and return to employment are treated 
as having a new employment spell by the BHPS. Therefore, for the purpose of this 
study, there would be cases where the “previous employer” is in fact the same 
employer to whom the respondent returns after a break in employment. To minimise 
the bias that occurs, the solution adopted in this study was to encode the variable 
‘change of employer’ (used at subsequent stages to encode the dependent variables) 
by also taking into account the change in occupation. This way, the bias only persists 
in the very unlikely case that employees return to work with the same employer, and 
immediately change occupation. In this situation (for less than 1% of respondents), 
the current employer is misleadingly encoded as being a ‘previous’ employer.
The third dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real weekly 
earnings. The BHPS records the wage as a continuous variable as usual gross pay per 
month. Using the consumer price indices available from the Office of National 
Statistics for years 1991 - 2003, a variable for the real weekly wage has been
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generated so that wage is measured at constant prices overtime, and its natural 
logarithm is used in this study. Figure 5.1 presents the frequency distribution for the 
natural logarithm of wages, which is slightly skewed to the left.












-4s.d. -3s.d. -2s.d. -1s.d. Mean +1s.d. +2s.d. +3s.d
Natural logarithm of the weekly wage
The BHPS also contains information on person, job and firm 
characteristics, and measures of these indicators are used as control variables in all 
econometric analysis. For reasons to do with space limitations and relevance, out of 
the range of characteristics available, only the following controls have been reported 
in this chapter’s tables (see Tables 5.3 to 5.7): age, gender, marital status, highest 
educational qualification, company size by number of employees, employee union
81 In this figure, for comparison, the normal and the kernel-density distributions are overlaid using the 
two continuous bell-shaped curves. This figure shows how the distribution o f  the natural logarihm o f  
weekly wages compares to the normal and the kernel-density distributions, which is informative in 
determining the choice o f  econometric methodology. In this study, the wage distribution is only slightly 
skewed to the left, so no special precautions need to be taken in the use o f  the econometric 
methodology chosen.
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membership status, type of job contract (whether full-time or part-time; as well as 
whether permanent, temporary or fixed-term), number of hours normally worked per 
week, number of overtime hours worked per week, and tenure with the firm (in 
weeks).
The set of characteristics used as controls for which results are not 
reported in this chapter are: number of dependent children, health status, current 
industry and region of residence. Finally, due to multi-collinearity, company sector 
and current occupation also became part of the set of variables not reported, insofar as 
these variables were used to split the sample according to private sector and 
professional occupation.
Descriptive statistics for all variables in the tables of reported results are 
shown in Appendix D.5, indicating for control variables which category was chosen 
as the base variable for the purpose of meaningful interpretation of results.
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5.3.2. Econometric methodology
To test the set of hypotheses highlighted above, this chapter builds probit, 
bivariate probit and fixed effects models with training, promotion and real wage as 
dependent variables. 82
5.3.2.1 Recent training and promotion with current employer -  two separate 
models
Firstly, the starting assumption is that training and promotion are 
independent variables, exogenously determined. To test Hypotheses 1 and 2 for 
training and promotion, marginal effects from a probit model are estimated.
Following Maddala (1983) and Wooldridge (2001), a probit model is an 
econometric model based on the generalised linear model (GLM), where the 
dependent variable yjt (/ is the individual subscript and t is the time subscript) can be 
only one or zero, and the continuous independent variables forming a vector of 
regressors b’ are estimated using the probit function:
Pr (y it  = 1 ) = F (b ' Xjt)  (Prohit Model Equation)
where:
b' = parameters to be estimated; and 
F = the normal cumulative distribution function.
82 The choice o f  a random as opposed to a fixed effects model is made after performing a standard 
Hausman test. The result o f  this test favoured a fixed effects model over a random effects model.
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The probit model assumes that there is an underlying, latent response 
variable, yn*, which in this chapter represents the probability of being trained with the 
current employer (in the probit model for training), and the probability of being 
promoted with the current employer (in the probit model for promotion). The latent 
variable yjt* can be expressed as:
yit* = b'xit + Ujt
where:
Xjt = a set of exogenous variables affecting the probability of being trained / promoted
with the current employer;
b' = parameters to be estimated; and
Uit = a stochastic error term.
In practice, yjt* is unobserved. Instead, a dummy variable y is observed,
where:
y = 1 if y,* > 0 , that is, for observation i training / promotion occurs; and 
y = 0 otherwise, that is, for observation i there is no training / promotion with the 
current employer.
It follows that:
prob (yn = 1) = prob (uit > -b 'xit)
Therefore:
prob (yjt = 1) = 1 -  F (-b ’xjt) (.Probabilities Equation)
where F is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and the observed 
values of y are the outcomes of a binomial process estimated via the Probit Model
226
Equation. The probabilities of these outcomes are generated by the Probability 
Equation and are dependent on the vector of exogenous regressors Xj.
The following two independent probit models are estimated in this chapter 
in order to investigate the determinants of training and promotion. Firstly, in order to 
investigate the probability of being trained:
Training with current employerit = a \ + a 2 Individuals + a 3 Educations + « 4 Jobs  +
O 5 ^training it + O, 6 Year + Straining it (1)
Secondly, in order to analyse the probability of being promoted:
Promotion with current employers -  p 1 + (3 2 Individuals + P 3 Educations + P 4 Jobs
P 5 -^promotion it P 6 Year + ^promotion it ( 2 )
In both equations (1) and (2) above, the following notations are used: 
i = individual employee subscript 
t = time subscript
F = the standard normal cumulative distribution function;
Individual — a vector of personal characteristics including age and its square; whether 
divorced, widowed or not married; whether in reasonable health; a dummy for 
smoking; and number of dependent children;
Education = a dummy variable for level of education, with highest education level as 
O-level qualifications as baseline category, as well as including a dummy for national 
vocational qualifications;
227
Job = a vector of work history variables including tenure with current employer, 
union membership, standard industry category, standard occupation category, whether 
in temporary or fixed-term contract, and whether in part-time work; 
draining (^ promotion) = a vector of variables, which includes for the training equation 
(respectively for the promotion equation) the following variables: incidence of recent 
promotion (training); lagged training with same employer; lagged training in previous 
employment spells; lagged promotion with same employer; and lagged promotion in 
earlier employment spells. Equations (1) and (2) are also each estimated with their 
associated interaction variable, to check for interaction effects between tenure and the 
dependent variable. These interaction variables are generated as the product of 
variables Training dummy * Tenure, and Training dummy * Promotion respectively. 
Year = a set of dummy variables controlling for the year when the spell of 
employment occurred; and
^training (^-promotion )  — e iT O r  t e r m s .
To ease the interpretation of results, the estimated report marginal effects 
from the probit models are reported i.e. the change in the probability for an 
infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, the 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.
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5.3.2.2. The interdependence between recent training and promotion with 
current employer
So far, the analysis has ignored model specification problems related to 
the interdependence of the probabilities of training and promotion. The two univariate 
equations (1) and (2) have been estimated by individual single equation probit 
methods. In order to check whether recent training and promotion are simultaneously 
determined, or whether training may be endogenous to our other covariates, the 
assumption of exogeneity is changed to allow for the possibility that training is 
endogenous. In this way, this chapter assesses whether the probability of training is 
related to the incidence of promotion {Hypothesis 1). Moreover, it tests whether 
employers cherry pick their employees by training those whom they intend to promote 
{Hypothesis 2).
A bivariate probit model (see Greene 2000) fits maximum-likelihood two- 
equation probit models for two dependent variables yij and y2j, where y*ij and y* 2j are 
the unobserved latent variables. We observe instead yjj = 1 if y* ij >0, and yij = 0 
otherwise (for i = 1, 2). The derivation equations for the latent variables assume that:
y* ij = a x j + e ij + offsetj 
y*2j = b z j + e 2j + offsetbj 
where:
E ( e , j )  = E ( e 2j ) =  0 
Var ( e ij) = Var ( e 2j) = 1 
Cov (e ij, e 2j) = P
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If the correlation term p  = 0, then the training and promotion are 
independent and there would be no reason to run a bivariate probit. However, if the 
correlation term p  is different than zero, a bivariate probit model is characterised by 
greater efficiency than univariate probit models, since the bivariate probit implies that 
training and promotion are jointly determined. The correlation term rho gives a 
measure of the way in which the unobservable factors not captured in the regression 
influence training and promotion.
The correlation terms p  for the bivariate probit models estimated in this 
study are shown in Tables 5.5 and 5.6 at the end of this chapter. Since all p  terms are 
significantly not equal to zero, this suggests that training and promotion are inter­
dependent, rather than the results of independent processes. Since all p  terms are 
positive, this suggests that training and promotion are influenced by the unobservable 
factors in the same direction.
Thus, equations (1) and (2) are estimated together via a bivariate probit 
model of training and promotion, as follows:
Training with current employerit = a i + a 2 Individuallt + a 3 Educationa + a 4 John
+ ft 5 ^ tr a in in g  it f t  6 T ea r "I" Straining it (1)
i and:
Promotion with current employer# = p 1 + p 2 Individual+ p 3 Educationu + P 4
Jobn + p 5 ^ p ro m o tio n  it "' P 6 Year + ^prom otion it (2)
V
It is assumed that the error terms Strain ing it and Spi-omotion it are the 
stochastic disturbance terms in each equation with s training it , s promotion it
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~ N(o,0,<j^,<jllt,p )  where the covariance is given by erw,2/, = pcrUl<J2il. In the
bivariate model, the disturbance terms, Strain ing it and £ prom otion it are jointly normally 
distributed with variances <j Ui and <j 2h .
The bivariate model specification replicates the separate probit models 
outlined above at Section 5.3.2.1. The Stata command used is biprobit. The bivariate 
model has been estimated both with and without interaction variables for Training 
dummy * Tenure, and respectively for Promotion dummy * Tenure. Since they were 
found to be statistically insignificant, the results reported in this chapter are from 
models that do not include interaction variables, and it can be concluded that there is 
no reason to assume tenure could be a discriminating basis for determining 
opportunities for training and promotion.
5.3.2.3. The effect of recent training and promotion with current employer on 
wages
The fixed effects estimator is obtained by ordinary least square (OLS) 
estimations based on the deviations from the means of each unit over time in a panel 
dataset. This approach is particularly relevant for panel datasets consisting of multiple 
“waves” (points in time when information is collected; a “wave” can be thought of as 
being a cross-section dataset), and in particular when there are expectations that the 
averages of the dependent variable will be different for each cross-sectional unit (in 
this study, the employee), or each time period (in this study, the spell of employment), 
but the variance of the errors will not be different.
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The model formulation is based on the assumption that differences across 
real wage observations can be captured by differences in the coefficients of the 
independent and control variables (Gujarati 2003). Therefore, while the intercept may 
differ across individuals, each individual’s intercept is time invariant. The equation 
for this model is:
yit = (a + Vj) + b Xjt + Ujt {Fixed Effects Equation)
where:
i = the ith cross-sectional unit, that is, the personal identifier (pid); 
t -  the tth time period;
yit = dependent variable, that is, natural logarithm of real weekly wage at current 
prices
a+ Vj = the fixed effects to be estimated; 
b' = parameters to be estimated;
Xjt = vector of regressor (independent and control variables), that is training / 
promotion with current employer; and
Ujt =  a stochastic error term. The assumptions made about the error terms are that they 
are fixed parameters following E (u;t ) ~ N (0, o ).
The remaining two hypotheses, Hypotheses 3 and 4 relate to the effect of 
recent training and promotion on individual earnings. Therefore, bivariate 
probabilities of promotion and training are imbedded in wage equations. This captures 
both the interdependence and endogeneity of training and promotions within a model 
of wage determination.
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Two standard Mincerian wage equations (Mincer 1974) are estimated with 
probability of promotion and training as covariates, as follows:
LnWageu = b\+ I02 Training with current employerit + b3 Individualit + 
b4 Educationit + b5 Jobit + b(,Z u + Ujt + Vj (3)
and
LnWagejt = b i’ + bi ’Promotion with current employerit + b35 Individualit + 
b f  Education u + b s'Job a + b f  Z it + Ujt + Vj (4)
where:
i = employee subscript 
t = period o f time
LnWagejt= natural logarithm of real weekly earnings; 
b and b ' = parameters to be estimated;
Variables (Training with current employer, Promotion with current employer 
Individual, Education, Job, Z) = the independent and control variables replicating 
those described in Section 5.3.2.1 as well as variables measuring the accumulation of 
training and promotion;
Ujt = a stochastic error term; and 
V/ = the fixed effects to be estimated.
Besides introducing training and promotion as dummy variables in the 
equations (3) and (4), the two wage equation estimations above also attempt to take 
into account the stock of training and promotion by including in the models the 
variables Total Trained t-1 and Total Promoted t-1. These two variables offer a simple
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additive measure of the total number of years in the sample for which training and 
promotions have occurred.83
All models are estimated at three levels:
(a) data is split by gender, in order to assess whether there is discrimination in training 
and promotion; then
(b) within each gender, data is split by sector, into private or public, due to the very 
different forces at play in the private as opposed to the public sector; and then
(c) within each gender, data is split by occupation, into professional and non­
professional, due to different labour market characteristics of professional vs. non­
professional jobs.
Moreover, all models are also estimated with the option of clustering by 
the variable containing the cross-wave personal identifier (pid) in order to obtain 
robust standard errors. This method ensures that observations are treated as 
independent across waves only if they do not represent repeated observations on the 
same individual.
83A proxy for the total stock o f  training is needed since any prior training should augment human 
capital and be reflected in the wage (Pischke 2001, Almeida-Santos and Mumford 2006, Ariga and 
Brunello 2006). A proxy for the total stock o f  promotion is also needed since any prior promotions may 
signal increased worker ability, and lead to higher wages.
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5.4. Discussion of results
This section presents the results estimated in Tables 5.3-5.7 in this order, 
with results highlighted in bold where they represent values discussed within the text. 
It starts with two probit models analysing the determinants of training (Table 5.3) and 
promotion (Table 5.4). It continues with the discussion of the bivariate probit model 
assessing the link between training and promotion (Table 5.5). It ends with the results 
from the fixed effects wage models for training (Table 5.6) and for promotion (Table 
5.7). Full tables can be found at the end of the chapter and the most relevant parts of 
the Tables are provided in the main text alongside the respective discussion of results.
A common structure is shared by all table columns, stemming from the 
way the data is split by gender, sector and occupation. Models are estimated in the 
first instance for all workers, but throughout, the data is split by gender. Secondly, the 
data is split by sector, and results are shown for the private sector. In the end, the 
estimations are separated by occupational sector, with results reported for both 
professional and non-professional occupations. The term ‘professional occupation’ is 
used in this chapter to refer to those categories of jobs classified in the Standard 
Occupational Classification used by BHPS as being amongst the following three: (1) 
managers and administrators; (2) professional occupations; or (3) associate 
professional and technical occupations.84 The assumption behind this occupational 
split is that professional jobs require the acquisition of a relatively higher level of 
skills, and that training and promotion issues within these jobs are of a relatively 
different nature compared to non-professional occupations.
84 The BHPS uses the Standard Occupational Classification 1992, available at: 
http://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/ulsc/bhps/doc/vola/app3_2.php
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5.4.1. The determinants of training and promotion — two separate models
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 report marginal effects, P-values and robust standard 
errors from the separate probit equations (1) and (2) above, with dependent variables 
Training with same employer t and Promotion with same employer t respectively.
By looking at the first row in Tables 5.3a and 5.3b, it is clear that training 
and promotion with the same employer are positively associated (.Hypothesis 1). 
Promotion with the same employer is related to training with the same employer with 
marginal effects between 18 percentage points (pp) for male non-professionals and 
almost 30 for female professionals, meaning employers tend to offer the two to the 
same employees. This result is also enhanced by the fact that for all categories of 
employees the interaction variables Training dummy*tenure and Promotion 
dummy*tenure enter as highly significant in relation to promotion, and respectively 
for training, thus re-confirming the link between training and promotion.85
Table 5.3a. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent training with current employer for male employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter) 1
All________ Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.208 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.179 0.000
same employer in 
spell t
(0 .020) (0 .022) (0.026) (0.030)
Columns (1) contain marginal effects, with standard errors in brackets. Columns (2) contain p-values. 
Estimations are adjusted for clustering by individual.
85 With the exception o f  the estimate for Promotion dummy*Tenure for non-professional males, which 




Determinants of recent training with current employer for female employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All________ Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.286 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.246 0.000
same employer in 
spell t
(0 .021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
Similar to Tables 5.3a and 5.3b, the first row in Tables 5.4a and 5.4b also
shows that training and promotion with the same employer are interlinked, except that
marginal effects are smaller here, between 5 pp (for male non-professionals) and
almost 10 pp (for male professionals).
Table 5.4a. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent promotion with current employer for male employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
_______________________ All_________Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
 ( 1) (2) ( 1) (2) ( 1) (2) ( 1) (2)
Training with 0.064 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.045 0.000
same employer in (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
 spell t______________________________________________________________________
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
Table 5.4b. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent promotion with current employer for female employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
 ( 1) (2) ( 1) (2) ( 1) (2) ( 1) (2)
Training with same 0.056 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.041 0.000
employer in spell t (0.005)________(0.006)___________ (0.009)________ (0.005)___________
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
Although timing and causation remain unresolved, in that the BHPS 
dataset does not allow for a distinction between the timing of the training and 
promotion episodes with current employer, this is a preliminary indicator of cherry- 
picking behaviour by employers (Hypothesis 2). Even if employers train workers after 
promotion, it remains the case that workers who have been selected for training are 
those who have demonstrated suitability for promotion, whether considered in terms
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of absolute ability or quality of job match. For both men and women, the extent of 
correlation between promotion and training is greater for professional employees than 
for non-professionals.
The models estimated in Tables 5.3 (and 5.4) also include a selection of 
lagged variables for training (and promotion). These distinguish between current and 
previous employer-provided training (promotion). As such, one lagged variable refers 
to a period between the 1st and the 2nd previous spells of employment (lag t-1), and the 
second lagged variable refers to a period between the 2nd and the 3rd previous spell of 
employment. For a visual explanation of how the spells relate to time, see Appendix 
D.4.
Continuing the analysis of results in Table 5.3, the set of lagged variables 
related to training shows that prior training, irrespective of whether it is with the 
previous or current employer, is a precursor of current training. This result suggests 
that a first training episode could start a virtuous cycle of learning. An interpretation 
would be that as the benefits of training are experienced, and as they reward the 
incumbent for the effort deployed during training via increased productivity, this 
positive experience would give the incumbent not only the reinforcement of higher 
wages (assumed in case productivity were to translate into higher wages), but also an 
incentive for further knowledge accumulation. Thus, training generates further 
training.
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Table 5.3a. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent training with current employer for male employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All________ Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 











Training with same 



































Notes: Columns (1) contain marginal effects, with standard errors in brackets. Columns (2) contain p- 
values. Estimations are adjusted for clustering by individual.
Table 5.3b. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent training with current employer for female employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All________ Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 











Training with same 



































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
Most notably, the probability of training increases if the previous training 
episode was with the current employer, a variable which is a strong predictor of recent 
training. Marginal effects for men are between 22 pp and 27 pp, and between 19 pp 
and 23 pp for women.
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Despite not being able to ascertain from the data whether training is 
general or specific, if training were assumed to be general, the impact on training 
incidence of the past training episodes would not be expected to depend on whether 
these episodes were provided by the current or by the previous employer. This 
assumption is not supported by the evidence shown in Table 5.3 for men and women: 
training with previous employer has a significant impact on recent training. Out of the 
six split levels investigated, at three levels (male in the private sector, non­
professional male, and women working in professional occupations), some marginal 
effects related to the the impact on recent training of training with the previous 
employer (in either spell t-1 or t-2) are slightly smaller than the impact of training 
with the current employer. However, at the other three levels of data split 
(professional male, women in the private sector and women working in non­
professional occupations) the reverse is true, though the differences are sometimes 
small. For these latter categories, training incidence is rather more correlated to a 
training episode with the previous employer (t-1) than with the current employer, 
hence, to a certain small extent, a sequence of training episodes is rather more likely 
than a single training episode. An alternative explanation for the results obtained with 
respect to employees in the latter three categories, could be that their training contains 
a relatively slightly larger proportion of general training than for the rest of the 
employees — in particular, this could be the case of non-professional women.
Marginal effects reported for men with regard to their training episodes 
(Table 5.3a) are not consistently different than those reported for women (Table 5.3b). 
This can be interpreted as suggesting that a gender discrimination expectation 
(constructed merely based on the extant literature) with regard to the probability of
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being trained is not supported by BHPS data. Unlike previous studies which found 
evidence that British women were disadvantaged with regard to training access 
(Booth 1991, Green 1991, Arulampalam and Booth 1997), Table 5.3 confirms the 
more recent results reported by Green and Zanchi (1997) who maintain that there has 
been convergence between genders with regard to training access in Britain.
Looking at the impact of promotion on recent training, prior promotions 
do not have a significant impact on recent training for men. Similarly, for women this 
impact is largely insignificant, and, if significant, the marginal effects are small. 86 
Therefore, having been already promoted, employees are seen as less likely to need 
enhancement of skills. This is a result consistent across gender, sector and occupation, 
in support of the hypothesis that training is a precedent to promotion {Hypothesis 1 
and Hypothesis 2).
86 The cases where the impact is significant are if  wom en’s prior promotion was with their previous 
employer, but this is highly significant to recent training for the private sector, and marginally 
significant in the non-professional occupations. On the contrary, for professional women, promotion 
with previous employer is only marginally significant.
241
Table 5.3a.87 Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent training with current employer for male employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All________ Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.208 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.179 0.000
same employer in 
spell t
(0 .020) (0 .022) (0.026) (0.030)
Promotion with 0.009 0.458 0.002 0.888 -0.003 0.877 0.022 0.216
same employer in 
spell t-1
(0 .012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
Promotion with -0.005 0.679 -0.001 0.963 -0.015 0.399 0.004 0.822
same employer in 
spell t-2
(0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
Promotion with -0.003 0.949 -0.016 0.795 -0.020 0.797 -0 .00088 0.998
previous employer 
in spell t-1
(0.055) (0.061) (0.077) (0.086)
Promotion with -0.053 0.382 -0.049 0.458 -0.113 0.172 0.028 0.750
previous employer 
in spell t-2
(0.057) (0.061) (0.077) (0.090)
Interaction 0.00027 0.000 0.00026 0.001 0.00034 0.001 0.00016 0.115
promotion*tenure (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
See footnotes to table 5.3a.
Table 5.3b. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent training with current employer for female employees
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)


















same employer in (0 .021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
spell t
Promotion with 0.015 0.246 0.043 0.003 0.002 0.908 0.029 0.082
same employer in (0.013) (0.015) (0 .021) (0.017)
spell t-1
Promotion with -0.019 0.181 -0.014 0.361 -0.015 0.497 -0.021 0.235
same employer in (0.014) (0.015) (0 .022) (0.017)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.083 0.089 0.031 0.578 0.137 0.078 0.048 0.425
previous employer (0.051) (0.057) (0.076) (0.063)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.003 0.953 -0.019 0.752 -0.079 0.252 0.077 0.259
previous employer (0.049) (0.059) (0.068) (0.074)
in spell t-2
Interaction 0.00157 0.000 0.00039 0.000 0.00174 0.000 0.00036 0.001
promotion*tenure
See footnotes to table 5.3a.
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
87 C o lu m n s (1 ) contain  m arginal e ffec ts , w ith standard errors in brackets. C olu m n s (2 ) contain  p -va lu es. 
E stim ation s are adjusted for c lustering by individual.
88 Results are estimated to 3 digits, with further digits only added if P-value < 0.100. For instance, this 
is the case with the interaction variablepromotion*temire.
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The reported results for control variables show that age (modelled in a 
quadratic form) only appears to be significant for men’s training if they are not split 
by occupation or sector. Overall, men have a higher probability of being trained as 
they advance in their careers but marginal effects are less than 1 pp. Marital status 
also only impacts on men’s probability of training, with non married, single or 
widowed men being less likely to receive training than their married counterparts. 
This finding is consistent with the literature observing differences in labour market 
attachment with regard to marital status: married workers tend to have increased 
responsibilities and higher attachment to their work, hence they would have a higher 
probability of promotion. As signalled in the extant literature, education enters 
strongly significantly in both models for women and men. A possible anecdotal 
finding is that the category of employees most likely to receive training are those with 
higher education degrees who find themselves working in non-professional
89occupations (marginal effect 18 pp).
Of notable importance is the finding that lower education levels are 
negatively related to the probability of training, i.e. those with low educational 
attainment have a negative probability of training.90 This reinforces the hypothesis 
that the lower skilled may find themselves trapped in a vicious cycle of learning 
(marginal effects for those with less than O level are bigger for men, at around 8 pp as 
opposed to around 6 pp for women). Tenure does not appear to have an impact on 
probability of being trained with current employer. However, this result could be
89 This raises the issue o f  returns to education versus returns to training, an issue which has been 
considered beyond the scope o f  this study.
90 In the American market, Finegold et al 2005 finds that educated and experienced individuals are 
more likely to be offered training, but lower-skilled individuals are more likely to take training when it 
is offered and spend more hours on it.
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explained by the fact that the current spell of employment would by default imply that 
tenure had not yet been accumulated with the current employer. Overtime hours 
appear to be used as a signal by employers with regard to allocation of training to 
women. This is only the case for men in professional occupations. As a positive by­
product of union membership, there is a strong positive correlation between being a 
union member and an increase in probability of being trained (marginal effects are 
around 5 pp across genders). This is consistent with some previous results in the 
literature (e.g. Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Heyes and Stuart 1998). Similarly, the 
larger the company size, the higher the probability of being trained, probably since 
larger organisations can allocate more resources for this purpose. Working part-time 
is negatively associated with male training, but this result is smaller for females. 
Finally, working on temporary contracts appears to have a strong negative impact on 
training, with the largest impact out of all control variables (up to 18 pp for 
professional women) and irrespective of gender, sector or occupation. These findings 
are very much in line with the UK-based study by Sutherland (2004) who used the 
WERS 98 and finds, in contrast to Green (1999), that are statistically significant 
differences between training incidence with respect to types of employment contract: 
those on a temporary or fixed term contract are 12 pp less likely to receive training 
than those on permanent contracts.
Turning to the determinants of promotion (Table 5.4), training offered in 
any two previous employment spells of the sample, either by current or previous 
employers, is either not significantly associated with male and female promotions or 
is correlated with a marginal effect of less than 3 pp. This suggests that it is the most 
recent training that is relevant for promotion, and reinforces the link between training
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and promotion observed contemporaneously in both Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Firstly, an 
interpretation is that any prior training would already have been incorporated in 
earlier promotions. Hence, previous promotions (with current or previous employer) 
could be associated with recent promotion, but earlier training has a smaller effect. 
Secondly, it can be observed that, in spite of the small marginal effects, these results 
on training offer further support for the cherry picking hypothesis. This support is in 
the fact that there is consistency across gender, sector and occupation with regard to 
the significant positive association between training with the same employer 2 to 3 
spells ago (t-2) and recent promotion, so employers seem to “cherry pick” by 
promoting those who have been trained (and, if employers can be assumed to 
carefully pre-plan the long-term training and promotion candidates, it could also seem 
that employers give preferential training treatment only to those employees whom 
they intend to promote).
245
Table 5.4a. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent promotion with current employer for male employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter) 
All Private sector Professional Nc
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2)
Training with 































































































































collinear, which validates the current estimation format o f  the models including both lags.
An important result from Table 5.4a is that men are more likely to be 
promoted if they have been promoted up to two employment spells earlier {Promotion 
with same employer t-1 has marginal effects between 6 and 9 pp), provided this 
promotion occurred with the current employer. A previous promotion with another 
employer, between one and two years ago, tends to be an inferior signal of worker 
ability and quality of job match compared to previous promotion with the current
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employer. This signal being inferior shows that promotion with previous employer is 
not even significantly associated with current promotion, apart for males taken in 
general where it has a lower value of 4.1 pp compared with 6.6 pp for promotion with 
same employer in t-1. The main exception from previous promotion being an inferior 
signal are males in non-professional occupation: they are more likely to be promoted 
with the current employer if they have been promoted with the previous employer (8.8 
pp) than if they have been promoted with the current employer (6.8 pp)
For men only, a promotion with the same employer even two to three 
spells of employment ago {t-2) remains positively associated with promotion. Hence, 
the signal offered by internal promotion is persistent. This is because promotion with 
the current employer two to three spells of employment ago, backed up by further 
tenure and experience with the firm, is regarded positively by the employer. Judging 
by a worker’s tenure and experience, if the worker has shown loyalty and 
commitment to the firm, then promotions raise the quality of the job match or 
demonstrate the quality of the match. These results supply empirical support to the 
internal labour market theory which postulates that employers rely on internal job 
ladders to promote workers (Doeringer and Piore 1971).91
For female employees, there is somewhat weaker evidence of internal job
ladders, with the exception of female professionals (marginal effect 5.8 pp, Table
5.4.b). These effects on promotion probabilities are overall smaller than those
obtained for men. In terms of career advancement in the external labour market, this
finding has implications for promotion for all employees, especially in the non­
91 This result goes against the findings from Grimshaw et a t (2001) who analyse 4 large UK  
organisations and suggest that ‘many o f  the “traditional” pillars o f  the internal labour market have been 
dismantled’ (Grimshaw et a l 2001 : 25).
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professional occupations (maximum 8.8 pp for men in Table 5.4a, 7.5 pp for women 
in Table 5.4b). It could be argued that skills in these occupations are less firm- 
specific, more homogeneous and more general and transferable compared to 
professional occupations. Hence, promotion with a previous employer appears to give 
a similar signal of worker ability to promotion with the present employer. Promotion 
with a previous employer more than 2 spells of employment ago is not significantly 
correlated with promotion for both men and women, suggesting that employees 
should capitalise quickly on the higher status achieved after a promotion, as the value 
of their promotion depreciates fast and loses the potential to signal higher ability to 
their employers.
The interaction variable training*tenure is shown to be highly significant 
across genders, sectors and occupation. This provides further evidence in support of 
the hypothesis that employers cherry pick their workers.
A consistent difference between men and women is that Table 5.4b 
reports smaller marginal effects for women compared to Table 5.4a for men. This may 
be the result of other differences between genders affecting the way promotion is 
determined. For instance, less frequent employment spells for women may lead to 
effects of previous or current promotion and training episodes depreciating faster than 
for men.92 The difference between the marginal effects for men and women are 
smaller than 5 pp, a non-zero result which can be interpreted as evidence that women 
are discriminated against with regard to their promotion probability in current
92 Simple data tabulations in the panel provide some support to this suggestion.
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employment. This estimate is in accordance with previous results reported by 
Francesconi (2001) and Booth et al (2003).
Table 5.4b. Probit marginal effects:
Determinants of recent promotion with current employer for female employees 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All________ Private sector_____Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 










Training with same 











Training with same 






























































































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
It can also be noticed that for men, training and promotions variables with 
the same employer accumulate to a higher impact on promotion, whereas for women 
the variables with the relatively higher impact on promotion are training variables. 
This finding is in accordance with Melero (2004), who notes that females’ career
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paths tend to be determined by their human capital, while males rely more on 
promotion mechanisms for determining their career paths.
In terms of the impact of control variables on promotion probabilities with 
the current employer, there is strong evidence to support the fact that age enters 
negatively in an inverted U-shape relationship with promotion (except for 
professionals), suggesting diminishing chances of promotion with career 
advancements with current employer. This may be a consequence of out-or-up 
contracts, an empirical evidence for tournament theory, and could be interpreted as a 
result of having been promoted to the extent that there are not higher positions to fill. 
Marital status has a similar effect on promotion as on training probabilities: for men 
only, being married leads to a higher chance of promotion.
Respondents’ highest educational qualification does not appear to be 
extensively used by employers to signal promotion potential. There are two 
exceptions: (1) employers of female professionals, for whom levels of education 
below higher education are significant in lowering the probability of promotions; and 
(2) employers of non-professional men who seem to use education levels to signal 
increased promotion potential.
There is evidence of highly significant company size effects, larger for 
men than for women, with workers in larger companies being more likely to be 
promoted, possibly due to wider internal job ladders and more complex hierarchical 
organisation. This discrepancy between genders reinforces the assumption (also 
encountered in other estimations in this chapter) that men may have a relatively higher
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knowledge of, or preference for using internal company politics in order to advance 
their careers.
Tenure, union membership and number of overtime hours worked are all 
highly significant for promotion prospects, but the marginal effects are very small 
(under 0.1). Variables that control for the effects of the type of labour contract show, 
broadly, that workers employed in these labour arrangements suffer negative 
consequences with regard to their promotion prospects.
5.4.2. The interdependence between training and promotion
Tables 5.3 and 5.4 have assumed training and promotion to be exogenous 
and have ignored model specification problems related to the interdependence of 
training and promotion, such as the endogeneity of training. To address this, a 
bivariate probit model of training and promotion is estimated using maximum 
likelihood estimation, and results are reported for men in Table 5.5a (Part 1 for trained 
and Part 2 for promoted), and for women in Table 5.5b (Part 1 for trained and Part 2 
for promoted).
Training.
Tables 5.5a (Part 1) and 5.5b (Part 1) further show that training depends largely on 
previous training for all categories in the dataset. This reinforces the conclusion 
reached above, in that an initial training episode generates further training.
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Table 5.5a. Bivariate probit estimates of probability of promotion and training 
coefficients: Male employees. Part 1: Male employees, trained 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
trained trained trained trained
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 











Training with same 



































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
Table 5.5a. Ctnd. Bivariate probit estimates of probability of promotion and training 
coefficients: Male employees. Part 1: Male employees, trained 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
trained trained trained trained
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 















































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
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Table 5.5b. Bivariate probit estimates of probability of promotion and training 
coefficients : Female employees. Part 1: Female employees, trained 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
trained trained trained trained
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 











Training with same 



















































































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
Previous promotions are mainly not related to current training, with the 
exception of promotion with current employer in the previous 1 to 2 spells. An 
interpretation could be that the need for training was addressed prior to promotion, 
hence employees who are promoted are much less likely to be those who benefit from 
contemporaneous training93 - yet another proof of the ‘cherry picking’ hypothesis.
93 It is important to emphasise that contemporaneous training relates to the current promotion spell, 
which could last an undetermined length o f  time.
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Looking at control variables, age men’s probability to be trained decreases 
as they approach retirement age. Age is not significant for women with regard to their 
probability of being trained. Marital status is also only relevant for men, suggesting 
increased promotion probabilities for married employees. Higher education levels are 
associated with higher training incidence across all categories. This may suggest that 
the development of a desire to accumulate knowledge prior to the start of working life 
is a good indicator of the occurrence of further training episodes. Tenure appears to be 
significantly related to training probabilities for male and female professionals, but 
the marginal effects are small. Union membership is positive and highly significant 
across categories, with quite large coefficients, the largest impact being in the private 
sector (0.20 for women in the private sector). The effects of company size, number of 
hours worked and types of contract largely mirror those from Tables 5.3 and 5.4. Men 
working part-time seem to fare the worst with regard to their training probability, 
which is not surprising considering their lower attachment to the firm.
Promotion
Turning to promotion, Tables 5.5a (Part 2) and 5.5b (Part 2) show that 
regardless of gender, sector or occupation, the probability of promotion depends 
mostly on the occurrence of previous promotions with current employer (coefficients 
are highly significant for lag t-1). The finding that promotions tend to depend so 
significantly on previous promotions is evidence that employers tend to use internal 
job ladders.94
94 In so far as the BHPS is constructed, external hiring is picked up in the dataset via controlling for the 
type o f  contract, and variables related to the usage by the company o f  agency, freelance and temporary 
workers.
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For male employees only, promotion in previous 2 to 3 spells (lag t-2) is 
also significantly associated to current promotion, whereas for women this is not so. 
Instead, current promotions here take into account promotions with previous 
employers in spells 1 to 2 .
Table 5.5a. Part 2: Male employees, promoted 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
________________ promoted_______ promoted________promoted_________ promoted
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 











Training with same 



















































































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
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Table 5.5b. Part 2: Female employees, promoted 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 











Training with same 



















































































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
The impact of female previous training on female promotions is bigger 
than the impact of male previous training on male promotions. When training is done 
with the current employer, it is highly significant across all categories in this study 
and has a positive impact on promotion probabilities. This is further evidence for the 
cherry picking hypothesis. However, for men, training episodes with previous 
employers in periods t-1 and t-2 do not have an impact on current promotion.
Control variables entered in these estimations show that age is only 
significant for female promotions (with the exception of professionals), and appears to
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follow an inverted U-shape profile with a maximum around 30 for female 
professionals. This is consistent with women returning to full-time work and 
resumption of career after childbirth. Marital status is significant only for men where 
it impacts positively on their promotion prospects. Education variables broadly show 
that when deciding who gets the promotion, employers would not use education as a 
signal of potential. However, the variables available are not precise enough to cover 
educational achievement in more detail. Tenure is highly significant across categories, 
but the estimated coefficients are small. Thus, promotions are a reward for long- 
service. It is also possible that using tenure (i.e. experience) as a predictor for 
promotion is less costly than using more rigorous and detailed evaluations of worker 
performance. The number of overtime hours worked is an important determinant of 
promotion. This result is consistent with the ‘rat race’ theory of Landers et al. (1996 : 
329) whereby extra ‘billable’ overtime hours worked are perceived by employers as a 
signal of a high level of commitment and increased effort by workers, even if greater 
hours are associated with a diminishing marginal product. Union membership is only 
significant for the promotion prospects of females working in the private sector. The 
impacts of company size and type of employment contract largely mirror those 
obtained in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
The marginal effects in the bivariate probit are higher for most of the 
independent variables and the control variables (sometimes higher by a factor of 3) 
than the marginal effects obtained in the separate probit models for training estimated 
separately from promotion. This original approach taken in this chapter by analysing 
training and promotion in a bivariate probit, expands the extant knowledge on the
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inter-relationship between training and promotion where estimates seem to have been 
very much biased downwards.95
5.4.3. The impact of training and promotion on wages
Tables 5.6 and 5.7 report results from two independent fixed effects wage 
equations where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real weekly wages 
at current prices. In these equations promotion and training are treated as exogenous 
dummy variables.
95 It is not unusual for bivariate probit results to vary in size from univariate probit results. In essence, 
this variation is evidence to the need o f  estimations that also take into account the inter-relations 
between variables. For an example o f  a study within the literature o f  employee-related organisational 
outcomes, in which bivariate probit model results differ from univariate probit model results, see 
Rayton (2006).
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Table 5.6a. OLS fixed effects wage equations: The impact of training on male wages 
(table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter) 
_____________________  All__________Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.000 0.973 -0.006 0.181 0.004 0.534 -0.003 0.600
employer in spell t (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Training with same 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.335 0.009 0.149 0.013 0.025










employer in spell t-2 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Training with 0.007 0.417 0.002 0.837 0.017 0.208 0.005 0.709
previous employer 
in spell t-1
(0.009) (0.010) (0.014) (0.012)
Training with 0.013 0.201 0.012 0.293 0.017 0.231 0.008 0.545
previous employer 
in spell t-2
(0.010) (0.011) (0.014) (0.013)









See footnotes to table 5.3a.
Table 5.6b. OLS fixed effects wage equations: The impact of training on female 
wages (table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-
__________________________________________________________________ professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.018 0.000 0.010 0.144 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.004










employer in spell t-1 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Training with same 0.019 0.000 0.015 0.038 0.014 0.045 0.023 0.001
employer in spell t-2 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Training with 0.044 0.000 0.034 0.012 0.030 0.044 0.039 0.005
previous employer 
in spell t-1
(0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Training with 0.014 0.214 -0.001 0.947 0.022 0.163 0.007 0.663
previous employer 
in spell t-2
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)









See footnotes to table 5.3a.
In Table 5.6, returns to recent training are only significant for women and 
at just over 1.5 %, are somewhat lower than those previously reported in the extant 
studies which do not control for promotion (e.g. Pischke 2001 or Ariga and Brunello 
2006). The inclusion of promotion in the econometric model, which is the main
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original contribution made by this chapter to the literature on training, may have 
reduced returns to training. It may be that the employee needs time to assimilate this 
training, or that it takes time to prove the increased post-training work ability that 
should then be rewarded by higher wages. Thus, employees may have to wait until the 
productivity effects of their training are visible to the employer who then increases 
their wages. Alternatively, it may be that the employers choose to postpone by as 
much as possible the rewarding of such training. To this extent, there could thus be 
evidence of the dual-moral hazard problem exposed in the theoretical section of this 
chapter. It is to be noted that if training raises the productivity levels of workers, then 
workers expect a share of the increased economic rents - otherwise they quit.
For both men and women, there is however more significant evidence that 
previous training spells are reflected in wage level increases over time. For women, 
this is so almost irrespective of whether training episodes were with the previous or 
the current employer, suggesting that female training may be more general. However, 
for men it is only the training with the current employer that accounts for higher 
wages, especially if the time elapsed from a training episode is larger (lag of training 
with same employer t-2). The lack of significant wage effects is especially striking for 
professional male training episodes. It may be that for the highly skilled, further 
access to training does not bring significant wage level increases to a wage that is 
already higher. Additionally, the highly skilled may also have increased access to 
training that is also more costly to the employer, hence the employer could be 
reluctant to pay the double bill of both the training cost and the wage increase.
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From employees’ point of view, these results may also reflect a difference 
in the character / form of training between genders: there is a female preference for or 
collection of more frequent or more relevant training, which then does translate into 
wage increases. This assumption reinforces a similar finding (in Section 5.4.1) above, 
which exposed a possible tendency of women to advance their careers, by pecuniary 
or non-pecuniary advancement, via human capital accumulation. 96 On the contrary, to 
advance in their careers, males resort to the use of promotion mechanisms and achieve 
differentiation via the accumulation of the promotions stock.
The returns to accumulation of promotions in Table 5.6 are all highly 
significant, ranging from 1.7 % for non-professional males to 4.7 % for professional 
females. The relevance of promotions is discussed in more detail below.
Finally, in Table 5.7, returns to recent promotion are in line with findings 
in the literature, ranging across all observations between a minimum of 4.4% for men 
non-professionals (while women’s minimum is of 5.2% for professionals) and a 
maximum of 7 .3% for women non-professionals (while men’s maximum is 6% for 
professionals). Booth et al (2003) found that wage growth for promoted women was 
significantly lower than for promoted men. This disparity, highly relevant for the 
‘glass ceiling’ debate, is observed here for the women professional category. Booth et 
al (2003) derive differential returns to promotion for men and women by estimating 
coefficients on female interaction terms in a pooled wage equation rather than by 
estimating separate male and female equations as in Tables 5.6 and 5.7. The method
96 It may also be that this result reflects the stylised effects o f  female labour market participation, 
whereby females tend to have longer or more often career breaks, hence specialise less and consume 
more frequent training episodes.
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employed in this chapter is less restrictive as it does not impose equality of male and
female coefficients on the control variables.
Table 5.7a. OLS fixed effects wage equations: The impact of promotion on male 
wages (table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter) 
____________________ All________ Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 




































































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
Table 5.7b. OLS fixed effects wage equations: The impact of promotion on female 
wages (table partially presented here -full table is shown at the end of the chapter)
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 




































































See footnotes to table 5.3a.
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The finding that, with the exception of professional women, women’s 
returns to promotion (and especially, non-professional women’s returns being higher 
by 3 pp than their male counterparts) are slightly higher than men’s (even though the 
differences are not significant at 5%), could hide some level of unobserved 
discrepancies in the quality of starting jobs and/or in the level of the labour market 
entrance wage. This could be the result of women catching-up with men as gender 
discrimination in the workplace and in society is reduced and as women gain higher 
qualifications or higher skills through training.
Firstly, with this regard to the quality of starting jobs, it may be that 
women get what appear to be higher post-promotion wage increases when one starts 
from a relatively lower wage -  the wage could be lower due to the so called “joint 
job” searches, whereby the female side of a couple accepts a lower wage in the area 
where her partner finds a job. This is the case in a US study performed by Hersch and 
Viscusi (1996), which observes that women could find themselves constrained to start 
at lower job levels, therefore taking up in jobs with more promotion prospects. 
Additionally, higher jobs to be promoted into are relatively more numerous when one 
starts low.
Secondly, with regard to the entrance on the market, Manning and 
Robinson (2004) use the BHPS and find evidence that the wage gaps between women 
and men are partly related to fact that women working part-time are more likely to be 
amongst the entrants on the labour market. Having started on a relatively lower wage,
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absolute increases in earnings after promotions are thus translated into relatively 
higher percentage point increases for this category of employees.97
Both men and women enjoy positive wage returns to previous promotions 
awarded by the current employer. For instance, the compounded real returns to a male 
professional worker promoted annually over the last three years are 14.8 % and 
equivalent female real returns are rather similar at 13.0 %. It is only these estimated 
female returns that corroborate the findings of Booth et al 2003 on the inferiority of 
female returns to promotion.
However, neither men nor women who were promoted with a previous 
employer one to two years ago continue to experience a post-promotion wage effect 
contemporaneously. Therefore, workers who were rising up a job ladder in another 
organization may have to start on a new wage ladder again at the present firm when 
they switch jobs. This in turn suggests that they may have been unlikely to make 
further career progress with their former employer.
Returns to total training are significantly greater than zero (except for 
female non-professionals where the estimate is not significant), ranging from 0.4 % 
for non-professional males to 1.2 % for male in private employment and with female 
returns in between. These are somewhat lower than returns estimated in models that 
do not control for promotion (Pischke 2001, Ariga and Brunello 2006), and this result 
would have been expected. Therefore this chapter, through its original approach to 
analysing training and promotion, contributes to unearthing evidence that previous
97 Part-time job for non-professional women is significant and positively correlated to wage increases 
in Table 5b.
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estimates of returns to training had conflated training with promotion, therefore their 
estimates were biased upwards.
Control variables for Tables 5.6 and 5.7 show that age is highly significant 
across categories only for females, and enters in an inverted U-shape relationship with 
earnings, with implied maximum wage for males at age 37 and for females at age 60. 
Being married decreases women’s wages, but it increases men’s (coefficients are not 
large), a result previously known in the empirical literature on wages. Education 
variables are very much in accordance with the abundant literature demonstrating 
positive returns to schooling, and results here show that this is more so for women. 
Returns to schooling also appear to be higher than returns to training. Across all 
categories, tenure, working in larger organisations and number of overtime hours 
worked enter highly significant with regard to wages. Workers on other types of 
employment than full-time and permanent are significantly disadvantaged with regard 
to the wages earned by their counterparts.
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5.5. Conclusions and summary
A multi-spell panel of more than 60,000 observations is constructed using 
information on employment spells for over 10,000 individuals followed in the BHPS 
waves from 1991 to 2003. The chapter builds on a theoretical framework that supports 
and encourages more research into understanding the links between training and 
promotion. The original contribution of this chapter stems mainly from aiming to fill 
this gap in the empirical economic literature, and from adding a unique sense of time 
to the analysis: training and promotion are investigated with regard to whether they 
are contemporaneous or in previous employment, as well as to whether they are with 
the previous or the current employer. Inspired by previous research, the chapter 
outlines, tests and finds support for a set of four hypotheses related to training and 
promotion determinants, as well as the wage returns to training and promotion. Three 
types of econometric models are estimated: probit, bivariate probit and OLS with 
fixed effects. The data are split by gender, sector and occupation. Furthermore, the 
richness of these results allows for the discovery of new findings beyond the scope of 
the initial hypotheses.
Training and promotion with the same employer are positively associated. 
Although timing and causation remain unresolved due to the nature of the data 
available, there is a strong indication of cherry-picking behaviour by employers: for 
both men and women, the extent of correlation between promotion and training is 
greater for professional employees than for non-professionals.
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Training generates further training, especially if previous training was 
with the current employer. The two categories of employees likely to receive most 
frequent training episodes are male in professional occupations, and females in the 
private sector.
Prior promotions do not have a significant impact on recent training. 
Having been already promoted, employees are seen as less likely to need 
enhancement of skills. This is further evidence of training as a precedent to 
promotion, showing that the two workplace practices are interlinked, and that cherry- 
picking occurs.
A noteworthy result, which differs from previous research, is that the 
gender discrimination with regard to training access is not observed in the panel based 
on BHPS data. This confirms the more recent results reported by Green and Zanchi 
(1997) who maintain that there has been convergence between genders with regard to 
training access in Britain.
With regard to the determinants of current promotion, it is estimated that 
for both men and women training is significantly associated with the likelihood of 
promotion and that previous training, one to three years ago, is rather irrelevant for 
recent promotion. Also, previous promotions (but mostly promotions with current 
employer for male) generate further promotion. This finding is true for both genders, 
with the sole exception being non-professional workers.
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This chapter finds only very little evidence that women are discriminated 
against with regard to promotion prospects with current employer. The difference 
between genders is modest, at less than 5 pp difference in women’s promotion 
probability within current employment. Results from a bivariate model which allows 
for the endogeneity of training and promotion reinforce the findings from the two 
independent probit models.
Estimations of the wage levels as they change over time show that recent 
training does not translate into substantial wage increases in the same period of time. 
It could be that the signal of increased post-training ability takes time to manifest 
itself. Alternatively, employers may intentionally postpone the due increase in wage, 
as suggested by the dual-moral hazard problem. For both men and women, there is 
however significant evidence that previous training spells are reflected in wages 
increases. Some of the results may be interpreted as proof for a possible tendency of 
women to advance their careers (by pecuniary or non-pecuniary advancement) via 
human capital accumulation.
Finally, with regard to returns to recent promotion, wage growth for 
promoted women is shown to only be lower than for promoted men in the case of 
women in professional occupations. This finding could hide unobserved discrepancies 
in the quality of the starting jobs and/or in the level of the labour market entrance 
wage for women. Both men and women enjoy positive returns to previous promotions 
awarded by the current employer. However, neither men nor women who were 
promoted with a previous employer one to two years ago continue to experience a 
post-promotion wage effect contemporaneously.
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A welcome improvement to the BHPS dataset would be the addition of 
questions that allow for the timing of employment and training spells, as well as the 
content of training to be better ascertained. Moreover, a question that specifically 
addresses the incidence of promotion by asking the incumbent whether he/she has 
been promoted, would be crucial for further research advancements on this topic. 
Further advancements to this study could be obtained by using a union -  non-union 
data split, or an industry split based on whether the firm is or is not in the production 
sector.
This chapter is only the beginning of research into the time-effects of 
training and promotion. It is evident that there is a wealth of unexplored factors and 
links still waiting to be discovered. The set of results obtained above may prove to 
have wide-ranging applications for policy makers, firms and employees, as well as 
advancing the currently limited understanding of the relationship between training and 
promotion in the labour market.
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Summary for Chapter V
• Studying the previously under-researched relationship between training and 
promotion allows an insight into, and an analysis of, the decisions made by firms with 
respect to training and promotion.
• The contributions of this chapter are:
- contributing to closing the gap in the literature on the link between training and 
promotion. There are many original findings such as the fact that returns to training in 
the extant literature are biased upwards due to other studies conflating training with 
promotion;
- analysing the time dimensionality of when training and promotion occur, and the 
way they precede or succeed each other within the employment relationship with the 
same or the previous employer -  an original feature of this study;
- exploiting the potential of the British Household Panel Survey to offer information 
on the chosen topic of research. A multi-spell panel of more than 60,000 observations 
is constructed, spanning 13 years (1991 -  2003) of employment records in Britain for 
over 10,000 individuals.
• The hypotheses tested are:
(1) employers offer training to those whom they intend to promote: there is a positive 
and significant relationship between the probability of being trained at present, on one 
side, and the history of training and promotion episodes on the other side;
(2) employers use training as a filter for searching for promotable employees: the 
probability of being promoted is higher after training. Recent training has a positive 
and statistically significant impact on the likelihood of being promoted;
(3) the occurrence of training has a positive and statistically significant effect on the 
level of wages;
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(4) the occurrence of promotion has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
the level of wages as they change over time.
• The models use two dependent variables: training with current employer, and 
promotion with current employer. Models for recent training and promotion with 
current employer are generated as two independent regressions, then as 
interdependent regressions. In the end, a fixed effects model estimates the effect of 
recent training and promotion with current employer on earnings (real wages).
• Main findings, supporting all four hypotheses, show that:
- promotion with the same employer is related to training with the same employer 
with marginal effects between 18 pp (for male non-professionals) and almost 30 pp 
(for female professionals);
- the probability of training increases if the previous training episode was with the 
current employer, a variable which is a strong predictor of recent training. Marginal 
effects for men are between 22 pp and 27 pp, and between 19 pp and 23 pp for 
women;
- a gender discrimination expectation (constructed merely based on the extant 
literature) with regard to the probability of being trained is not supported by BHPS 
data. In fact, there has been convergence between genders with regard to training 
access in Britain;
- it is the most recent training, as opposed to past training with the current or previous 
employer, that is relevant for promotion;
- for men, training and promotions variables with the same employer accumulate to a 
higher impact on promotion, whereas for women the variables with the relatively 
higher impact on promotion are training variables. This could suggest that females
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career paths tend to be determined by their human capital, while males rely more on 
promotion mechanisms;
- the probability of promotion depends mostly on the occurrence of previous 
promotions with current employer. This is regardless of gender, sector or occupation;
- the wage returns to recent training are only significant for women and score at just 
over 1.5 %. For both men and women, there is however more significant evidence that 
previous training spells are reflected in wages increases;
- returns to total training are significantly greater than zero, ranging from 0.4 % for 
non-professional males to 1.2 % for male in private employment and with female 
returns in between. These are somewhat lower than returns estimated in models that 
do not control for promotion. Therefore this chapter, through its original approach to 
analysing training and promotion, contributes to unearthing evidence that previous 
estimates of returns to training had conflated training with promotion, therefore their 
estimates were biased upwards;
- the wage returns to accumulation of promotions are all highly significant, ranging 
from 1.7 % for non-professional males to 4.7 % for professional females;
- both men and women enjoy positive real wage returns to previous promotions 
awarded by the current employer. For instance, the compounded returns to a male 
professional worker promoted annually over the last three years are 14.8% and 
equivalent female returns are rather similar at 13.0%. However, neither men nor 
women who were promoted with a previous employer one to two years ago continue 





Determinants of recent training with current employer for male employees
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.208 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.224 0.000 0.179 0.000
same employer in (0 .020) (0 .022) (0.026) (0.030)
spell t
Training with same 0.246 0.000 0.238 0.000 0.270 0.000 0.227 0.000
employer in spell t- 
1
Training with same
(0.008) (0.009) (0 .011) (0 .010)
0.087 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.111 0.000 0.069 0.000
employer in spell t- (0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0 .010)
Training with 0.222 0.000 0.195 0.000 0.285 0.000 0.171 0.000
previous employer (0.018) (0.019) (0.026) (0 .022)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.052 0.002 0.053 0.003 0.045 0.120 0.060 0.003
previous employer (0.017) (0.019) (0.030) (0 .021)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.009 0.458 0.002 0.888 -0.003 0.877 0.022 0.216
same employer in (0 .012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019)
spell t-1
Promotion with -0.005 0.679 -0.001 0.963 -0.015 0.399 0.004 0.822
same employer in (0.013) (0.014) (0.018) (0.019)
spell t-2
-o.ooo"Promotion with -0.003 0.949 -0.016 0.795 -0.020 0.797 0.998
previous employer (0.055) (0.061) (0.077) (0.086)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.053 0.382 -0.049 0.458 -0.113 0.172 0.028 0.750
previous employer (0.057) (0.061) (0.077) (0.090)
in spell t-2
Interaction 0.00027 0.000 0.00026 0.001 0.00034 0.001 0.00016 0.115
promotion * tenure (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Personal , job and workplace characteristics
Age -0.007 0.001 -0.007 0.002 -0.006 0.174 -0.007 0.003
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0.004) (0 .002)
Age squared 0.005 0.041 0.005 0.066 0.005 0.378 0.005 0.090
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Not married -0.020 0.015 -0.019 0.029 -0.018 0.196 -0.021 0.027
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0 .010)
98 C o lu m n s (1 ) contain  m arginal effects , w ith standard errors in brackets. C olum ns (2 ) contain  p -values. 
E stim ation s are adjusted for clustering by individual.
99 Results are estimated to 3 digits, with further digits only added if P-value < 0.100. For instance, this 
is the case with the interaction variable p r o m o t i o n * t e n u r e .
100 C ontrols are a lso introduced for: num ber o f  dependent children, health status (d isab led ), sm oker, standard 
industry category , standard occu pation  category, region o f  residence, com pan y sector and year du m m ies.
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Table 5.3a. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: Higher 0.013 0.541 0.069 0.008 0.000 0.991 0.043 0.364
degree (0 .021) (0.027) (0.028) (0.050)
Education: First 0.060 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.056 0.004 0.055 0.003
degree (0.013) (0.014) (0 .020) (0 .020)
Education: Other 0.067 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.043 0.020 0.078 0.000
higher qualification (0 .010) (0.018) (0 .011)
Education: GCE A 0.024 7 0.025 0.027 0.014 0.025 0.256 0.022 0.046
level (0 .011) (0 .011) (0 .022) (0 .011)
Education: Less -0.086 0.000 -0.076 0.000 -0.087 0.001 -0.078 0.000
than 0  level or (0 .010) (0.025) (0 .010)
other
Company size: 25- 0.036 0.000 0.039 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.020 0.025
99 (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.009)
Company size: 0.056 0.000 0.068 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.042 0.000
100-499 (0.009) (0 .010) (0.015) (0 .010)
Company size: over 0.082 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.066 0.000
500 (0 .010) (0 .012) (0.016) (0 .012)
Tenure 0.000 0.510 0.000 0.471 0.000 0.196 0.000 0.635
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.074 0.000 -0.058 0.004 -0.075 0.026 -0.068 0.001
(0.017) (0.019) (0.032) (0.018)
Temporary contract -0.120 0.000 -0.104 0.000 -0.145 0.014 -0.111 0.000
(0.017) (0.017) (0.052) (0.015)
Fixed-term contract -0.094 0.000 -0.078 0.000 -0.130 0.000 -0.068 0.001
(0.015) (0.018) (0.027) (0.018)
No. of hours -0.001 0.035 -0.001 0.210 -0.001 0.279 -0.001 0.082
normally worked (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .000)
per week
0.813No. of overtime 0.001 0.051 0.001 0.207 0.002 0.009 0.000
hours in normal (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .000)
week
Union member 0.053 0.000 0.062 0.000 0.057 0.000 0.046 0.000















Determinants of recent training with current employer for female employees
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.286 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.292 0.000 0.246 0.000
same employer in (0 .021) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031)
spell t
Training with same 0.221 0.000 0.191 0.000 0.235 0.000 0.208 0.000
employer in spell t- 
1
Training with same
(0.007) (0 .010) (0 .012) (0.009)
0.093 0.000 0.079 0.000 0.120 0.000 0.081 0.000
employer in spell t-
9
(0.008) (0 .010) (0.014) (0 .010)
Training with 0.215 0.000 0.210 0.000 0.182 0.000 0.234 0.000
previous employer (0.017) (0 .020) (0.025) (0 .021)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.071 0.000 0.035 0.054 0.063 0.025 0.080 0.000
previous employer (0.017) (0.019) (0.028) (0 .021)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.015 0.246 0.043 0.003 0.002 0.908 0.029 0.082
same employer in (0.013) (0.015) (0 .021) (0.017)
spell t-1
Promotion with -0.019 0.181 -0.014 0.361 -0.015 0.497 -0.021 0.235
same employer in (0.014) (0.015) (0 .022) (0.017)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.083 0.089 0.031 0.578 0.137 0.078 0.048 0.425
previous employer (0.051) (0.057) (0.076) (0.063)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.003 0.953 -0.019 0.752 -0.079 0.252 0.077 0.259
previous employer (0.049) (0.059) (0.068) (0.074)
in spell t-2
Interaction 0.00157 0.000 0.00039 0.000 0.00174 0.000 0.00036 0.001
promotion* tenure (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Personal., job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.002 0.344 -0.003 0.224 0.006 0.182 0.001 0.712
(0 .002) (0 .002) (0.005) (0 .002)
Age squared -0.003 0.262 0.002 0.404 -0.007 0.231 -0.002 0.402
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
Not married -0.007 0.364 -0.004 0.601 -0.005 0.712 -0.010 0.203
(0.007) (0.008) (0.014) (0.008)
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Table 5.3b. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: Higher 0.001 0.947 0.050 0.176 -0.027 0.356 0.182 0.001
degree (0 .022) (0.039) (0.029) (0.063)
Education: First 0.033 0.008 0.007 0.632 0.032 0.129 0.033 0.049
degree (0.013) (0.015) (0 .021) (0.017)
Education: Other 0.083 0.000 0.070 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.080 0.000
higher qualification (0.009) (0 .011) (0.019)
Education: GCE A 0.031 0.004 0.030 0.005 0.031 0.237 0.027 7 0.010
level (0 .011) (0 .011) (0.026) (0 .011)
Education: Less -0.061 0.000 -0.044 0.000 -0.052 0.093 -0.056 0.000
than 0  level or (0 .010) (0 .010) (0.031) (0.009)
other
Company size: 25- 0.026 0.001 0.034 0.000 0.049 0.001 0.015 0.057
99 (0.008) (0.009) (0.015) (0.008)
Company size: 0.042 0.000 0.066 0.000 0.025 0.127 0.044 0.000
100-499 (0.009) (0 .010) (0.017) (0.009)
Company size: over 0.044 0.000 0.095 0.000 0.032 0.063 0.054 0.000
500 (0 .010) (0.013) (0.018) (0 .011)
Tenure 0.000 0.342 0.000 0.810 0.000 0.477 0.000 0.553
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.026 0.015 -0.010 0.414 -0.028 0.163 -0.020 0.092
(0 .010) (0 .012) (0 .020) (0 .012)
Temporary contract -0.129 0.000 -0.113 0.000 -0.180 0.000 -0.107 0.000
(0 .012) (0 .012) (0.033) (0 .011)
Fixed-term contract -0.040 0.017 -0.003 0.912 -0.071 0.010 -0.009 0.668
(0.016) (0.026) (0.027) (0 .021)
No. of hours 0.001 0.008 0.001 0.061 0.001 0.200 0.001 0.022
normally worked (0 .000) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001)
per week
No. of overtime 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000
hours in normal (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .001)
week
Union member 0.053 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.046 0.000















Determinants of recent promotion with current employer for male employees
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 0 ) (2)
Training with 0.064 0.000 0.069 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.045 0.000
same employer in (0.005) (0.006) (0 .010) (0.006)
spell t
Training with 0.005 0.074 0.005 0.100 0.003 0.589 0.005 0.059
same employer in (0.003) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
spell t-1
Training with 0.014 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.022 0.001 0.010 0.002
same employer in (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
spell t-2
Training with 0.000 0.958 0.005 0.428 -0.004 0.786 0.000 0.990
previous employer (0.006) (0.007) (0.014) (0.006)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.004 0.509 0.004 0.526 0.028 0.065 -0.008 0.247
previous employer (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.006)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.066 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.068 0.000
same employer in (0.007) (0.008) (0 .012) (0 .011)
spell t-1
Promotion with 0.013 0.008 0.013 0.017 0.021 0.043 0.017 0.009
same employer in (0.006) (0.006) (0 .011) (0.008)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.041 0.088 0.031 0.259 0.020 0.643 0.088 0.014
previous employer (0.030) (0.034) (0.046) (0.057)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.001 0.959 -0.010 0.711 -0.016 0.660 0.003 0.926
previous employer (0 .020) (0.024) (0.033) (0.037)
in spell t-2
Interaction 0.00011 0.000 0.00012 0.000 0.00019 0.000 0.00007 0.000
training*tenure (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Personal,, job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.001 0.333 0.000 0.608 -0.001 0.775 0.001 0.121
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .001)
Age squared -0.003 0.009 -0.003 0.038 -0.003 0.379 -0.003 0.014
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0.003) (0 .001)
Not married -0.010 0.001 -0.011 0.001 -0.023 0.001 -0.005 0.151
(0.003) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
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Table 5.4a. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) 0 )
Education: Higher 0.002 0.705 -0.001
degree (0.007) (0.007)
Education: First 0.008 0.079 0.005
degree (0.005) (0.005)
Education: Other 0.004 0.351 0.001
higher (0.004) (0.004)
qualification
Education: GCE A 0.001 0.898 -0.002
level (0.004) (0.004)
Education: Less -0.001 0.749 -0.005
than O level or (0.004) (0.005)
other
Company size: 25- 0.018 0.000 0.015
99 (0.004) (0.004)
Company size: 0.027 0.000 0.026
100-499 (0.004) (0.005)
Company size: 0.030 0.000 0.029
over 500 (0.005) (0.006)
Tenure 0.00006 0.000 0.00005
(0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.011 0.195 -0.017
(0.007) (0.008)
Temporary -0.043 0.000 -0.043
contract (0.002) (0.002)
Fixed-term -0.029 0.000 -0.026
contract (0.004) (0.006)
No. of hours 0.000 0.915 -0.000
normally worked (0 .000) (0 .000)
per week
No. of overtime 0.001 0.000 0.001
hours in normal (0 .000) (0 .000)
week
Union member 0.001 0.762 0.002
(0.003) (0.004)




























































































0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0 .000) (0 .000)
0.004 0.586 -0.004 0.184
(0.007)________ (0.003)
Observations 29638 23406 11387 18251






Determinants of recent promotion with current employer for female employees
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.056 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.093 0.000 0.041 0.000
employer in spell t (0.005) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
Training with same 0.007 0.003 0.010 0.002 0.006 0.311 0.008 0.001
employer in spell t- 
1
Training with same
(0 .002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003)
0.013 0.000 0.013 0.000 0.028 0.000 0.007 0.005
employer in spell t- 
o
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.003)
Training with 0.009 0.068 0.010 0.092 0.028 0.036 0.002 0.714
previous employer (0.005) (0.006) (0.015) (0.004)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.003 0.587 0.006 0.354 -0.006 0.653 0.006 0.238
previous employer (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.006)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.038 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.040 0.000
same employer in (0.006) (0.006) (0 .012) (0.008)
spell t-1
Promotion with 0.002 0.617 -0.003 0.451 0.000 0.965 0.004 0.402
same employer in (0.004) (0.004) (0 .010) (0.005)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.043 0.005 0.052 0.016 0.015 0.608 0.075 0.000
previous employer (0 .021) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.003 0.795 0.003 0.858 -0.018 0.558 0.003 0.815
previous employer (0 .012) (0 .020) (0.028) (0.016)
in spell t-2
Interaction 0.00010 0.000 0.00011 0.000 0.00022 0.000 0.00001 0.000
training* tenure (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Personal Jo b  and workplace characteristics
Age 0.001 0.037 0.002 0.013 0.004 0.100 0.001 0.037
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .001)
Age squared -0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.001 -0.007 0.021 -0.002 0.010
(0 .001) (0 .001) (0.003) (0 .001)
Not married -0.003 0.140 -0.002 0.450 -0.002 0.764 -0.004 0.070
(0 .002) (0.003) (0.006) (0 .002)
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Table 5.4b. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
0 ) (2) (1)
Education: Higher -0.001 0.840 0.003
degree (0.006) (0.010)
Education: First -0.002 0.601 -0.004
degree (0.003) (0.004)
Education: Other 0.000 0.969 0.001
higher (0.003) (0.003)
qualification
Education: GCE A 0.005 0.148 0.003
level (0.004) (0.004)
Education: Less -0.003 0.364 -0.005
than O level or (0.003) (0.004)
other
Company size: 25- 0.004 0.101 0.009
99 (0.003) (0.003)
Company size: 0.009 0.002 0.013
100-499 (0.003) (0.004)
Company size: 0.012 0.000 0.013
over 500 (0.003) (0.005)
Tenure 0.00004 0.000 0.00004
(0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.023 0.000 -0.026
(0.003) (0.004)
Temporary -0.024 0.000 -0.029
contract (0.003) (0.003)
Fixed-term -0.016 0.001 -0.015
contract (0.004) (0.006)
No. of hours 0.00028 0.00016
normally worked 0.042 0.415
per week (0 .000) (0 .000)
No. of overtime 0.001 0.000 0.001
hours in normal (0 .000) (0 .000)
week
Union member 0.003 0.296 0.006
(0 .002) (0.004)
















































































































Bivariate probit estimates of probability of promotion and training coefficients :
Male employees
Part 1: Male employees, trained
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
trained trained trained trained
0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.690 0.000 0.696 0.000 0.703 0.000 0.685 0.000
employer in spell t- 
1
(0 .021) (0.024) (0.030) (0.028)
Training with same 0.257 0.000 0.249 0.000 0.296 0.000 0.228 0.000
employer in spell t- (0 .022) (0.026) (0.032) (0.032)
Training with 0.594 0.000 0.549 0.000 0.727 0.000 0.502 0.000
previous employer (0.044) (0.049) (0.069) (0.059)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.154 0.001 0.166 0.002 0.132 0.079 0.185 0.004
previous employer (0.048) (0.054) (0.075) (0.064)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.077 0.030 0.055 0.172 0.041 0.350 0.126 0.031
same employer in (0.035) (0.040) (0.044) (0.058)
spell t-1
Promotion with -0.006 0.888 0.011 0.811 -0.030 0.527 0.028 0.662
same employer in (0.039) (0.045) (0.048) (0.065)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.030 0.854 -0.020 0.920 -0.030 0.883 0.069 0.810
previous employer (0.162) (0.199) (0 .202) (0.289)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.168 0.369 -0.179 0.419 -0.324 0.152 0.088 0.757
previous employer (0.186) (0 .221) (0.226) (0.285)
in spell t-2
Personal, job and workplace characteristics
Age -0.021 0.001 -0.023 0.001 -0.018 0.094 -0.023 0.003
(0.006) (0.007) (0 .011) (0.008)
Age squared 0.015 0.044 0.016 0.070 0.015 0.273 0.016 0.100
(0.008) (0.009) (0.013) (0 .010)
Not married -0.065 0.008 -0.067 0.017 -0.055 0.130 -0.076 0.021
(0.025) (0.028) (0.036) (0.033)
Education: Higher 0.040 0.510 0.206 0.008 -0.003 0.969 0.137 0.369
degree (0.061) (0.078) (0.073) (0.152)
Education: First 0.177 0.000 0.163 0.000 0.137 0.006 0.187 0.002
degree (0.036) (0.041) (0.050) (0.059)
Education: Other 0.198 0.000 0.229 0.000 0.107 0.025 0.258 0.000
higher qualification (0.027) (0.031) (0.048) (0.033)
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Table 5.5a. Continued
Part 1. Continued .
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
trained trained trained trained
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: GCE A 0.072 0.023 0.087 0.013 0.061 0.291 0.077 0.039
level (0.032) (0.035) (0.058) (0.037)
Education: Less -0.269 0.000 -0.259 0.000 -0.231 0.001 -0.282 0.000
than 0  level or (0.033) (0.036) (0.070) (0.037)
other
Company size: 25- 0.116 0.000 0.130 0.000 0.168 0.000 0.076 0.013
99 (0.024) (0.027) (0.039) (0.031)
Company size: 0.180 0.000 0.228 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.154 0.000
100-499 (0.026) (0.029) (0.039) (0.033)
Company size: 0.248 0.000 0.343 0.000 0.260 0.000 0.228 0.000
over 500 (0.028) (0.033) (0.041) (0.037)
Tenure 0.00017 0.041 0.000 0.639 0.00023 0.007 0.000 0.949
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.243 0.000 -0.210 0.003 -0.203 0.027 -0.264 0.000
(0.059) (0.070) (0.092) (0.076)
Temporary contract -0.449 0.000 -0.425 0.000 -0.458 0.007 -0.481 0.000
(0.068) (0.076) (0.170) (0.075)
Fixed-term contract -0.335 0.000 -0.301 0.000 -0.407 0.000 -0.273 0.000
(0.057) (0.073) (0.083) (0.077)
No. of hours -0.003 0.034 -0.002 0.200 -0.002 0.330 -0.003 0.065
normally worked (0 .001) (0.001) (0 .002) (0 .002)
per week
No. of overtime 0.003 0.016 0.002 0.085 0.006 0.002 0.001 0.642
hours in normal (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0 .002)
week
Union member 0.157 0.000 0.197 0.000 0.154 0.000 0.150 0.000
(0.022) (0.028) (0.035) (0.028)
Constant -0.475 0.000 -0.545 0.000 -0.428 0.066 -0.305 0.070
(0.133) (0.150) (0.233) (0.168)
Observations 29638 23406 11387 18251
Rho 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
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Table 5.5a. Continued










(1) (2) (1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.127 0.000 0.132 0.000 0.098 0.011 0.157 0.000
employer in spell t- 
1
Training with same
(0.029) (0.033) (0.039) (0.043)
0.150 0.000 0.174 0.000 0.150 0.000 0.156 0.001
employer in spell t-
2
(0.031) (0.035) (0.041) (0.047)
Training with 0.073 0.241 0.118 0.082 0.067 0.434 0.056 0.536
previous employer (0.062) (0.068) (0.086) (0.090)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.051 0.437 0.052 0.472 0.158 0.067 -0.116 0.310
previous employer (0.066) (0.073) (0.086) (0.114)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.504 0.000 0.477 0.000 0.453 0.000 0.635 0.000
same employer in (0.040) (0.045) (0.049) (0.065)
spell t-1
Promotion with 0.130 0.008 0.133 0.014 0.123 0.043 0.214 0.010
same employer in (0.049) (0.054) (0.060) (0.084)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.346 0.070 0.270 0.248 0.127 0.605 0.727 0.012
previous employer (0.191) (0.233) (0.246) (0.289)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.033 0.880 -0.131 0.682 -0.150 0.529 0.061 0.909
previous employer (0.219) (0.321) (0.238) (0.532)
in spell t-2
Personal , job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.005 0.622 0.000 0.985 -0.009 0.531 0.014 0.263
(0.009) (0 .011) (0.015) (0.013)
Age squared -0.028 0.023 -0.024 0.088 -0.011 0.546 -0.036 0.032
(0 .012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017)
Not married -0.122 0.000 -0.133 0.000 -0.152 0.000 -0.084 0.091
(0.033) (0.038) (0.044) (0.050)
Education: Higher 0.031 0.653 0.009 0.916 -0.108 0.189 -0.021 0.921
degree (0.068) (0.083) (0.082) (0.208)
Education: First 0.101 0.030 0.070 0.174 -0.092 0.138 0.265 0.001
degree (0.047) (0.052) (0.062) (0.080)
Education: Other 0.055 0.164 0.028 0.517 -0.078 0.211 0.139 0.004




All Private sector Professional Non-professional
promoted promoted promoted promoted
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: GCE A 0.019 0.674 -0.001 0.983 -0.091 0.207 0.080 0.152
level (0.046) (0.049) (0.072) (0.056)
Education: Less -0.044 0.352 -0.080 0.126 0.015 0.854 -0.099 0.084
than 0  level or (0.048) (0.052) (0.081) (0.057)
other
Company size: 25- 0.190 0.000 0.172 0.000 0.171 0.000 0.220 0.000
99 (0.036) (0.039) (0.048) (0.054)
Company size: 0.282 0.000 0.280 0.000 0.251 0.000 0.350 0.000
100-499 (0.036) (0.040) (0.050) (0.053)
Company size: 0.306 0.000 0.317 0.000 0.287 0.000 0.355 0.000
over 500 (0.040) (0.046) (0.052) (0.061)
Tenure 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.168 0.086 -0.245 0.044 -0.006 0.965 -0.342 0.026
(0.098) (0.122) (0.135) (0.153)
Temporary contract -0.924 0.000 -0.935 0.000 -0.922 0.014 -0.928 0.000
(0.204) (0.238) (0.401) (0.243)
Fixed-term contract -0.495 0.000 -0.446 0.000 -0.689 0.000 -0.384 0.009
(0.103) (0.128) (0.149) (0.146)
No. of hours -0.000 0.864 -0.001 0.489 0.002 0.274 -0.004 0.179
normally worked (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0.003)
per week
No. of overtime 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.009 0.000
hours in normal (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002)
week
Union member 0.028 0.379 0.045 0.245 0.041 0.349 -0.041 0.357
(0.032) (0.039) (0.044) (0.045)
Constant -1.349 0.000 -1.173 0.000 -0.895 0.003 -1.679 0.000
(0.195) (0.226) (0.299) (0.263)
Observations 29638 23406 11387 18251
Rho 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.30
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
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Table 5.5b.











(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.621 0.000 0.606 0.000 0.602 0.000 0.641 0.000
employer in spell t- 
1
Training with same
(0 .020) (0.029) (0.032) (0.026)
0.271 0.000 0.268 0.000 0.311 0.000 0.265 0.000
employer in spell t-
2
(0 .022) (0.031) (0.035) (0.029)
Training with 0.584 0.000 0.633 0.000 0.478 0.000 0.675 0.000
previous employer (0.042) (0.052) (0.066) (0.053)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.199 0.000 0.122 0.049 0.152 0.032 0.259 0.000
previous employer (0.047) (0.062) (0.071) (0.062)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.085 0.023 0.179 0.000 0.042 0.413 0.145 0.008
same employer in (0.037) (0.048) (0.052) (0.055)
spell t-1
Promotion with -0.053 0.200 -0.050 0.347 -0.039 0.479 -0.068 0.281
same employer in (0.041) (0.053) (0.056) (0.063)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.279 0.044 0.160 0.394 0.350 0.078 0.242 0.212
previous employer (0.138) (0.188) (0.198) (0.194)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.012 0.932 -0.059 0.793 -0.214 0.226 0.256 0.233
previous employer (0.144) (0.226) (0.177) (0.214)
in spell t-2
Personal , job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.004 0.481 -0.010 0.183 0.011 0.339 0.002 0.793
(0.006) (0.008) (0 .011) (0.007)
Age squared -0.007 0.348 0.009 0.363 -0.012 0.390 -0.007 0.443
(0.008) (0 .010) (0.014) (0.009)
Not married -0.021 0.321 -0.015 0.597 -0.011 0.754 -0.037 0.168
(0 .021) (0.029) (0.034) (0.027)
Education: Higher 0.005 0.938 0.183 0.127 -0.076 0.294 0.536 0.001
degree (0.065) (0 .120) (0.072) (0.166)
Education: First 0.100 0.006 0.028 0.585 0.069 0.190 0.117 0.034
degree (0.036) (0.052) (0.053) (0.055)
Education: Other 0.241 0.000 0.236 0.000 0.164 0.001 0.263 0.000




All Private sector Professional Non-professional
trained trained trained trained
0 ) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: GCE A 0.095 0.003 0.109 0.003 0.070 0.280 0.097 0.005
level (0.031) (0.037) (0.065) (0.035)
Education: Less -0.185 0.000 -0.162 0.000 -0.134 0.090 -0.199 0.000
than 0  level or (0.030) (0.036) (0.079) (0.032)
other
Company size: 25- 0.080 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.130 0.001 0.053 0.054
99 (0.023) (0.031) (0.038) (0.028)
Company size: 0.128 0.000 0.233 0.000 0.072 0.080 0.153 0.000
100-499 (0.025) (0.032) (0.041) (0.031)
Company size: 0.137 0.000 0.315 0.000 0.094 0.031 0.182 0.000
over 500 (0.028) (0.039) (0.044) (0.035)
Tenure 0.00027 0.012 0.000 0.177 0.00030 0.025 0.000 0.190
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.084 0.008 -0.045 0.312 -0.085 0.096 -0.073 0.070
(0.031) (0.045) (0.051) (0.040)
Temporary contract -0.461 0.000 -0.527 0.000 -0.502 0.000 -0.461 0.000
(0.050) (0.071) (0.096) (0.058)
Fixed-term contract -0.140 0.006 -0.029 0.760 -0.208 0.003 -0.044 0.542
(0.051) (0.095) (0.070) (0.073)
No. of hours 0.004 0.006 0.004 0.053 0.002 0.210 0.005 0.013
normally worked (0 .001) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002)
per week
No. of overtime 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 0.000
hours in normal (0 .002) (0 .002) (0 .002) (0.003)
week
Union member 0.157 0.000 0.201 0.000 0.138 0.000 0.156 0.000
(0 .022) (0.034) (0.034) (0.029)
Constant -1.184 0.000 -0.943 0.000 -1.245 0.000 -1.116 0.000
(0.130) (0.165) (0.233) (0.154)
Observations 30615 18476 9840 20775
Rho 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
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Table 5.5b. Continued









(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.167 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.104 0.015 0.231 0.000
employer in spell t- 
1
Training with same
(0.031) (0.041) (0.043) (0.044)
0.181 0.000 0.180 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.156 0.002
employer in spell t-
2
(0.034) (0.047) (0.047) (0.049)
Training with 0.187 0.002 0.207 0.005 0.228 0.008 0.128 0.150
previous employer (0.061) (0.074) (0.086) (0.089)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.053 0.454 0.084 0.328 -0.044 0.653 0.145 0.146
previous employer (0.071) (0.086) (0.097) (0 .100)
in spell t-2
Promotion with 0.412 0.000 0.305 0.000 0.364 0.000 0.538 0.000
same employer in (0.046) (0.058) (0.059) (0.070)
spell t-1
Promotion with 0.018 0.745 -0.070 0.325 -0.002 0.973 0.060 0.489
same employer in (0.056) (0.071) (0.072) (0.086)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.452 0.003 0.499 0.015 0.139 0.483 0.787 0.000
previous employer (0.151) (0.205) (0.198) (0 .210)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.056 0.770 0.053 0.839 -0.164 0.514 0.096 0.737
previous employer (0.191) (0.262) (0.251) (0.286)
in spell t-2
Personal, job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.022 0.026 0.028 0.022 0.029 0.071 0.027 0.038
(0 .010) (0 .012) (0.016) (0.013)
Age squared -0.042 0.002 -0.051 0.002 -0.051 0.014 -0.045 0.010
(0.013) (0.016) (0 .021) (0.017)
Not married -0.045 0.154 -0.029 0.491 -0.011 0.811 -0.080 0.070
(0.032) (0.042) (0.045) (0.044)
Education: Higher -0.032 0.729 0.057 0.664 -0.196 0.066 0.076 0.770
degree (0.091) (0.130) (0.106) (0.260)
Education: First -0.015 0.771 -0.052 0.466 -0.219 0.001 0.114 0.203
degree (0.051) (0.071) (0.069) (0.090)
Education: Other 0.028 0.482 0.028 0.574 -0.148 0.017 0.058 0.257




All Private sector Professional Non-professional
promoted promoted promoted promoted
0 ) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: GCE A 0.081 0.077 0.052 0.354 -0.081 0.308 0.149 0.006
level (0.046) (0.056) (0.080) (0.054)
Education: Less -0.063 0.173 -0.084 0.124 -0.044 0.634 -0.092 0.092
than 0  level or (0.047) (0.055) (0.092) (0.054)
other
Company size: 25- 0.068 0.056 0.141 0.002 0.102 0.056 0.030 0.527
99 (0.036) (0.045) (0.053) (0.048)
Company size: 0.136 0.000 0.200 0.000 0.160 0.004 0.109 0.028
100-499 (0.037) (0.047) (0.056) (0.050)
Company size: 0.171 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.183 0.001 0.144 0.012
over 500 (0.041) (0.055) (0.058) (0.058)
Tenure 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000) (0 .000)
Part-time job -0.377 0.000 -0.425 0.000 -0.520 0.000 -0.215 0.002
(0.053) (0.071) (0.082) (0.071)
Temporary contract -0.615 0.000 -0.916 0.000 -0.517 0.009 -0.699 0.000
(0 .121) (0.187) (0.198) (0.155)
Fixed-term contract -0.328 0.000 -0.269 0.070 -0.383 0.002 -0.328 0.025
(0.093) (0.148) (0 .121) (0.146)
No. of hours 0.004 0.030 0.003 0.371 0.001 0.743 0.013 0.000
normally worked (0 .002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003)
per week
No. of overtime 0.014 0.000 0.017 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.020 0.000
hours in normal (0 .002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
week
Union member 0.059 0.081 0.102 0.043 0.037 0.424 0.040 0.409
(0.034) (0.050) (0.047) (0.049)
Constant -1.906 0.000 -1.909 0.000 -1.676 0.000 -2.345 0.000
(0 .201) (0.243) (0.314) (0.269)
Observations 30615 18476 9840 20775
Rho 0.33 0.33 0.31 0.34
See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
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Table 5.6a.
OLS fixed effects wage equations: 
The impact of training on male wages
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
0 ) (2) (1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.000 0.973 -0.006 0.181 0.004 0.534 -0.003 0.600
employer in spell t (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Training with same 0.011 0.009 0.005 0.335 0.009 0.149 0.013 0.025
employer in spell t-1 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Training with same 0.013 0.003 0.012 0.017 0.012 0.052 0.015 0.016
employer in spell t-2 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Training with 0.007 0.417 0.002 0.837 0.017 0.208 0.005 0.709
previous employer (0.009) (0 .010) (0.014) (0 .012)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.013 0.201 0.012 0.293 0.017 0.231 0.008 0.545
previous employer (0 .010) (0 .011) (0.014) (0.013)
in spell t-2
Total Promoted t-1 0.030 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.017 0.010
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)
Personal, job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.079 0.198 0.054 0.562 0.028 0.696 0.027 0.806
(0.062) (0.093) (0.073) (0 .111)
Age squared -0.114 0.000 -0.116 0.000 -0.120 0.000 -0.107 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Not married 0.002 0.816 0.004 0.662 -0.026 0.023 0.030 0.003
(0.008) (0.009) (0 .011) (0 .010)
Education: Higher 0.162 0.000 0.222 0.000 0.055 0.192 -0.038 0.648
degree (0.034) (0.049) (0.042) (0.084)
Education: First 0.146 0.000 0.136 0.000 0.044 0.216 0.158 0.001
degree (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.046)
Education: Other 0.032 0.008 0.018 0.198 -0.020 0.445 0.061 0.000
higher qualification (0 .012) (0.014) (0.027) (0.014)
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Table 5.6a. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
Education: GCE A 
level
Education: Less than 
O level or other 
Company size: 25- 
99
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No. of overtime 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.000
hours in normal (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
week


















Observations 29638 23406 11387 18251
Number of cross­ 5306 4581 2454 4123
wave person 
identifier
R-squared Within 0.37 0.38 0.35 0.37




OLS fixed effects wage equations:
The impact of training on female wages
All Private sector Professional Non­
professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Training with same 0.018 0.000 0.010 0.144 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.004
employer in spell t (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Training with same 0.023 0.000 0.019 0.006 0.019 0.005 0.023 0.000
employer in spell t-1 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Training with same 0.019 0.000 0.015 0.038 0.014 0.045 0.023 0.001
employer in spell t-2 (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Training with 0.044 0.000 0.034 0.012 0.030 0.044 0.039 0.005
previous employer (0.010) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
in spell t-1
Training with 0.014 0.214 -0.001 0.947 0.022 0.163 0.007 0.663
previous employer (0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015)
in spell t-2
Total Promoted t-1 0.043 0.000 0.040 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.040 0.000
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Personal, job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.097 0.000 0.097 0.000 0.203 0.003 0.061 0.040
(0.028) (0.028) (0.069) (0.030)
Age squared -0.079 0.000 -0.087 0.000 -0.096 0.000 -0.069 0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Not married 0.021 0.010 0.030 0.005 0.002 0.847 0.017 0.090
(0.008) (0.013) (0.010)
Education: Higher 0.275 0.000 0.340 7 0.000 0.144 0.004 0.393 0.003
degree (0.042) (0.091) (0.051) (0.134)
Education: First 0.177 0.000 0.215 0.000 0.065 0.094 0.331 0.000
degree (0.026) (0.052) (0.039) (0.046)
Education: Other 0.037 0.006 0.028 0.123 0.055 0.056 0.016 0.321
higher qualification (0.013) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016)
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Table 5.6b. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non­
professional
(1) (2) 0 ) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: GCE A 0.028 0.092 0.042 0.066 0.015 0.690 0.038 0.053
level (0.017) (0.023) (0.039) (0.019)
Education: Less than -0.005 0.798 0.017 0.462 -0.096 0.066 0.015 0.464
0  level or other (0.018) (0.024) (0.052) (0.020)
Company size: 25- 0.070 0.000 0.077 0.000 0.023 0.024 0.078 0.000
99 (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.008)
Company size: 1 GO- 0.103 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.109 0.000
499 (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
Company size: over 0.110 0.000 0.121 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.125 0.000
500 (0.009) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011)
Tenure 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.00035 0.034 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Part-time job -0.213 0.000 -0.163 0.000 -0.312 0.000 -0.079 0.000
(0.008) (0.011) (0.014) (0.010)
Temporary contract -0.083 0.000 -0.108 0.000 -0.182 0.000 -0.062 0.000
(0.011) (0.015) (0.022) (0.013)
Fixed-term contract -0.051 0.000 -0.103 0.000 -0.090 0.000 -0.072 0.000
(0.013) (0.023) (0.016) (0.018)
No. of hours 0.021 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.033 0.000
normally worked per (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
week
No. of overtime 0.005 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.009 0.000
hours in normal (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
week
Union member 0.057 0.000 0.043 0.000 0.034 0.000 0.053 0.000
(0.007) (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)
Constant 1.909 0.077 2.008 0.052 -1.033 0.701 2.502 0.032


















See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
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Table 5.7a.
OLS fixed effects wage equations:
The impact of promotion on male wages
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.050 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.060 0.000 0.044 0.000
same employer in (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011)
spell t
Promotion with 0.041 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.036 0.000 0.051 0.000
same employer in (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.011)
spell t-1
Promotion with 0.040 0.000 0.037 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.023 0.060
same employer in (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.036 0.277 0.015 0.725 0.048 0.234 0.025 0.649
previous employer (0.033) (0.041) (0.041) (0.056)
in spell t-1
Promotion with -0.007 0.834 -0.027 0.517 0.039 0.345 -0.031 0.586
previous employer (0.034) (0.042) (0.042) (0.056)
in spell t-2
Total Trained t-1 0.009 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.006 0.013 0.004 0.073
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Personal, job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.075 0.221 0.046 0.621 0.025 0.734 0.030 0.783
(0.062) (0.093) (0.072) (0.111)
Age squared -0.115 0.000 -0.116 0.000 -0.121 0.000 -0.107 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Not married 0.003 0.718 0.006 0.512 -0.024 0.036 0.031 0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Education: Higher 0.162 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.063 0.141 -0.010 0.905
degree (0.034) (0.049) (0.043) (0.084)
Education: First 0.142 0.000 0.126 0.000 0.047 0.193 0.157 0.001
degree (0.025) (0.032) (0.036) (0.046)
Education: Other 0.031 0.011 0.011 0.420 -0.014 0.586 0.063 0.000
higher qualification (0.012) (0.014) (0.027) (0.014)
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Table 5.7a. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Education: GCE A 0.032 0.028 0.019 0.253 -0.029 0.369 0.065 0.000
level (0.015) (0.017) (0.032) (0.017)
Education: Less than -0.023 0.187 -0.040 0.034 -0.004 0.942 -0.009 0.635
0  level or other (0.017) (0.019) (0.049) (0.019)
Company size: 25- 0.047 0.000 0.055 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.038 0.000
99 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Company size: 1 GO- 0.073 0.000 0.074 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.079 0.000
499 (0.006) (0.007) (0.010) (0.008)
Company size: over 0.086 0.000 0.100 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.097 0.000
500 (0.007) (0.009) (0.011) (0.010)
Tenure 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Part-time job -0.311 0.000 -0.274 0.000 -0.217 0.000 -0.341 0.000
(0.013) (0.016) (0.020) (0.017)
Temporary contract -0.135 0.000 -0.120 0.000 -0.195 0.000 -0.103 0.000
(0.013) (0.014) (0.034) (0.014)
Fixed-term contract -0.056 0.000 -0.057 0.000 -0.038 0.042 -0.061 0.000
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.016)
No. of hours 0.005 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.007 0.000
normally worked per (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
week
No. of overtime 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.009 0.000
hours in normal (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
week
Union member 0.057 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.061 0.000 0.050 0.000
(0.006) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Constant 4.282 0.071 5.375 0.126 7.045 0.015 5.575 0.180


















See footnotes to Table 5.3a.
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Table 5.7b.
OLS fixed effects wage equations:
The impact of promotion on female wages
All Private sector Professional Non-professional
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Promotion with 0.061 0.000 0.067 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.073 0.000
same employer in (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
spell t
Promotion with 0.057 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.052 0.000 0.066 0.000
same employer in (0.009) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
spell t-1
Promotion with 0.041 0.000 0.034 0.006 0.026 0.028 0.054 0.000
same employer in (0.010) (0.012) (0.012) (0.015)
spell t-2
Promotion with 0.014 0.668 0.018 0.676 0.016 0.690 0.033 0.475
previous employer (0.032) (0.043) (0.039) (0.046)
in spell t-1
Promotion with 0.026 0.440 -0.015 0.750 0.036 0.378 0.014 0.772
previous employer (0.033) (0.048) (0.041) (0.050)
in spell t-2
Total Trained t-1 0.006 0.004 0.011 0.000 0.008 0.010 0.001 0.783
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Personal, job and workplace characteristics
Age 0.098 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.213 0.002 0.060 0.045
(0.028) (0.028) (0.069) (0.030)
Age squared -0.080 0.000 -0.088 0.000 -0.101 0.000 -0.070 0.000
(0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004)
Not married 0.020 0.015 0.028 0.007 0.001 0.944 0.017 0.092
(0.008) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
Education: Higher 0.290 0.000 0.349 0.000 0.150 0.003 0.434 0.001
degree (0.042) (0.091) (0.051) (0.134)
Education: First 0.184 0.000 0.207 0.000 0.068 0.078 0.350 0.000
degree (0.026) (0.052) (0.039) (0.046)
Education: Other 0.045 0.001 0.030 0.100 0.066 0.021 0.028 0.073
higher qualification (0.013) (0.018) (0.029) (0.016)
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Table 5.7b. Continued
All Private sector Professional Non-
professional
Education: GCE A 
level
Education: Less than 
O level or other 
Company size: 25- 
99








No. of hours 
normally worked per 
week 
No. of overtime 
































































































































































Observations 30615 18476 9840 20775
Number of cross­ 5457 4041 2329 4425
wave person 
identifier
R-squared Within 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.54






This last chapter of the thesis presents highlights of some research 
challenges along with future potential research avenues, and concludes with an 
overview of the main findings of the analysis conducted in each chapter.
Comparative to extant research, this thesis adds the original insight of 
intending to focus on the employee side of the story while also keeping research in the 
fuller context of cross-sector company / workplace analysis. For instance, Chapter IV 
looks at the impact of HRM practices on both company and employee effort, thereby 
analysing perceptions of workplace effort and employee effort in relation to the same 
set of HRM practices and within the same workplace. Moreover, the challenge in 
analysing attitudinal variables comes from self-reported information, yet the inclusion 
of attitudinal variables in econometric modelling is on the increase in the labour 
economic literature.
To counteract the possible imperfect reliability of the data, more than one 
dataset is used in this thesis at times (e.g. Chapter III uses two datasets) and, 
reassuringly, comparisons of the patterns shown by attitudinal variables from different 
datasets tend to reveal similarities. Future availability of more datasets which address 
research questions aimed at employees, without shying away from the use of 
attitudinal variables, could continue to improve the picture obtained from this thesis 
and enhance our understanding of these relatively under-researched aspects in the 
workplace.
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In terms of type of the datasets and the time range of the studies covered 
in this thesis, both cross-section and panel datasets have been utilised in order to 
analyse the incidence, scope and impact of HRM practices. Researchers would most 
likely welcome panel data, for instance by re-running the CERS which has so far only 
been conducted as a cross-section. The fact that the previously available WERS 
datasets (WIRS 1980, 1984, 1990) did not contain an employee questionnaire meant 
that, for the purpose of this thesis, the other WIRS datasets could not have brought 
more insight into the analysis of employee performance. The recent expansion of the 
WERS series to include WERS 2004 offers a natural continuation of the research 
started in this thesis, with WERS04 being only the second WERS dataset comprising 
an employee questionnaire.
Another suggestion for helping future research is that data contains more 
in-depth detail about how HRM practices are implemented and the ways in which 
they are being used. The vast majority of the extant literature works with one­
dimensional measures of HRM practices, in spite of there being a potentially strong 
argument for the importance of measuring the way a practice is implemented. It is 
however plausible to assume that there is a correlation between the incidence and the 
effective use of a particular practice. Thus, there is an opportunity for commissioning 
ample designs of questionnaires which should in future not only probe for the 
incidence of HRM practices, but also incorporate a measure of the intensity and 
effectiveness with which these practices are implemented.
Future datasets could also be more generous with their industry-specific 
observations. This thesis has intentionally amalgamated industry sectors, while
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conducting separate research for male vs. female, private vs. public sector, or for 
employees in professional vs. non-professional qualifications. The main aim of the 
thesis has been to focus on whether there is an impact of HRM practices on a 
particular organisational measure, hence it was considered appropriate to use a model 
that generalised the findings by deliberately including more than one industry sector 
and occupation. It is believed that the continual expansion of Information Technology, 
corroborated with renewed interest in the topics covered by this thesis, would lead to 
the future development of vastly improved datasets, which would allow researchers to 
conduct more industry-specific analysis without the ubiquitous downside of ending up 
with too few observations.
A final challenge stems directly from the nature of this research: not 
having a unanimously accepted definition and measurement of HRM practices. 
Therefore, setting up a commonly agreed set of definitions and taxonomy for HRM 
practices could be one of the most difficult challenges faced by future researchers, 
but, at the same time, one of the most rewarding, informative and constructive.101
Turning to the summary of this thesis, it conducts research into the impact 
of HRM practices on various aspects of organisational performance in Britain. In view 
of the fast changing business environment and the growing international competition 
faced by British firms, corroborated with an ever-expanding set of practices available 
to HR managers, this thesis aims to expand practitioners’ and academics’ 
understanding of the complex ways in which HRM practices can become an effective
101 Researchers at the Advanced Institute o f Management (AIM) are presently involved in a project that 
aims to create a comprehensive list o f  widely accepted definitions for HRM practices.
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tool for increasing job satisfaction and effort, and decreasing stress and the need to 
work overtime.
As presented in Chapter II, the distinct complexity faced by researchers 
who attempt to work with HRM practices starts at a most-obvious point: there is no 
unanimously accepted definition of an “HRM practice”, nor unanimously accepted 
taxonomy of practices. Therefore, the main challenge is that extant research tends to 
be unsystematic and does not allow for comparisons, due to inconsistent usage and 
measurement of HRM practices. Moreover, as shown in the literature review, the 
main trends exhibited by the extant literature are the predominance of Anglophone 
research, contingency approaches, disparate attempts to classify HRM practices, 
different levels of analysis and study designs (Ichniowski et al 1996), preference 
given to quantitative data (especially financial) and neglecting the employees’ 
insights.
The general conclusion of the literature review is that human resources 
have a critical and irrefutable role in organisational performance (Arthur 1994; 
Huselid 1995; Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi 1997). Therefore, there is a fast 
growing empirical literature aiming to reveal, capture and explain the precise ways in 
which HRM can be used to increase performance. Despite the large number of studies 
on this topic, there is yet no universal agreement over the performance impact of 
single or “bundles” of HRM practices. This thesis attempts therefore to expand the 
present understanding of HRM practices for the benefit of British employees, 
employers, policy makers and other researchers. It also adds a rather novel dimension
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to the previous research by including in the analysis a large set of attitudinal variables 
aimed at portraying the impact of HRM practices on employees in Britain.
Chapter III investigates the impact of HRM practices on performance as 
proxied by self-reported measures of overall job satisfaction, satisfaction with job 
autonomy and satisfaction with pay. Data is jointly used from two sources, providing 
a basis of comparison as well as a viable means of constructing a reliable time frame 
for British organisations at the beginning of the XXI Century. The econometric 
modelling used takes the form of ordered probit models, supported by binomial probit 
models for consistency checks. After controlling for a large number of personal, job 
and firm-related characteristics, several HRM practices raise workers overall job 
satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay, but these effects are not significant when 
union differential effects are taken into account. Satisfaction with pay is higher where 
performance-related pay and seniority-based reward systems are in place. A pay 
structure that is perceived to be unequal is associated with a substantial reduction in 
both non-union members’ overall job satisfaction and their satisfaction with pay. 
Although HRM practices can raise worker job satisfaction, if workplace pay 
inequality widens, some non-union members may experience reduced job satisfaction. 
Close supervision of work is disliked, but workers enjoy some visual assessment of 
their performance, suggesting that some monitoring is desirable. Furthermore, giving 
workers a ‘voice’ through employee involvement schemes has a positive effect on job 
satisfaction. Holding regular meetings with employees to enable them to express their 
views about work is a practice that also has a substantial effect in raising job 
satisfaction. Especially consistent throughout the study is the finding that workers 
enjoy on-going learning, job autonomy and working in teams.
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Chapter IV analyses the impact of HRM practices on the level of both 
company and employee effort as perceived by employee and managers separately. 
Econometric methods used include factor analysis and ordered probit models. Firstly, 
in terms of supervision and ways of monitoring work quality, the practices that are 
found to have a consistent positive impact are: setting competency standards and 
using customer surveys. Secondly, factor analysis is used to identify 3 systems of 
HRM practices most likely to have an impact on effort, including job control, 
consultation, performance related pay and employee-paid training. Additionally, 
training, and communication and consultation appear to have a strong and consistent 
impact on individual effort, while pay equality, benchmarking and strategic planning 
play a major role in increasing company effort. Rather controversially, it is found that 
some practices which decrease the amount of supervised control, such as job 
autonomy, lead to decreases in individual effort, but working from home is associated 
with higher individual effort.
Chapter V uses a panel of individuals from the 13 waves of the British 
Household Panel Survey (1991-2003). It focuses on two workplace practices, training 
and promotion. Splitting the data by gender, sector and occupation, estimations for 
probit, bivariate probit, and fixed effects models are obtained in order to analyse the 
determinants, interrelationships, and wage impact of recent training and promotion 
with current employer. Inspired by previous research, the chapter outlines a set of four 
hypotheses related to training and promotion determinants, as well as the wage returns 
to training and promotion. The main finding is that training and promotion with the 
same employer are positively associated. Although timing and causation remain 
unresolved due to the nature of the data available, there is a strong indication of
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cherry-picking behaviour by employers. Another consistent result is that training 
generates further training, especially if previous training was with the current 
employer. A noteworthy result, breaking apart from previous research, is that the 
gender discrimination with regard to training access is not observed in the panel based 
on BHPS data.
With regard to the determinants of current promotion, it is estimated that 
for both men and women training is significantly associated with the likelihood of 
promotion and that previous training, one to three years ago, is rather irrelevant for 
recent promotion. Also, previous promotions (but mostly promotions with current 
employer for male) generate further promotion. This chapter finds little evidence in 
support of the expectation that women are discriminated against with regard to 
promotion prospects with current employer. The difference between genders is 
modest and statistically insignificant. Results from a bivariate model that assumes 
endogeneity of training and promotion reinforce the findings from the two 
independent probit models.
The estimation of the real wage levels as they change over time shows that 
recent training does not translate into higher wage levels in the same period of time. 
For both men and women, there is however significant evidence that previous training 
spells are reflected in higher wages levels. Finally, with regard to returns to recent 
promotion, wage growth for promoted women is shown to only be lower than for 
promoted men in the case of women in professional occupations. This finding could 
hide unobserved discrepancies in the quality of the starting jobs and/or in the level of 
the labour market entrance wage for women. Both men and women enjoy positive
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returns to previous promotions awarded by the current employer. However, neither 
men nor women who were promoted with a previous employer one to two years ago 
continue to experience a post-promotion wage effect contemporaneously. This may 
suggest the prevalence of up-or-out contracts in some organisations, and could imply 
adverse job switching effects occur.
The broad conclusion of this thesis is that certain practices appear to be 
contingent to a type of person, job or company characteristic, whereas others, such as 
training and learning, pay equality, or communication and consultation, tend to have a 
stronger and consistently positive impact on performance. This thesis can be seen as a 
stepping stone on the path towards enhancing the existing understanding of the way in 
which HRM practices impact on performance. Its results can be interpreted as a vivid 
reminder that future research could continue to investigate this relatively new labour 
economics area in order for the complexity of the issues involved to become even 
more transparent.
Every new study into the HRM-performance relationship should be 
welcome, and action should be taken in order to encourage the further development of 
research in this area of crucial importance to the future of British organisations. 
Those who stand to benefit from an increased knowledge, are not only practitioners 
who can obtain increased productivity and competitiveness, but also employees who 
can work in a more satisfactory and performance-enhancing environment. Thus, the 
research agenda supported by this thesis can also contribute to the wider aim of 




Appendix A.l Suggesting a taxonomy of performance measures 












- Profits (pre and 
post-tax returns on 
investment, returns 
on assets, stock 
price)
- Capital market 
assessments
- Market share
- Stature and 
reputation






assumptions and deduction description and induction
scientific holistic
how to resolve conflicting interests how to determine cooperative solutions
Appendix A.3 Attempting a taxonomy of HRM measures using work organisation
(source: Hunter and Hit 200 : 33)
Low Flexibility High Flexibility
Low Discretion Taylorist Bureaucracy Cross-Trained Group
High Discretion High-Discretion Specialists
High-Performance
Workplace
Appendix A.4 Attempting a taxonomy 




of HRM measures using the architectural 




bonuses, merit pay, 










assessed by: valid objective 
measures, 360 degree 
appraisal process, supported 
by selection systems, training 
systems
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Appendix A.5 Attempting a taxonomy of HRM measures using a hierarchy of
four HRM systems of practices
(adapted from: Ichniowski et al 1997 : 296 - 298)




HRM  system 2:
Like HRM  system 
1, but with 
improvements in:
HRM  system 3:
Like HRM  system 2, 
(lacking one or more 
o f the practices 
between brackets) but 
with improvements in:
H RM  system 4:
Most innovative, 
incorporates 
innovative HRM  
practices in all areas
close supervision initiation of worker involvement
high level of worker 
involvement
high level of worker 
involvement
strict work rules 
and narrow job 
responsibilities
like HRM system 1
(lack of job rotation or 
reduced job 
classifications)
job duties covering 






like HRM system 1 (lack of multi-attribute incentive pay)
multi-attribute 






















no screening like HRM system 1
(lack of extensive 
screening)
extensive screening 
of new workers, often 
lasting one year
no off-line or 
other formal 
training
like HRM system 1 extensive skills training
off-line training in 
technical skills and 
team problem solving





Appendix A.6 Seven practices of successful organisations 
(adapted from Pfeffer 1998, Chapter 3)
1. Selective hiring of new personnel;
2. Job security;
3. Extensive training;
4. Self-managed teams and decentralisation of decision-making as the basic
principles of organisational design;
5. Reduced status distinctions and barriers (including dress, language, office
arrangements, and wage differences across levels);
6. Comparatively high compensation contingent on organisational performance;
7. Extensive sharing of financial and performance information throughout the 
organisation.
Appendix A.7 ‘The downward performance spiral’ 




-lousy customer service 
-low stock price
Individual behaviours:
-decreased motivation and effort 
-more accidents 
-more turnover 





-salary freeze or reduction 
-use of part-time & contract labour 
-freeze on hiring and promotions
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Appendix A.8 Changes in the management of employees in Britain as reflected by 
the WIRS series (1980-1998) (source: Cully et al 1999):
1. the presence of a personnel specialist - the number of workplaces with a personnel 
specialist increase by a third in the past decade;
2. lower integration of employee relations with strategic objectives as the number of 
workplaces with a personnel specialist on board fell from nearly a half in 1990 (47%) 
to a little more than a third in 1998 (36%) Cully et al 1999 : 225;
3. the roles of specialists and non-specialist remained different (specialists are more 
likely to deal with pay or conditions for employment and less likely to deal with 
training), with little change in specialists’ roles, and an increase in responsibilities for 
non-specialists (especially increase in pay, conditions for employment and grievances);
4. communication with the workforce. Systematic use of the management chain for 
communicating with employees was the most used channel of communication. Second 
most used channel was newsletters distributed to all employees. These two channels 
continued to be the most used in the survey series;
5. no major changes in information given to employees. A slow increase in distributing 
information about the financial position of the workplace and of the organization was 
noticed. However, there remained workplaces were, according to managers, very little 
information was shared (Cully et al 1999 : 231);
6. financial participation: only the incidence of profit-sharing and of share ownership 
schemes is explored and it is found to have declined in the 1990s;
7. trade unions: unionised workplaces (halved), trade union memberships (halved) 
union recognition (fallen by a third), compulsory union membership arrangements 
disappeared (e.g. the closed shop was made illegal during the past decade). However, 
union representation has a constant presence in the past decade (Cully et al 1999 : 
246);
8. workplace conflict - decreased sharply to an average number of industrial actions of 
only 2 in 100 workplaces and 6% of workplaces experiencing industrial action of any 
kind in the past five years (Cully et al 1999 : 298).
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Appendix B
Appendix B.l. Comparison of WERS 1998 and CERS 2000 datasets 
(only aspects where differences occur are presented here below)
WERS CERS




• WERS contains slightly more young respondents (age less than 24): 
11% compared to 7 % in CERS;
• WERS has less people in the lower-prime age group (41%) as opposed 
to CERS (46%);
• Otherwise, the age distributions are similar, with the majority of 
people being in their lower-prime years.




• WERS and CERS samples include exactly the same percentage of 
respondents with no educational qualification (22%), and with less 
than an A-level qualifications (37%). In both datasets, the latter is the 
largest group;
• However, WERS contains a lower percentage of respondents with 
degrees or higher degrees (25% in WERS as opposed to CERS 31%), 
and has relatively more respondents with A-level than CERS (16% in 
WERS as opposed to 10% in CERS).
4. Level o f  
skill
At a first glance, the distributions of respondents in both sample seems 
similar:
- the largest group: intermediate, managerial or technical positions; and
- the smallest group: the unskilled.
However, WERS has a more evenly spread distribution (lower kurtosis) 
as opposed to CERS. This becomes evident, for instance, by a more- 
than-double difference in the percentages of respondents at the two 
extremes:
- there are more professionals in WERS (WERS 17%, CERS 7%); and
- there are more unskilled in WERS (WERS 10%, CERS 4%).
5. Union 
membership
Relatively more respondents in WERS (41%) than in CERS (31%) are 
union members.
Workplace characteristics
Workplace size: WERS includes more large workplaces than CERS.
• 54% of workpalces in WERS employ over 100 employees compared to only 39% in 
CERS.
• The largest group of workplaces, by size, has between 100 and 500 employees (40%) 
in WERS. By contrast, in the CERS sample, the workplace size distribution peaks 
both at the ‘between 100 and 500’ size level (19.75% workplaces) and at the 
‘between 0 and 10’ workplace size level (20.03%).
These differences are explained by the design of the WERS survey. Unlike CERS, 
which has the advantage of including all sizes of workplaces, WERS survey is limited to 
workplaces employing > 10 employees. This is one of the drawbacks of WERS. Hence, 
the study of CERS can be seen as completing the view offered by WERS with regard to 
the base variable in the models, namely workplace size between 0 and 10 employees.
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W ork organisa tion  & su p erv isio n
Working in groups or teams 0.59 0.49
Individual performance differentiated from peer 0.78 0.41
Employee can be seen all the time by supervisor or manager 0.50 0.50
Work progress can be visually assessed 0.53 0.50
E m ployee  invo lvem en t /  voice
Information is disseminated in workplace 0.78 0.41
Employee is part o f  an improvement group 0.30 0.46
Workplace has a formal suggestion scheme 0.36 0.48
Management holds meetings were employees can express their 0.69 0.46
view s
R ecru itm en t & se lec tion
Initial pay is negotiable 0.29 0.45
Train ing  & learn ing
Education or training paid by employer in the past 2 years 0.52 0.50
Job requires on-going learning 0.83 0.38
S en io r ity -b a sed  p a y
Pay is related to tenure 0.40 0.49
P er fo rm a n ce-re la ted  p a y
Incentive payment based on own performance 0.22 0.42
Incentive payment based on team performance 0.17 0.37
Incentive payment based on company performance 0.26 0.44
Participating in a profit-share scheme or share (option) scheme 0.15 0.36
P ercep tion  o f  ow n p a y
own pay is relatively high 0.09 0.29
own pay is reasonably similar 0.58 0.49
own pay is relatively low 0.32 0.47
E ffec t o f  p e rc e iv e d  w o rkp lace  inequality  on p erfo rm a n ce
pay gap is much too big 0.22 0.42
pay gap is too big 0.29 0.45
pay gap is about right 0.45 0.50
pay gap is too small 0.03 0.18





EMPLOYEE, JOB AND WORKPLACE CHARACTERISTICS
E m ployee  characteristics
Age 39.05 10.60
Age squared 1636.88 848.87
Gender (m ale= l) 0.48 0.50
Marital status
Married, living with spouse 0.65 0.48
Separated, or divorced, or widowed 0.14 0.34
Single 0.22 0.41
Number o f  children under 16 living with respondent
One child 0.19 0.40
Two children 0.17 0.38
More than two children 0.06 0.24
N o children 0.57 0.50
Highest educational qualification
Degree or higher degree 0.31 0.46
A -level (or equivalent) 0.10 0.30
Less than A-level 0.37 0.48
no qualification 0.31 0.46
Level o f  skill
Professional 0.10 0.30
Managerial and technical 0.31 0.46
Skilled non-manual 0.24 0.43
Skilled manual 0.19 0.39
Partly skilled/semi-skilled 0.15 0.36
Unskilled 0.04 0.20
Union member 0.31 0.46
Jo b  characteristics
Contract status
Permanent full-time 0.71 0.45
Permanent part-time 0.20 0.40
Fixed term, temporary 0.09 0.28
W orkplace characteristics
Size (number o f  employees)
> 1000 0.12 0.32
5 0 0 - 9 9 9 0.07 0.25
1 0 0 -4 9 9 0.20 0.40
5 0 - 9 9 0.11 0.31
2 5 - 4 9 0.15 0.35
2 0 - 2 4 0.07 0.25
1 1 - 1 9 0.09 0.29






Appendix B.3 Sample means and standard deviations
CERS WERS
Mean St. dev. Mean St. dev.
Teamwork
HRM PRACTICES
W ork organisa tion  & su p erv ision  
0.60 0.49 0.89 0.31
Supervision o f  work progress 0.52 0.50 0.27 0.44
Constant supervision 0.50 0.50 Na na
Notice boards
E m ployee  invo lvem en t /  vo ice
In form ation  d issem ina tion  
0.58 0.49 0.93 0.26
newsletter or magazine 0.62 0.49 0.75 0.43
email or website 0.42 0.49 0.49 0.50
improvement groups
In vo lvem en t in decision  m aking  
0.33 0.47 0.50 0.50
Formal suggestion schemes 0.39 0.49 0.28 0.45
meetings where employees can 0.71 0.45 0.87 0.34
express their views
R ecru itm en t & se lec tion  
Management asks employees about 0.29 0.45 0.27 0.44
pay
Tra in ing  & lea rn in g  
Both training and skill development 0.50 0.50 0.39 0.49
are encouraged
Either training or skill development 0.39 0.49 0.38 0.49
is encouraged 
Neither training nor skill 0.11 0.31 0.23 0.42
development are encouraged 
Pay based on tenure
S en io r ity -b a sed  p a y  
0.40 0.49 0.52 0.50
Performance-related pay Na Na 0.27 0.44
Own performance 0.24 0.43 na na
Team performance 0.19 0.39 na na
Company performance 0.29 0.46 na na
Profit sharing/ option schemes 0.17 0.38 0.45 0.50
Pay gap is small
P erce ived  w orkp lace  inequality  
Na Na 0.01 0.12
pay gap is much too big 0.23 0.42 na na
pay gap is too big 0.29 0.45 na na
pay gap is about right 0.48 0.50 na na
pay gap is too small 0.02 0.17 na na
pay gap is much too small 0.01 0.07 na na
job tasks
J o b  a u to n o m y -  in fluence over... 
0.64 0.48 0.66 0.47
pace o f  work 0.79 0.41 0.71 0.45




Mean St. dev. M ean St. dev.
EM PLO YEE, JO B AND W ORKPLACE C H A RA CTERISTIC S
E m ployee characteristics
Age 18 -  24 0.08 0.27 0.11 0.32
2 5 - 3 9 0.47 0.50 0.43 0.49
4 0 - 4 9 0.25 0.43 0.26 0.44
50 or over 50 0.21 0.40 0.20 0.40
Gender (l=m ale) 0.50 0.50 0.52 0.50
Married living with spouse 0.64 0.48 0.70 0.46
Separated, divorced, or widowed 0.14 0.34 0.08 0.27
Single 0.23 0.42 0.22 0.42
No children 0.58 0.49 0.59 0.49
One child 0.20 0.40 0.30 0.46
Two children 0.17 0.37 0.11 0.31
More than two children 0.05 0.23 0.01 0.07
Degree or higher degree 0.33 0.47 0.28 0.45
A-level or equivalent 0.10 0.31 0.17 0.38
Qualification less than A-level 0.36 0.48 0.37 0.48
No qualification 0.20 0.40 0.19 0.39
Professional 0.07 0.25 0.18 0.38
Managerial/intermediate technical 0.34 0.47 0.22 0.42
Skilled non-manual 0.23 0.42 0.21 0.41
Skilled manual 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36
Partly skilled /semi-skilled 0.14 0.35 0.15 0.36
Unskilled 0.03 0.18 0.08 0.28
Union member 0.35 0.48 0.40 0.49
Jo b  charac teristics
Permanent full-time contract 0.76 0.43 0.75 0.43
Permanent part-time 0.17 0.37 0.17 0.38
Not permanent 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.27
W orkplace characteristics
Workplace size (No. o f  employees)
> 1000 0.13 0.34 0.05 0.22
5 0 0 - 9 9 9 0.08 0.27 0.09 0.28
1 0 0 -4 9 9 0.21 0.41 0.40 0.49
5 0 - 9 9 0.11 0.32 0.19 0.40
2 5 - 4 9 0.14 0.34 0.19 0.39
20-24 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.18
10-19 0.09 0.29 0.04 0.21
1-10 0.18 0.39 na na
Public sector workplace 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47
Private sector 0.65 0.48 0.39 0.49
Other 0.04 0.21 0.28 0.45
313
Appendix B.4 Construction of the HRM variables from CERS and WERS
W ork organisa tion  a n d  su p erv isio n
CERS: Teamwork: employee is part 
o f  a team
WERS: Teamwork incidence in the 
workplace
CERS: Employee reports that work 
progress can be visually assessed 
WERS: Supervision o f  work 
progress used as a practice in the 
workplace
CERS: Employees report they can 
be seen all the time by supervisor or 
manager 
WERS: -
Employee is asked: Excluding any supervisor or manager you work for, 
do you usually work in a group or team with two or more other people? 
HR Manager is asked: What proportion, if  any, o f  [employees in the 
largest occupational group] at this workplace work in formally 
designated teams?
Coded 1 for teamwork, 0 for no employees working in teams.
Employee is asked: Most o f  the time, can your supervisor or manager 
tell at a glance how your work is progressing?
HR Manager is asked: what are the main methods by which logs are 
made aware o f  their job responsibilities?
Coded 1 for supervision amongst the first three answers to this question 
(i.e. amongst the main three methods used in the organisation). 
Employee is asked: Do you carry out your work in a place where you 
can be seen all the time by a supervisor or manager?
Variable not available in the dataset.
E m ployee  in vo lvem en t/ vo ice
In form ation  d issem ina tion
CERS: notice boards 
WERS: notice boards
CERS: newsletter or magazine: 
combination o f
WERS: newsletter or magazine
CERS: e-mail or website 
WERS: e-mail
Employee is asked: Does your employer give you news o f  what is 
happening in the organisation by any o f  the methods on this card? 
notice boards
Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace? 
notice boards
Coded 1 if  notice boards are used, 0 if  notice boards are ‘not used here’ 
Employee is asked: Does your employer give you news o f  what is 
happening in the organisation by any o f  the methods on this card? 
news-sheet, internal newspaper or magazine
Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace? 
newsletters or magazines
Coded 1 if  newsletters or magazines are used, 0 if newsletters or 
magazines are ‘not used here’
Employee is asked: Does your employer give you news o f  what is 
happening in the organisation by any o f  the methods on this card? 
web-site or internal e-mails
Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping
up-to-date about this workplace?
e-mail
Coded 1 if  notice e-mail is used, 0 if  e-mail is ‘not used here’.
In vo lvem en t in decision  m aking
CERS: Employee as part o f an 
improvement group
WERS: Incidence o f  improvement 
groups in the workplace
CERS: Workplace has a formal 
suggestion scheme 
WERS: Workplace has a formal 
suggestion scheme
Employee is asked: Some organisations have groups o f  employees who 
meet regularly to think o f  improvements that could be made within the 
organisation. Are you involved in such a group?
HR manager is asked: Do you have groups at this workplace that solve 
specific problems or discuss aspects o f  performance or quality? They 
are sometimes known as quality circles or problem-solving groups or 
continuous improvement groups.
Employee is asked: Does your employer have a formal suggestion 
scheme?
HR manager is asked: Do you have any channels through which 
employees can make suggestions for improving working methods? 
Coded 1 for suggestion schemes.
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Appendix B.4 (continued)
CERS: Management holds meetings 
were employees can express their 
views
WERS: Management holds 
meetings were employees can 
express their views
Employee is asked: Does management hold meetings in which you can 
express your views about what is happening in the organisation?
A combination of:
Employee is asked: How helpful do you find the following in keeping 
up-to-date about this workplace? 
meetings of managers and employees
Coded 1 if notice meetings are used, 0 if meetings are ‘not used here’, 
and
Employee is asked: How good would you say managers here are at the 
following: providing everyone with the chance to comment on proposed 
changes?
Coded 1 for ‘very good’ and ‘good’, 0 for the rest.
The combined variable is coded 1 if both variables above are 1.
F in a n c ia l involvem ent, R ecru itm en t & se lec tio n
CERS: Employee is part of a profit- 
share scheme or share (option) 
scheme
WERS: Incidence of profit-sharing 
scheme or share ownership schemes 
in the workplace
CERS: Initial pay is negotiable
WERS: Frequency of being asked 
about pay issues
Employee is asked: Do you participate in profit-sharing scheme or share 
(option) scheme?
HR manager is asked: Do any employees at this workplace receive 
payments or dividends from any of the following variable pay schemes?
1. Profit-related payments or bonuses
2. Deferred profit sharing scheme
3. Employee share ownership schemes 
Coded 1 i f ‘yes’ at any of the three above.
Employee is asked: When you entered your present job, were you able 
to negotiate personally with your employer over the pay they were 
offering you?
Employee is asked: How often are you and others working here asked 
by managers for your views on the following? 
pay issues
Coded 1 for frequently and sometimes, 0 for hardly ever and never.
T rain ing  & lea rn in g
CERS: Both/Either/Neither 
training and skill development are 
encouraged :
education or training paid by 
employer in the past 2 years
job requires on-going learning
WERS: Both/ Either/ Neither 
training and skill development are 
encouraged
training paid or organised by the 
employer in the last year
encouragement o f skill development 
in the workplace
Combination of the variables in the two rows below:
Employee is asked: Have you received any education or training 
provided or paid for by your current employer, in the last 2 years? 
Please include any education or training which is still continuing. 
Employee is asked: Statements about job: My job requires that I keep 
learning new things.
Combination of the variables in the two rows below:
Employee is asked: During the last 12 months, how much training have 
you had, either paid for or organised by your employer?
Coded 1 for any training, 0 for none.
Employee is asked: Do you agree or disagree, with the following 
statements about working here?
people working here are encouraged to develop their skills 
Coded 1 for strongly agree and agree, 0 for the rest.
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Appendix B.4 (continued)
P ay pra c tices
S en io r ity -b a sed  p a y
CERS: Use o f pay based on tenure 
in the workplace
WERS: Use o f pay structures based 
on tenure in the workplace
Employee is asked: How true is it that the organisation rewards 
employees who have worked there a long time?
HR manager is asked: Which, if any, o f the factors listed on this card 
explain the differences between actual pay levels o f fulltime [employees 
in the largest group] at this workplace? 
age of employees, years of service
P erfo rm a n ce-re la ted  p a y
CERS: Performance-related pay 
Incentive payment based on own 
performance
Incentive payment based on team 
performance
Incentive payment based on 
company performance 
WERS: Incidence of performance- 
related pay in the workplace
Employee is asked: Do you receive any incentive payment, bonus or 
commission based on your own performance?
Employee is asked: Do you receive any incentive payment, bonus or 
commission based on team performance?
Employee is asked: Do you receive any incentive payment, bonus or 
commission based on organisational performance?
HR manager is asked: Do any employees at this workplace receive 
payments or dividends from any o f the following variable pay schemes? 
Individual or group performance-related schemes
P erce ived  w orkp lace  inequality
CERS: Pay equality 
WERS: Pay equality
Employee is asked: Thinking of the highest and the lowest paid people 
at your place of work, how would you describe the gap between their 
pay, as far as you know? Pay gap is much too big / pay gap is too big / 
pay gap is about right / pay gap is too small / pay gap is much too small 
HR manager is asked: Which, if any, of the factors listed on this card 
explain the differences between actual pay levels o f fulltime [employees 
in the largest group] at this workplace? None.
I f ‘none’ above, checking again: So, all full-time [employees in the 
largest group] receive the same amount of pay?
Coded 1 if the answer is Yes.
P ercep tion  o f  re la tive  incom e
CERS: Perception o f relative 
income:
WERS: -
Employee is asked: How would you describe wages or salary paid? 
own pay is relatively high / own pay is reasonably similar / own pay is 
relatively low.
Variable not available in the dataset.
J o b  au tonom y- in fluence over
CERS: job tasks 
WERS: job tasks 
CERS: pace of work 
WERS: pace o f work 
CERS: how job is done
WERS: how job is done
Employee is asked: Do you decide the specific tasks that you carry out 
from day to day or does someone else?
Coded 1 for employee, 0 for someone else.
Employee is asked: In general, how much influence do you have about
the following: the range of tasks you do in your job
Coded 1 for ‘a lot’ and ‘some’, 0 for the ‘a little’ and ‘none’.
Employee is asked: Does someone else decide how much work you do 
or how fast you work during the day?
Coded 1 for employee, 0 for someone else.
Employee is asked: Employee is asked: In general, how much influence 
do you have about the following: the pace at which you work 
Coded 1 for ‘a lot’ and ‘some’, 0 for the ‘a little’ and ‘none’.
Employee is asked: Is yours a job which allows you to design and plan 
important aspects of your own work or is your work largely defined for 
you?
Coded 1 for yes.
Employee is asked: Employee is asked: In general, how much influence 
do you have about the following: how you do your work 
Coded 1 for ‘a lot’ and ‘some’, 0 for the ‘a little’ and ‘none’.
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Appendix B.5 Construction of dependent variables in CERS and in WERS, for the 
binary and ordinal probit models
Panel 1 The distribution of overall job satisfaction: original and recoded variables (CERS)
Original dataset variable Binomial variable Ordinal variable
Value and answer Obs. % Value Obs. % Value Obs. %
1 Completely satisfied 230 10.79 1
satisfied
5 230 10.79
2 Very satisfied 730 34.24 1,791 84.01 4 730 34.24
3 Satisfied 831 38.98 3 831 38.98
4 Neutral 164 7.69 0 2 164 7.69
5 Dissatisfied 117 5.49 neutral or 331 15.53 16 Very dissatisfied 26 1.22 not dis­ 167 7.84
7 Completely dissatisfied 24 1.13 satisfied satisfied
8 No answer or 
‘I don’t know’ 10 0.47 missing 10 0.47 missing 10 0.47
Total 2,132 100.00 2,132 100.00 2,132 100.00
Mean 2.73 0.74 3.33
Standard deviation 1.18 0.36 1.03
Panel 2 The distribution of satisfaction with pay: original and recoded variables (CERS)
Original dataset variable Binomial variable Ordinal variable
Value and answer Obs. % Value Obs. % Value Obs. %
1 Completely satisfied 59 2.77 1
satisfied
5 59 2.77
2 Very satisfied 215 10.08 1,250 58.63 4 215 10.08
3 Satisfied 976 45.78 3 976 45.78
4 Neutral 301 14.12 0 2 301 14.12
5 Dissatisfied 403 18.90 neutral or 869 40.76 1
6 Very dissatisfied 101 4.74 not dis­ 568 26.64
7 Completely dissatisfied 64 3.00 satisfied satisfied
8 or 9 No answer or 
‘I don’t know’ 13 0.61
missing 13 0.61 missing 13 0.61
Total 2,132 100.00 2,132 100.00 2,132 100.00
Mean 3.66 0.59 2.48
St. dev. 1.34 0.49 1.08
Panel 3 The distribution of satisfaction with pay: original and recoded variables (WERS)
Original dataset variable 





1 Very satisfied 969 3.43 1 9,972 35.34 5 969 3.43
2 Satisfied 9,003 31.91 satisfied 4 9,003 31.91
3 Neutral 6,561 23.25 0 3 6,561 23.25
4 Dissatisfied 7,879 27.92 neutral 17,917 63.49 2 7,879 27.92




6 or 7 No answer or 
‘I don’t know’ 326








































(n) (A) (B) (C) (D) = (n)x(A) (E) (F)
1 23 1.29 1.29 23 0.08 0.08
2 18 1.01 2.30 36 0.13 0.21
3 23 1.29 3.59 69 0.24 0.45
4 27 1.52 5.11 108 0.38 0.84
5 22 1.23 6.34 110 0.39 1.23
6 37 2.08 8.42 222 0.79 2.01
7 49 2.75 11.17 343 1.22 3.23
8 35 1.96 13.13 280 0.99 4.22
9 49 2.75 15.88 441 1.56 5.78
10 74 4.15 20.03 740 2.62 8.41
11 59 3.31 23.34 649 2.30 10.71
12 64 3.59 26.94 768 2.72 13.43
13 62 3.48 30.42 806 2.86 16.29
14 95 5.33 35.75 1,330 4.71 21.00
15 94 5.27 41.02 1,410 5.00 26.00
16 113 6.34 47.36 1,808 6.41 32.40
17 131 7.35 54.71 2,227 7.89 40.30
18 117 6.57 61.28 2,106 7.46 47.76
19 141 7.91 69.19 2,679 9.49 57.26
20 112 6.29 75.48 2,240 7.94 65.20
21 127 7.13 82.60 2,667 9.45 74.65
22 113 6.34 88.95 2,486 8.81 83.46
23 94 5.27 94.22 2,162 7.66 91.12
24 70 3.93 98.15 1,680 5.95 97.08








Appendix C.2 Composition o f sample by number o f respondents per workplace
39% o f  companies
20% o f  companies
41% o f  companies
□  companies with 1-10 
respondents 
(contributing 6% o f  
employees in sample)
H companies with 11-18 
respondents 
(contributing 42% o f  
employees in sample)
□ companies with 19-25 
respondents 
(contributing 52% o f  
employees in sample)
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Appendix C.3 Variable definitions and means
D ependent variables Table Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Emp.: Job requires that I work hard Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 
4.4 27735 1.06 0.71 0 2
Mgr.: How hard people work here Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, 
4.4 24719 1.13 0.75 0 2
HRM  practices (Independent variables) Type o f variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
System 1 (Had Trained, Consultation, 
Control over job, and Pay related to Factor Analysis cluster
Factor Analysis 
cluster
28215 0.16 0.37 0 1
Performance)
System 2 (Had Trained, Consultation, but 
not both of Control over job & Pay related 28215 0.23 0.42 0 1
to performance)




Mgr.: Competency standards used to make 




28145 0.40 0.49 0 1
Mgr.: Emps. asked to help outside job 
descriptions
Mgr.: Ind. objectives (used to make emps. 


















Appendix C.3 Variable definitions and means. Ctnd.
H R M  practices (Independent variables) Type o f variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
28126 0.75 0.44 0 1
28135 0.58 0.49 0 1
28154 0.64 0.48 0 1
28126 0.43 0.49 0 1
28104 0.72 0.45 0 1
28113 0.86 0.35 0 1
27913 0.55 0.50 0 1
27854 0.29 0.45 0 1
28173 0.58 0.49 0 1
28173 0.05 0.22 0 1
28173 0.59 0.49 0 1
28173 0.49 0.50 0 1
28173 0.91 0.28 0 1
28173 0.69 0.46 0 1
28171 0.85 0.36 0 1
27513 0.44 0.50 0 1
26665 0.33 0.47 0 1
28204 0.39 0.49 0 1
28191 0.73 0.44 0 1
28194 0.59 0.49 0 1
27853 0.96 0.20 0 1
Mgr.: Job descriptions (used to make emps. 
aware o f job responsibilities)
Mgr.: Staff manual (used to make emps. 
aware o f job responsibilities)
Mgr.: Standard operational procedures 
(used to make emps. aware of job 
responsibilities)
Mgr.: Team objectives (used to make emps. 
aware o f job responsibilities)
Mgr.: Teamwork in over 60% of staff 
Mgr.: Workplace has strategic plan 
Mgr.: Workplace uses benchmarking
Mgr.: Workplace uses just-in-time systems
Mgr.: Quality monitored via customer 
surveys
Mgr.: Quality monitored via external 
auditors
Mgr.: Quality monitored via individual 
employees
Mgr.: Quality monitored via inspectors
Mgr.: Quality monitored via 
manager/supervisor
Mgr.: Quality monitored via records on 
fault/complaints
Mgr.: Supervision (used to make empl. 
aware o f job responsibilities)
Emp.: Mgt. keeps every one up to date with 
changes
Emp.: Mgt. responds to employee 
suggestions
Mgr.: Communication or consultation via 
meetings
Mgr.: Emps. informed about establishment 
finance
Mgr.: Emps. informed about internal 
investment plans
Emp.: Information dissemination: 














































3 Communication  
3 Communication  
3 Communication  
3 Communication  
3 Communication  
3 Com m unication
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Appendix C.3 Variable definitions and means. Ctnd.
H R M  practices (Independent variables) Type o f variable Obs. Mean St. Dev. M in M ax
Mgr.: Briefings are used 3 Communication 28169 0.91 0.29 0 1
Mgr.: Quality/Problem-solving/Cont. 
Improv. Groups are used 3 Communication 28155 0.50
0.50 0 1
Mgr.: Suggestion schemes used 3 Communication 28215 0.28 0.45 0 1
Emp.: Consulted over at least one job 
aspect
Mgr.: Not making changes without 
consulting with employees
3 Consultation 28051 0.53 0.50 0 1
3 Consultation 28192 0.72 0.45 0 1
Mgr.: A change in organisational 
performance had an upward effect on pay
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
27199 0.61 0.49 0 1
Mgr.: 4 weeks or more paid annual leave 
available
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28210 0.93 0.26 0 1
Mgr.: Employer pension scheme available
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28210 0.83 0.37 0 1
Mgr.: Pay varies according to: hours 
worked
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28116 0.70 0.46 0 1
Mgr.: Pay varies according to: skill/core 
competencies
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28133 0.86 0.34 0 1
Mgr.: Pay varies according to: tenure
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28133 0.51 0.50 0 1
Mgr.: Performance related pay
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28193 0.26 0.44 0 1
Mgr.: Profit-related pay, Profit sharing or 
ESOP
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28193 0.43 0.50 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace has pay equality
4 Pecuniary other 
than wage
28141 0.02 0.13 0 1
Emp.: Has job autonomy
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
28215 0.54 0.50 0 1
Emp.: Flexible working hours available
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
27666 0.34 0.47 0 1
Emp.: Job sharing available
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
27666 0.18 0.38 0 1
Emp.: Parental leave available
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
27666 0.28 0.45 0 1
Emp.: Working at home available
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
27666 0.11 0.32 0 1
Mgr.: Emps. have job control
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
28102 0.62 0.48 0 1
Mgr.: Option of working from home 
available
5 Non-pecuniary: 1 
flexibility
28180 0.47 0.50 0 1
Mgr.: Emps. have guaranteed job security
5 Non-pecuniary: 2 
job security
28093 0.17 0.37 0 1
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Appendix C.3 Variable definitions and means. Ctnd.
H RM  practices (Independent variables) Type o f variable Obs. M ean St. Dev. Min M ax
Mgr.: Company car or car allowance 
available
Mgr.: Private health insurance available
Mgr.: Sick pay in excess o f statutory 
available
Emp.: Either training or skill development 
is encouraged
Emp.: Neither training nor skill 
development is encouraged 
Mgr.: Induction (used to make emps. aware 
ofjob responsibilities)
Mgr.: Over 40% of staff had off-the-job 
training
Mgr.: Recruitment tests are used 
Mgr.: Workplace accredited as an Investor 
in People
Mgr:. Over 60% of supervisors trained in 
people mgt. skills_______________________
5 Non-pecuniary: 3 
more recent policies 
5 Non-pecuniary: 3 
more recent policies 









28215 0.20 0.40 0
28215 0.18 0.38 0
28215 0.80 0.40 0
27210 0.38 0.49 0
27210 0.28 0.42 0
28135 0.83 0.37 0
27750 0.55 0.50 0
28180 0.33 0.47 0
27391 0.35 0.48 0
25532 0.42 0.49 0
Appendix C.4 Variable definitions and means: employee, job and workplace 
characteristics
E m ployee, job  and workplace 
characteristics
Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Emp. Female 28161 0.51 0.50 0 1
Emp. Young (16-24) 28153 0.11 0.32 0 1
Emp. Lower prime (25-39) 28153 0.40 0.49 0 1
Emp. Upper prime (40-49) 28153 0.26 0.44 0 1
Emp. Up to retirement (50-65) 28153 0.22 0.42 0 1
Emp. Separated/divorced/widowed 28095 0.09 0.28 0 1
Emp. Single 28095 0.22 0.41 0 1
Emp. Married 28095 0.69 0.46 0 1
Emp. No dependent children 27598 0.59 0.49 0 1
Emp. Has children age 0-4 27598 0.14 0.34 0 1
Emp. Has children age 5-11 27598 0.19 0.39 0 1
Emp. Has children age 12-18 27598 0.20 0.40 0 1
Emp. Ethnic background other than white 28048 0.04 0.20 0 1
Emp. Degree or higher 27979 0.25 0.44 0 1
Emp. A-level 27979 0.16 0.37 0 1
Emp. Less than A-level 27979 0.37 0.48 0 1
Emp. No qualifications 27979 0.22 0.41 0 1
Emp. Has vocational qualifications 27734 0.38 0.48 0 1
Emp. Professional 27518 0.17 0.38 0 1
Emp. Managerial 27518 0.11 0.31 0 1
Emp. Associated professional 27518 0.10 0.30 0 1
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Appendix C.4 Ctnd.
E m ployee, job  and workplace 
characteristics Obs. Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Emp.: Skilled non-manual 27518 0.21 0.40 0 1
Emp.: Skilled manual 27518 0.15 0.36 0 1
Emp. Partly skilled 27518 0.16 0.37 0 1
Emp.: Unskilled 27518 0.10 0.30 0 1
Emp.: Professional & 
Associated/Managerial 27518 0.38 0.49 0 1
Emp. Non-professional occupation 27518 0.62 0.49 0 1
Emp. I am a union member 28095 0.41 0.49 0 1
Emp. Tenure: under 1 year 28122 0.16 0.37 0 1
Emp. Tenure: 1 to 2 years 28122 0.12 0.33 0 1
Emp. Tenure: 2 to 5 years 28122 0.23 0.42 0 1
Emp. Tenure: 5 to 10 years 28122 0.22 0.41 0 1
Emp. Tenure: over 10 years 28122 0.26 0.44 0 1
Emp. Has an illness or a disability 28031 0.05 0.23 0 1
Emp. Permanent contract 28021 0.93 0.26 0 1
Emp. Temporary contract 28021 0.04 0.19 0 1
Emp. Fixed-term contract 28021 0.03 0.18 0 1
Emp. Part-time job 24534 0.23 0.42 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size: over 1000 28125 0.05 0.22 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 500-999 28125 0.09 0.28 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 100-499 28125 0.40 0.49 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 50-99 28125 0.19 0.40 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 25-49 28125 0.19 0.39 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 20-24 28125 0.03 0.18 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 10-19 28125 0.05 0.21 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size 20-49 28125 0.22 0.42 0 1
Mgr.: Workplace size: over 500 28125 0.14 0.34 0 1
Mgr.: Public sector 28215 0.35 0.48 0 1
Mgr.: Private sector 28215 0.65 0.48 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Production (Manufacturing, 28215 0.23 0.42 0 1
or Electricity, gas, water, or Construction) 
Mgr.: Sector: Hotels and restaurants & 28215 0.10 0.30 0 1
Transport and communication 
Mgr.: Sector: Wholesale and retail 28215 0.13 0.33 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Financial services 28215 0.06 0.23 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Other business services 28215 0.09 0.29 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Public administration 28215 0.10 0.30 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Education 28215 0.12 0.33 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Health 28215 0.12 0.33 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Other community services 28215 0.05 0.21 0 1
Mgr.: Sector: Financial/Other business 28215 0.15 0.35 0 1
services
Mgr.: In production sector 28197 0.20 0.40 0 1
Mgr.: Market is declining 28215 0.07 0.25 0 1




Selected studies on training and its economic consequences, listed by country
Country Selected studies
UK Booth 1991, Bartel 1995, Arulampalam and Booth 1997, Green and
Zanchi 1997, Green 1997, Black and Lynch 1998, Shields 1998, Green
1999, Whitfield 2000, Booth and Bryan 2002, Battu et al 2003, Booth et
al 2003, Grugulis 2003, Hoque 2003, Martin 2003, Sutherland 2004,
Vignoles et al 2004, Almeida-Santos and Mumford 2005, Collier et al
2005, Almeida-Santos and Mumford 2006, Dearden et al 2006, Gospel
and Foreman 2006. The most recent findings cited here (Dearden et al
2006), coming from several datasets (LFS, Annual Census of Production)
show that a 1% point increase in training increases hourly wages by
about 0.3 %.
Canada Cameron et al 2005
Germany Pischke 2001, Zwick 2004
Israel Harel and Tzafir 1999
Italy Conti 2005
Japan Owan 2004, Kawaguchi 2006
Thailand Ariga and Brunello 2006
USA Acemoglu and Pischke 1998, Frazis et al 1998, Burke and Baldwin 1999,
Pergamit and Veum 1999, Autor et al 2002, Ichniowski and Show 2002,
Paulson Gjerde 2002, Ichniowski et al 2003, Owan 2004
Appendix D.2
Selected studies on promotion, listed by country
Country Selected studies
UK Francesconi 2001, Booth et al 2003, Eguchi 2004, Melero 2004
Finland Pekkarinen and Vartiainen 2006
Japan Owan 2004
Spain Bayo-Moriones and Ortin-Angel (2006)
USA Hersch and Viscusi 1996, Landers et al 1996, Pergamit and Veum 1999,
Paulson Gjerde 2002, Owan 2004
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Appendix D.3
Distribution of panel data observations (spells of employment) by year
Year Frequency Percent Cumulative
frequency
1991 4,862 8.07 8.07
1992 4,519 7.50 15.57
1993 4,303 7.14 22.71
1994 4,347 7.21 29.93
1995 4,315 7.16 37.09
1996 4,514 7.49 44.58
1997 4,635 7.69 52.27
1998 5,151 8.55 60.82
1999 5,025 8.34 69.16
2000 5,006 8.31 77.47
2001 4,962 8.24 85.70
2002 4,344 7.21 92.91
2003 4,270 7.09 100.00
Total 60,253 100.00
Appendix D.4
Distribution of panel data observations by gender, sector and occupation
Sample total: 60,253
Men Women
Absolute Percentage Absolute Percentage
In sample 29,638 49.19 30,615 50.81
By gender, in 
private sector 23,406
55.89 
Of total men: 78.97
18,476 44.11Of total women: 60.35





Of total men: 38.42 9.840
46.36
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